“A lasting and predictable US-China relationship could open space for the United States and Taiwan to deepen meaningful ties. It could also reduce the risk of other countries building stronger ties with Taiwan without fear of being drawn into an escalating militarized confrontation,” writes Ryan Hass. This piece originally appeared in the Taipei Times.
I had the privilege of meeting many Taiwanese leaders and thinkers during a study tour in August. A theme I heard repeatedly on this trip was that poor US-China relations benefit Taiwan.
On the face of it, I understand the argument. After all, there is a disturbing record of American leaders negotiating with Beijing at the expense of Taiwanese leaders. For example, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt returned Taiwan to the Republic of China after World War II. President Richard Nixon surprised Taiwanese leaders when he visited in 1972 with Mao Zedong. President Jimmy Carter unilaterally chose to normalize relations with Beijing and de-recognize Taipei in 1979. President Ronald Reagan also negotiated a communiqué with Beijing on future reductions in US arms sales to Taiwan without leadership support. Taiwanese. In other words, US leaders on both sides have pursued interests with China at the expense of Taiwan.
Importantly, all of these examples predate Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Since the transition, US leaders have generally recognized that Taiwan’s elected authorities are the best judges of Taiwan’s interests and that they must be consulted on any potential change in US policy that would impact Taiwan’s security. There is also a tradition of U.S. officials quietly consulting their Taiwanese counterparts before and after high-level exchanges with Chinese leaders on Taiwan-related issues.
Even so, there still seems to be a lingering sense that Taiwan is the beneficiary of deteriorating relations between Washington and Beijing. This argument deserves examination.
On the one hand, Taiwanese leaders likely believe that when relations between Washington and Beijing are strained, the likelihood of the United States and China reaching an agreement on Taiwan is reduced. Taiwanese leaders likely also gain confidence when the United States sees Taiwan as standing on the frontier of freedom and deserving of support to preserve autonomy and democracy.
On the other hand, there should be no concern these days that the United States and China will make deals regarding Taiwan without Taipei’s consent. There is no significant support for the United States to sacrifice Taiwan’s interests in pursuit of Beijing’s advantages.
President Biden has been more outspoken in his support for Taiwan than any leader since before Nixon. Congressional and public support for Taiwan is also very strong, just as it is also very negative towards Beijing.
Any concerns about the United States compromising Taiwan’s interests should be further dispelled by the fact that US-China relations are currently in a steep decline that resembles two previous nadirs in relations. The first severance of relations occurred after the founding of the People’s Republic of China and was exacerbated by the Korean War and subsequent domestic upheaval in China. The second blackout occurred after the Tiananmen Massacre and the end of the Cold War. Each of the previous two nadirs lasted for many years. This period will probably be no different.
Furthermore, historical records suggest that cross-Strait relations and US-Taiwanese relations are not derived from US-China relations. As I have explained elsewhere, the deterioration of US-China relations has not translated into better US-Taiwanese relations, or vice versa. For example, during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, cross-Strait relations warmed while US-China competition became more competitive. Conversely, the downturn in US-China relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not generate a boon for US-Taiwanese relations. The point is that each of the three dyads in US-China-Taiwan relations operates according to its own logic and is guided by each side’s identification of priorities and concerns.
There is also a risk for Taiwan if US-China relations become so strained that every event turns into a major test of will. Taiwan’s security becomes more precarious when viewed as the central flashpoint between the United States and China, leading every action to be measured as a win or loss for one or the other.
The more Taiwan is pushed to become the central flashpoint of great power rivalry, the more pressure Taipei will face to make alignment decisions between the United States and China. Already, US demands are leaning on Taiwan to limit high-tech exports to China. Taiwan is also expected to join a grouping with other advanced democracies that produce high-end semiconductors (eg, South Korea, Japan, and the United States). China is urging Taiwanese companies to move in the opposite direction.
Given these realities, it may be more accurate to conclude that Taiwan’s interests are best protected when US-China relations are neither too hot nor too cold. A lasting and predictable U.S.-China relationship could open space for the U.S. and Taiwan to deepen meaningful ties. It could also reduce the risk of other countries strengthening their relations with Taiwan without fear of being drawn into an escalating militarized confrontation. Ultimately, the more Taiwan is integrated into the fabric of the global economy and maintains strong, interest-based relations with the United States and others, the better it will be able to preserve its autonomy and way of life. democratic.
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