The drive to position the United States as the partner of choice has been a regular feature of Washington’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific across multiple administrations. Commonly used in business and government enterprises, but not formally defined, “partner of choice” describes a long-term economic or security relationship with the implication of exclusivity, and in the case of the US government, often involves an active effort to reduce competition for said partnership by pushing out other nations that woo their partner or actively demand hostility from their partner. But Washington’s fixation on this implicitly exclusive style of partnership is counterproductive and represents the wrong approach to the region. Nowhere is this truer than in Southeast Asia.
Washington has far more partners than formal treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific, and even some of its allies have complex defense relationships involving, to varying degrees, Washington’s two biggest geopolitical rivals, Russia and China. In Southeast Asia, Singapore, arguably Washington’s closest partner in the region, is not an official ally of the United States, while two of its treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines, have spent the past few years keeping Washington at bay while flirting with Beijing. While US President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is a welcome signal of interest, it is very thin on detail for an administration nearing its midpoint. Washington largely envisions itself as a partner of choice, and if it expects to remain a viable option for any kind of partnership, it must lead in the areas most important to its partners, rather than relying primarily on its security relationships.
Many in Washington assume that the Indo-Pacific states and multilateral institutions share their view of China as a hostile state, or that they see the United States as a benign power in their region. And it is certainly true that China’s popularity, according to polls by organizations such as the Pew Research Center, has declined in the region. Proximity to Beijing can cause great concern.
The drive to position the United States as the partner of choice has been a regular feature of Washington’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific through multiple administrations. Commonly used in business and government enterprises, but not formally defined, “partner of choice” describes a long-term economic or security relationship with the implication of exclusivity, and in the case of the US government often involves an active effort to reduce competition for said partnership, pushing out other states that woo their partner or actively demand hostility from their partner. But Washington’s fixation on this implicitly exclusive style of partnership is counterproductive and represents the wrong approach to the region. Nowhere is this truer than in Southeast Asia.
Washington has many more partners than formal treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific, and even some of its allies have complex defense relationships involving Washington’s two biggest geopolitical rivals, Russia and China, to varying degrees. In Southeast Asia, Singapore, arguably Washington’s closest partner in the region, is not an official ally of the United States, while two of its treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines, have spent the past few years keeping Washington at bay while flirting with Beijing. While US President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is a welcome signal of interest, it is very thin on detail for an administration nearing its midpoint. Washington largely envisions itself as a partner of choice, and if it expects to remain a viable option for any kind of partnership, it must lead in the areas most important to its partners, rather than relying primarily on its security relationships.
Many in Washington assume that the Indo-Pacific states and multilateral institutions share their view of China as a hostile state, or that they see the United States as a benign power in their region. And it is certainly true that China’s popularity, according to polls by organizations such as the Pew Research Center, has declined in the region. Proximity to Beijing can cause great concern.
But it is a mistake to assume that Southeast Asia sees the United States as inherently virtuous and China as fundamentally bad. That’s a dangerous assumption in a region where at least three countries—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—are still struggling (with some U.S. support, it must be noted) with unexploded ordnance left over from horrifically devastating wars, and still others, such as eg Indonesia, can point to US intelligence agencies destabilizing their governments within living memory. Most states in Southeast Asia view both the United States and China with some degree of apprehension, but their experiences with Beijing are not as harsh as Washington might imply, nor are their interactions with Washington as cordial.
Southeast Asia is a region defined by its pragmatism. This is reflected in its main institution, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which works by consensus and outpaces its slowest and most hesitant members in solving problems and preventing conflict. And, with at least one notable exception, it has been successful in these goals. ASEAN member states saw the devastating results of great power competition in their common backyard during the Cold War and are unlikely to join another.
The narrative surrounding the idea that Southeast Asian partners might be forced to choose between the United States and China continues to swirl, but in reality they will choose their own side. To quote former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s clichéd observation, “When elephants fight, the grass suffers, but when they make love, the grass suffers.” Southeast Asia, and much of the wider Indo-Pacific, is interested in maximizing cooperation with both elephants – the United States and China – without getting too close to one to anger the other.
But at the same time, neither country wants to be so dependent on either that, in the unlikely event of a US-China détente, it finds itself vulnerable to coercion from one half of the once-envisioned G-2. Playing the elephants against each other is just as important as keeping them from fighting. No one wants to be crushed under the passionate embrace of Beijing and Washington, no matter how improbable the merger of the two giants may seem.
The real competitive arena is the economy, not defense and security. Defense relationships are important, and the United States has deep and meaningful defense relationships that deserve continued attention. But even in that space, the United States will remain the partner of choice, and may not like other partners. Constantly preaching to Southeast Asia about Beijing’s predatory economy is paternalistic and a poor assessment of the region’s own ability to determine its own interests. Partners are not blind to Chinese financial practices. They are also well aware of the US response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and, more recently, the US role in the 2008 global financial crisis. No country in Southeast Asia is attracted by the possibility of complete exclusivity with the United States or China in any sector. Trying to change that will do little more than frustrate Washington’s partners.
Washington’s greatest hope for advancing its policy goals in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific lies in its ability to engage as a reliable economic partner and a stable security partner. Expecting or urging Southeast Asian states to join explicitly anti-China initiatives, resisting free trade agreements or staying out of fast-track economic arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership will not produce the desired political results for Washington.
Is ASEAN stronger than EU?
Asean is the most successful regional organization in Asia. The European Union is the most successful regional organization in Europe, and perhaps in the world. This may interest you : Here’s what China’s real estate debt crisis could mean for investors in Asian junk bonds. And yet, despite the many ties that bind these two institutions, the relationship between them is little known to the public.
Is the EU part of ASEAN? The EU is a founder and active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which aims to encourage constructive dialogue and consultation through confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of ensuring peace, prosperity and stability in the region and beyond.
What are the strength of EU?
The EU is the largest trade bloc in the world. It is the world’s largest exporter of industrial goods and services and the largest import market for more than 100 countries. Free trade among members was one of the fundamental principles of the EU.
Will ASEAN surpass EU?
The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) will overtake the EU in growth once its economies are integrated, the World Economic Forum in Jakarta has heard. Read also : TikTok performs ByteDance to focus on life leader Xiaohongshu with a new app.
What is one of East Asia’s biggest problems in terms of its population?
Most Asian countries face intractable demographic dilemmas. On the same subject : United States vs. TikTok: Congress steps up political fight against…. In most of East Asia, fertility has fallen below the replacement rate, the population is aging, the labor force is shrinking, and in Japan the population has begun to decline.
What are 3 challenges East Asia faces in increasing human well-being? But Asia faces three key challenges that could threaten its rise: the need for inclusive growth, good governance and environmentally sustainable development.
What is the population problem in Asia?
According to the United Nations, many East Asian countries have experienced a decline in total fertility rates over the past 50 years. In the period 1965-1970. the average family had five or more children. From 2005 to 2010, the average moved to below 2.1 children per family.
What are the two largest demographic issues facing East Asia?
In a report released on Wednesday, the World Bank said aging populations and low fertility rates were to blame, with 36 percent of the world’s over-65 population currently living in East Asia.
What are five issues that countries in East Asia are facing today?
Development issues in Asia and the Pacific
- Agriculture and food security. Despite growing prosperity, hunger and malnutrition persist in Asia and the Pacific. …
- Climate change and disaster risk management. …
- Digital technology. …
- Education. …
- energy. …
- Environment. …
- Finances. …
- Fragility and vulnerability.
What are the main problems in Asia? Tertiary menu. Population growth and economic development contribute to many environmental problems in Asia. These include pressure on land, habitat destruction and biodiversity loss, water scarcity and water pollution, air pollution, and global warming and climate change.
What are the 5 main countries in East Asia?
East Asia is the eastern region of Asia, which is defined both geographically and ethno-culturally. The modern states of East Asia include China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan.
What are some challenges that East Asia currently faces?
However, there are several obstacles that could hinder East Asia’s progress in the new economy. Among them are the lack of skilled workers, the existence and expansion of the “digital divide”, the fact that some East Asian nations face pressing social and political problems, as well as cultural barriers.
