It is now a cliché to say that we are in a new era of great power competition, but that does not mean it is untrue. America’s new national security strategy, the recently released national defense strategy and the imposition of draconian export controls on advanced computer chips and related technologies make it abundantly clear that the Biden administration sees China as a long-term strategic rival. Chinese President Xi Jinping and his associates seem to share a similar view. Fasten your seat belts: it’s going to be a bumpy ride.
Given this situation, how should we interpret the recent 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? It has provided professional China watchers with plenty to guzzle, including moments of drama such as the public humiliation of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. Xi won an unprecedented third term in power, consolidating his grip by appointing more loyalists to key positions, sidelining economically-oriented technocrats in favor of more statesman-oriented officials and likely setting himself up as president for life. As Kevin Rudd notes, economic growth and development are no longer the first priority; state security and maintaining the authority of the CCP are.
I’m hardly an expert on China, but I don’t necessarily understand that the relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries and the balance of power between them will have profound implications for many aspects of world politics. This raises the obvious question: What impact will the decisions made at the recent Party Congress have on the balance of power and competition between the US and China? Was what just happened in Beijing good news from the US point of view or not?
It is now a cliché to say that we are in a new era of great power competition, but that does not mean it is untrue. America’s new national security strategy, the recently released national defense strategy and the imposition of draconian export controls on advanced computer chips and related technologies make it abundantly clear that the Biden administration sees China as a long-term strategic rival. Chinese President Xi Jinping and his associates seem to share a similar view. Fasten your seat belts: it’s going to be a bumpy ride.
Given this situation, how should we interpret the recent 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? It has provided professional China watchers with plenty to guzzle, including moments of drama such as the public humiliation of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. Xi won an unprecedented third term in power, consolidating his grip by appointing more loyalists to key positions, sidelining economically-oriented technocrats in favor of more statesman-oriented officials and likely setting himself up as president for life. As Kevin Rudd notes, economic growth and development are no longer the first priority; state security and maintaining the authority of the CCP are.
I’m hardly an expert on China, but I don’t necessarily understand that the relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries and the balance of power between them will have profound implications for many aspects of world politics. This raises the obvious question: What impact will the decisions made at the recent Party Congress have on the balance of power and competition between the US and China? Was what just happened in Beijing good news from the US point of view or not?
My problem is that I can tell you two stories about this event: one that should put Americans at ease somewhat, and one that should make us increasingly nervous. To make matters worse, these conflicting stories are not mutually exclusive and may even be mutually reinforcing.
Let’s start with a good story as seen from the US perspective.
What happened in Beijing suggests that China is now returning to the same kind of one-man rule that delayed becoming a great power for decades. China already faces considerable headwinds – a slowing economy, an aging population and shrinking workforce, and growing international concern about its power and ambitions. Some of these developments were inevitable (e.g., growth always slows as economies mature, and demographic imbalances cannot be fixed overnight), but they were exacerbated by Xi’s rigid no-Covid policy, his crackdown on China’s high-flying tech sector, and his bellicose » wolf warrior” approach to foreign policy that China has adopted under Xi. And China’s problems go beyond US efforts to limit access to technology; Asian and European countries have also become increasingly cautious about close economic ties with China. Although German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and others are still pushing to keep that door open, broader trends (including the European Union’s decision to end a previously negotiated investment agreement) suggest that the openness that enabled China’s rapid rise is beginning to to close.
With these unfavorable developments, the recent party congress might have been an opportunity for an interim correction, but the opposite happened. Xi elevated state officials above more economically oriented technocrats, filled the top leadership with loyal cronies and continued his campaign to establish himself as a leader on par with Mao Zedong.
This may be bad news for Chinese companies and ordinary Chinese citizens, but it could be good news for the United States, as Mao was in many ways a disaster for China. He may have been a brilliant revolutionary leader and war strategist, but he had no idea how to run an economy or establish the material foundations for lasting global influence. His largely unchallenged leadership left China’s enormous potential untapped for decades, leading directly to disasters such as the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, and causing enormous human suffering, almost entirely within China itself. It was only after Mao died and his policies were abandoned that China began its remarkable rise. Mao’s successors were aware of the dangers of relying on a single, “infallible” leader, tried to enforce the principles of collective leadership and prevent a tragic repetition of past follies.
Under Xi, however, China is heading back in a different direction. Open criticism of Xi is now effectively impossible, meaning his policies – no matter how ill-conceived – will be implemented. If they backfire—and some of them will—they will be hard to turn around. It’s no coincidence that Chinese stocks fell after the party congress when investors realized there would be “no adults in the room” on economic policy. Unless one believes that Xi is the first completely infallible political leader in history—and he has already proven that he is not—his consolidation of power means that China will be less wealthy, less powerful, and less attractive to foreign residents than itself. would be under a less arbitrary leader whose associates could question his decisions and rein in his excesses. Looking ahead, who will tell Xi when he is wrong? Won’t subordinates be even more inclined to tell their superiors what they think they want to hear, and to withhold bad news so as not to reflect badly on them? This is a recipe for inefficiency that also increases the risk of big mistakes. In short, the new power configuration in Beijing will aid the US’s efforts to maintain its position of primacy.
But wait for the schadenfreude – there are big downsides here too. I can think of at least three possible problems.
First, slowing Chinese economic growth may be good for the balance of power between Washington and Beijing, but not good for the global economy, which is already teetering on the brink of recession. If China continues to stumble under Xi, many other economies – including our own – will suffer, ordinary people in many other countries will suffer, and extremists of all stripes will benefit.
Second, the higher priority of national security issues (and the decision to elevate them above economic growth) is a clear illustration of the dynamics of the spiral model at work. China’s rising power and growing ambitions have prompted a defensive response from the United States and others. Unsurprisingly, Beijing now recognizes that the international environment is more dangerous and seeks to protect itself from US efforts to limit its future growth.
Unfortunately, deteriorating relations between the two countries have already made it difficult to address common challenges such as climate change, and will likely make it even more difficult to work together on these issues in the future. On climate change, China and the United States have begun to look like a pair of paddlers on the Niagara River, fighting over who will sit back and steer even as their canoe careers approach the falls.
Third, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, when countries are run by uncontrolled autocrats or small groups of like-minded people (with no dissenters in sight), they are more likely to make big mistakes and have more trouble correcting them. when they do. Democracies are not immune to this danger, but it seems to be more prevalent in highly centralized dictatorships. If so, Xi’s consolidation of power means that we should expect Beijing to be more error-prone in the future than it was for much of the post-Mao era. However, this is not good news, as some of the mistakes they could make – like trying to retake Taiwan – would be extremely dangerous.
This is where my two stories could come together. If Xi Jinping’s centralization of power further saps China’s economic vitality and exacerbates the structural problems it already faces, then any hopes that he might equal or surpass Mao as China’s greatest modern leader will be in jeopardy. Any claim to equal or surpass Mao would depend on him doing something Mao failed to achieve, such as regaining official control of Taiwan. If he begins to suspect that China’s relative power has peaked, the temptation to act while he still can will increase. Speaking openly about this goal upsets others, and trying to do so would be a big risk, but it’s also the kind of misjudgment autocrats (or closed decision-making groups) are prone to.
There is one more reason for Americans to temper their satisfaction at seeing China move away from market principles, rely more on Marxism-Leninist teachings, and eschew collective leadership in favor of a one-man personality cult. The US political system is also in deep trouble, and there is every reason to expect things to get worse after the midterm elections. The two most powerful countries in the world seem to be engaged in a ruthless competition to see which system can become the most dysfunctional the fastest. Unfortunately, and despite what just happened in Beijing, I’m not sure China is winning.
Are Saudi Arabians friendly?
People in Saudi Arabia are friendly, hospitable and very steeped in their culture. This guide serves as an overview of what to expect there. On the same subject : Are worsening US-China relations in Taiwan’s interest?. In many ways, Saudi Arabia is a paradoxical country and culture. The people are hospitable but insular; friendly in some ways, rigid in others.
How do they treat women in Saudi Arabia? According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, despite recent reforms, women in Saudi Arabia experience discrimination regarding marriage, family and divorce. The Saudi government continues to target and repress women’s rights activists and movements.
What is forbidden in Saudi Arabia?
Saudi law prohibits the importation of the following items: weapons, alcohol, narcotics, pork and pork products, pornographic materials, distillery equipment, retreaded or used tires, used clothing, and certain sculptures.
Who is Saudi Arabia enemies with?
Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis now form a common enemy. On the same subject : NEW DETAILS: $ 8.8M art expansion for Oakwood schools starting new phase. Saudi Arabia’s Gulf allies Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates recognized Israel in 2020, primarily to gain Saudi support against Iran.
What is disrespectful in Arab culture?
Public displays of affection are generally considered rude and disrespectful in the Middle East. See the article : The US needs a better strategy to stop Iran. Although some cultures in the Middle East may be more tolerant than others, it is generally not okay to kiss, hug, or openly show intimacy.
Is Saudi Army Strong?
For 2022, Saudi Arabia is ranked 20th out of 142 countries considered for the annual GFP review. It has a PwrIndx* score of 0.2966 (a score of 0.0000 is considered “perfect”).
What is the most powerful army in the Arab world? The United Arab Emirates among the most militarily powerful Arab…
- The United Arab Emirates tops the ranking of the most powerful military forces according to the Global Fire Power Index for 2022. …
- The strength of the UAE military is 77,000 troops, with an active strength of 65,000 troops.
How big is Saudi Army?
Armed forces personnel are active military personnel, including paramilitary forces, if their training, organization, equipment and supervision indicate that they can be used to support or replace regular military forces. The number of Saudi Arabia’s military forces for 2019 was 252,000.00, a 0% increase from 2018.
How strong is Saudi Air Force?
| Royal Saudi Air Force | |
|---|---|
| Size | 20,000 1,056 aircraft |
| part | Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia |
| motto(s) | God is the greatest |
Who is Iran at war with?
The protracted military conflict between Iran and Iraq began in the 1980s.
Who won the Iran war? The war ended in a stalemate and a UN ceasefire, with neither side achieving any significant victories. The death toll of the war was high but uncertain. Most estimates put the total death toll at 500,000 troops, with similar figures for both sides.
What countries are allies with Iran?
China and India have also become friends of Iran; these three countries face similar challenges in the global economy as they industrialize and as a result find themselves aligned on many issues. Iran maintains regular diplomatic and trade relations with Russia and former Soviet republics.
What country is Iran at war with?
The Iran–Iraq War followed a long history of territorial border disputes between the two countries, with Iraq intent on recapturing the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab, which it had ceded to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement.
What was Iran called before Persia?
The term Persia has been used for centuries and originates from the region of southern Iran formerly known as Persis, alternatively as PÄrs or Parsa, modern FÄrs.
Why was Persia renamed Iran? In 1935, the Iranian government required those countries with which it had diplomatic relations to refer to Persia as “Iran”, which is the name of the country in Persian. The proposal for the change is said to have come from the Iranian ambassador to Germany, who came under the influence of the Nazis.
What was the old name of Iran?
For most of history, the territory now called Iran was known as Persia. It took its present name only in 1935.
What was Iran called before Islam?
The history of Iran, commonly known in the Western world as Persia until the middle of the 20th century, is intertwined with the history of a larger region, also known to some extent as Greater Iran, encompassing the area from Anatolia in the west to the border of ancient India and the Syr Darya in the east, from…
