Last week, Iran and the United States briefly resumed indirect negotiations to resurrect the 2015 nuclear deal. Unlike the previous round of talks in Vienna, which was halted in March, this round was hosted by Qatar and did not include representatives from the most other parties to the original agreement: China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. Although the talks ended without a breakthrough, the fact that Washington and Tehran accepted this new format suggests a common interest in restoring the agreement. US President Joe Biden’s administration has a strong desire to put Iran’s nuclear program back on track and avoid choosing from an unattractive list of options to prevent Tehran from enriching uranium to weapons level and to reduce its “breakout” time close to zero. For Iran, the strongest motivation is the easing of sanctions, which would allow it to sell oil and access billions of dollars in frozen accounts. Such relief is especially important now, as the cash-strapped Iranian government has been forced to cut subsidies on dairy, egg and wheat products, sparking public reactions and protests across the country.
To be sure, a common interest does not guarantee a renewed agreement, as indicated by the lack of progress in this latest round of talks. Tehran has insisted that Washington remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its list of foreign terrorist organizations, which Biden has publicly promised not to do. However, I believe that a deal will be likely at some point, even though each party’s hesitation to appear to concede something more could mean it will take some time to materialize. Of course, it is also possible that the United States and Iran will never overcome their differences. Or that Tehran, thinking Washington will give in under more pressure, accelerates its nuclear program, accumulates more bombs than 60% enriched uranium, starts enriching up to 90% (weapons grade) and disperses its supplies and denies access. to international inspectors, so that the world cannot see what it is doing.
Clearly, if there is no deal, or if Iran starts ramping up its nuclear program as part of its negotiating strategy, the US will need a better strategy to deter Tehran. But even if the two sides reach an agreement, the Biden administration will have to improve its deterrence. This is because once sanctions related to the 2015 deal are lifted, Iran will have little need for a follow-up deal, such as the “longer and stronger” deal previously touted by the Biden administration. Furthermore, key provisions of the 2015 agreement will “fade” in 2030, leaving Iran with no limits to the size of its nuclear infrastructure, the number or quality of its centrifuges, or the level of its enrichment. In other words, in 2030, Iran may have little reason not to advance to a point where it is turnkey away from a nuclear weapons capability. And resurrecting the deal would give Iran far more resources. As the Israelis, Saudis and Emirates like to point out, if the Iranians can flood their proxy militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen with weapons when under sanctions, imagine what they will be able to do when they are not.
To improve US deterrence in the long term, Washington should publicly declare what Tehran will lose if it continues on its current path and what it will gain by changing course. The goal must be to restore Iran’s fear of US military action without putting the country in a corner with no diplomatic way out. On the one hand, Iranian leaders must know that going forward they will risk losing the entire nuclear infrastructure, which has taken several decades to develop. On the other hand, they should understand that the broad sanctions regime, with its practical limitations and chilling effect on doing business with Iran, will be lifted if they give up their nuclear weapons option and stop coercing their neighbors.
NO ROOM FOR DOUBT
The Trump administration has failed to develop an effective deterrence strategy and, so far, neither has the Biden administration. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy has failed to deter Iranian attacks, direct or via prosecutors, against US forces in Iraq and Syria, oil tankers in the Persian and Gulf of Oman, and oil infrastructure in Arabia. Saudi. Even the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, hasn’t stopped the proxy attacks on the United States, though it may have made Iran more cautious about killing Americans.
Biden’s approach has not proved more effective. It accepted Iran’s request for indirect negotiations, allowed China to purchase Iranian oil without penalty, and eliminated the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen from the list of officially designated terrorist groups. Instead of moderating its behavior, however, Iran appears to have been encouraged. During the presidencies of Barack Obama and Trump, uranium enrichment to 20 percent, the dividing line between low and high enrichment, was considered provocative. This may interest you : President Biden’s remarks at the Launch of the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership. Now, Iran is not only enriching up to 20% without consequence, but it has moved on and enriched itself up to 60%, suggesting that it has little fear of a harsh US response. And so far it has been right. (Israeli security officials told me there was a debate within the Iranian regime about whether to get 60 percent rich, with some officials arguing that it was too risky. Those who pushed to get rich no doubt they feel vindicated and even more confident that the United States will not respond forcefully.)
To dissuade Iran from advancing its nuclear program and pursuing destructive regional policies, Washington will need an integrated strategy that draws on political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, cyber and military tools. He will also have to clarify his position, not only in private but also in public. Washington must warn Iran – and condition the international community to expect – that it will respond by all appropriate means if it detects a move towards a nuclear weapon. As part of the 2015 deal, Iran has pledged not to seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon. Since the US is publicly committed to preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb, it should keep Iran to its commitment whether or not the 2015 deal is reinstated. Instead of saying that all options are on the table – a claim so trivial that no one takes it seriously – the Biden administration should say that if Iran moves towards a weapon, it will jeopardize its entire nuclear infrastructure. Before publicly announcing this change of stance, the administration should privately explain its logic to US allies and rally their support. When the United States is aligned with its allies on Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Iranian leaders understand that it is better able to raise costs for the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, keeping Iran politically isolated is an issue. Iranian leaders do not see their country as similar to North Korea. In their eyes they are heirs of a great civilization, not of a hermit kingdom.
The US must aim to restore Iran’s fear of US military action without putting the country in a corner.
As Iranian leaders doubt that the United States will use force to prevent them from carrying out their nuclear program, the Biden administration will have to take several steps to make its declaratory policy credible. First, it should instruct the US Central Command to conduct exercises, both alone and with allies in the Middle East, to test air-to-ground attacks on reinforced targets. Second, it should run drills where it refuel Israeli planes, something that would be needed in any actual Israeli attack on Iran. What it shouldn’t do is what it did in May: deny that it refueled Israeli planes during a joint exercise simulating remote air-to-ground attacks. Washington must feed Iranian fears of an attack, not give the country’s leaders reason to doubt that it would ever act militarily against them.
Finally, to give further credence to its declaratory policy, the United States should provide additional military assistance to Israel. As noted above, Israel needs improved refueling capabilities to credibly and effectively threaten Iran’s strengthened nuclear infrastructure. The Biden administration is therefore expected to accelerate delivery of the KC-46 oil tanker, a refueling and aviation aircraft that it has agreed to sell to Israel, but not until 2024 at the earliest. Agreeing to be ahead of the curve, perhaps during Biden’s visit to Israel on July 13 and 14, would signal to the Iranians that the United States is ready to allow an Israeli military option if necessary. Alternatively, it could send out a similar signal by providing the Israelis with the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a 30,000-pound “mountain buster”, and hiring them a B-2 bomber to transport it. Israel currently does not have the capacity to destroy Iran’s Fordow underground enrichment site, which is built inside a mountain, but a MOP and a B-2 would change that, emphasizing that Washington is ready to withstand the attacks. Israelis if necessary.
This is not to say that the United States should want Israel to act in its place. Rather, it is to signal to Iran that Washington will act alone or with others to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if the country moves towards a nuclear weapon. Iranian leaders must regard any such move as dangerous for them; they must believe that the United States means what they say; and they must understand that it is preparing the ground for military action if Iran makes a diplomatic outcome impossible.
SOMETHING TO FEAR
But Washington cannot focus solely on the Iranian nuclear program. It must also have a strategy to counter the destabilizing behavior of the Tehran region, prevent Iranian weapons from reaching Iranian proxies, and strengthen the defenses of US allies and partners in the region, particularly against drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Read also : Heilferty drafted to the US U-23 women’s squad. of Iranian proxies. To that end, the US central command could integrate the early warning, drone, cyber and missile defenses of US regional partners, although these partners should agree to do so.
At a time when many US friends in the Middle East are concerned that the US is withdrawing from the region, defense integration is a way to reassure them and keep Washington rooted in the area. It has the advantage not only of sharing the defense burden, but also of making the existing resources of individual countries in the region count more. The United States would not need to provide additional defensive missiles to its partners if the missiles it has already supplied could be pooled effectively. The sum of these weapons is truly greater than the individual parts. And to the credit of the Biden administration, it is already working to develop the security architecture for integrated air and missile defense in the Middle East.
Finally, the US must be prepared to respond more forcefully to attacks by Iranian delegates on US forces in Iraq and Syria. The bases where US forces are stationed have been targeted more than 40 times, but the US has responded in a highly calibrated fashion only twice. Washington’s responses must be unexpected and must signal to Iranian leaders that, contrary to their assumptions, the United States is willing to use force against them. Maybe it’s time to grab a page from the Israeli playbook: hit Iranian targets, not proxies, in the middle of the night and don’t recognize it. The US should not put Iran in a position where it must respond or lose face, but it should also make it clear that it is no longer willing to tolerate these attacks.
The goal of the US declarative strategy must be to establish deterrence. The more clearly Iranian leaders understand what they could lose, the more likely they are to seek a diplomatic alternative. Of course, the US will also have to clarify what Iran will gain from this alternative. This could be a far greater relief from sanctions if Tehran accepts a longer and stronger agreement. Such a “more for more” deal might be possible, but only if Iranian leaders are truly afraid of what they might lose without it. Ironically, it appears that restoring Iran’s fear of the United States may be the only way to avoid a war, limit Iranian threats in the region, and produce an acceptable diplomatic outcome on the character of Iran’s nuclear program.
