First floated more than a decade ago by then-President Barack Obama, the “pivot to Asia” signaled the arrival of a new era of conflict between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Until the war in Ukraine, the need for a pivot away from a supposedly ungrateful Europe and towards a rapidly growing Asia was becoming increasingly orthodox within the US foreign policy establishment—from scholars ” realist” and “liberal international” in academia to think tanks. for talk show hosts. China has featured prominently in the Biden administration’s recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, albeit with an acknowledgment of the revisionist nature of Russian power.
Today the war that is now raging in Eastern Europe has shown that the “pivot” approach is mistaken. It is not in the United States’ interest to turn away from Europe as it asserts itself in Asia – and the country is rich and powerful enough to secure its interests in both theatres.
The “pivot to Asia” school misreads how global power is distributed and takes the continued economic decline and social fragmentation of the United States for granted. These adherents claim that we are now in a multipolar world heading towards a Chinese empire by the end of the century, with the US a declining power and Russia a somewhat distant third great power – allowed in the club because its nuclear weapons, its territorial bulk, and natural resources. Such analyzes rely primarily on comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP), population figures, and military size and professed capabilities.
But theorizing about multi-polarity must be checked against realities on the ground. At the moment we are watching Russia near the one year mark of a war against a country that — according to almost every analyst and policy theorist — should have overrun in a few weeks. In Ukraine, we see once again that wars between states are not just about pure numbers, be it GDP or populations or budgetary dollars and cents. The United States would do well to incorporate this lesson into its own grand strategic calculus moving forward, particularly on the Chinese challenge in Asia.
How powerful is China, really?
Arguments about China surging to dominate Asia, and then the world, are based on a skewed reading of the numbers. This may interest you : A 100 Percent Renewable Electricity Calculator for the United States. Even-handed qualitative assessments of what Beijing can do in an all-out conflict with the United States reveal a picture of the Sino-American balance of power that is anything but clear or simple, with several a variable that could very much determine the outcome. in contention
First, China’s economic rise has depended heavily on a massive transfer of US technology, expertise and manufacturing to China. For too long, US corporations have been given free rein to make the most of the labor arbitrage offered by China, with little regard for how their investment decisions would affect national security. That era is fast coming to an end, with the US now determined to block China’s unfettered access to its technological base, disconnect key supply chains, and re-land its manufacturing from China back to the United States and to Asian countries that share the USA. interests and threat perceptions. Admittedly, decades of blind adherence to the ideology of globalization and Beijing’s unfettered access to the US industrial base and research and development have caused serious damage. That said, the jury is still out on whether China can innovate on its own without access to US and European labs and universities – especially in defense.
Indeed, China has become the manufacturing ground floor for the world, but being the leading commercial shipper of consumer goods is one thing; learning how to build state-of-the-art weapon systems is another. It is one thing to build large numbers of ships and submarines; it’s another thing to pit their actual capabilities against those of the US Navy. The majority of China’s weapons are either systems purchased from Russia or systems derived from Soviet and Russian designs. Judging by the performance of Russian weapons in Ukraine, especially precision munitions and targeting systems, anyone predicting a resounding Chinese victory against the United States in a battle against Taiwan should take a deep breath and think again.
Rethinking the affordability question
Primarily, the “pivot to Asia” argument rests on the assumption that the United States no longer has the resources for the European and Asian theaters. But is this really true? US defense spending has been below its historical average for several decades. According to a World Bank assessment, the United States spent more than 9 percent of its GDP on defense in the 1960s. Cold War-era defense spending averaged between 5 and 6 percent of GDP. Today, defense spending is around 3.5 percent. The point here is not to argue what percentage of GDP should be spent on defence, but rather to show that the concept of a force capable of total war has been largely a political decision for the last thirty years mainly in one theatre, not necessarily driven by resource constraints. The real question is where national defense fits into the overall budget priorities of the United States, which are determined by overall threat perceptions.
Every great power requires a robust economy that can maintain a strong military, as well as a cohesive society at home that can reach consensus on foreign policy. In terms of the economy, decades of expatriation have shattered the country’s industrial foundations, leading to an overemphasis on services and an underemphasis on defense-related innovation, particularly hypersonic propulsion. Read also : Sydney McLaughlin carries United States to 33rd medal at UCI Track Cycling World Championships. Meanwhile, the US military has spent the past two-plus decades focusing on counterinsurgency priorities in the Global War on Terror while de-emphasizing state-on-state conflict. And the weakening of the middle class as a result of US industrial decline — along with, more recently, the stress caused by the pandemic and a surge in mass migration — has fueled group grievances and weakened national consensus on policy.
Still, none of these considerations are stopping leaders in Washington from committing themselves to building the significant political will needed to bring US defense spending closer to historical averages as a share of the economy. That would allow the United States to build a cross-domain Joint Force that can face the growing Chinese threat in Asia and land in Europe. The final strategic decision must be coupled with relentless pressure on European NATO allies to rearm. A NATO focused on properly resourced European conventional militaries, combined with a US nuclear guarantee and high-end enablers, is more than capable of deterring—and if necessary, defeating—Russia.
First principles of grand strategy
A larger question about US grand strategy moving forward depends on an understanding of the fundamentals of the country’s geopolitical DNA. Historically, the security and prosperity of the United States has depended not only on securing the Western Hemisphere, but also on securing free and open access to the global market. See the article : $275 million in additional U.S. military aid for Ukraine – U.S. Department of State. The United States entered two world wars and then led the West in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and its satellites to ensure that Europe remained the gateway to Eurasia. Likewise, it will not allow a single power to dominate Asia.
In this context, the debate over a “pivot to Asia” at the expense of the European pillar of America’s grand strategy reflects a fundamental misreading of the nation’s history and interests. It is unlikely that the American people will settle for second place in a great power competition. Its leaders owe it to them for an honest debate over the coming stakes.
Andrew A. Michta is dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. .
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official position or policy of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
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