US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin flew to Singapore in June to speak at the first in-person Shangri-La Dialogue since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, was the official headliner, but the contrasting speeches by Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe attracted the most attention.
Wei gave a tin-eared speech threatening Taiwan, warning the United States to stay out of the way and dismissing the agency of third countries. Austin, on the other hand, focused on alliances, partnerships and international rules as decisive. He hailed the US’s “unique network of alliances and partnerships” as a “profound source of stability” in the Indo-Pacific. And he declared America’s commitment to a region “where all countries — large and small — are free to prosper and legitimately pursue their interests, free from coercion and intimidation.”
Reflecting on these American commitments, Austin returned to one topic more than any other: the South China Sea. Even when not directly discussing the waterway, his remarks referred to “freedom of the seas,” “maritime security cooperation,” “threats in the gray zone,” and so on. In this, Austin was the latest in a long line of US officials going back decades to highlight the credibility of the alliance and defense of the law of the sea as the primary US interests in the South China Sea.
This article is adapted from On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea by Gregory B. Poling (Oxford University Press, 336 pp., $39.95, July 2022).
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin flew to Singapore in June to speak at the first in-person Shangri-La Dialogue since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, was the official headliner, but the contrasting speeches by Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe attracted the most attention.
Wei gave a tin-eared speech threatening Taiwan, warning the United States to stay out of the way and dismissing the agency of third countries. Austin, on the other hand, focused on alliances, partnerships and international rules as decisive. He hailed the US’s “unique network of alliances and partnerships” as a “profound source of stability” in the Indo-Pacific. And he declared America’s commitment to a region “where all countries — large and small — are free to prosper and legitimately pursue their interests, free from coercion and intimidation.”
Reflecting on these American commitments, Austin returned to one topic more than any other: the South China Sea. Even when not directly discussing the waterway, his remarks referred to “freedom of the seas,” “maritime security cooperation,” “threats in the gray zone,” and so on. In this, Austin was the latest in a long line of US officials going back decades to highlight the credibility of the alliance and defense of the law of the sea as the primary US interests in the South China Sea.
Reflecting on that history helps explain why Washington cares so much about a dispute over rocks and reefs half a world away. And it suggests what would be lost if China were to force the United States to abandon these long-held interests. Given Beijing’s campaign of militarization and coercion over the past decade, it is for the first time a real possibility, making it important to understand the stakes involved.
The oldest American interest at stake in the disputed waterway is the freedom of the seas and the law of the sea. American leaders have seen maintaining the high seas as essential to national prosperity and security for more than two centuries. Few interests have been so consistent throughout American history.
This commitment drove the young United States to launch its first military forays abroad in two wars with the Barbary States. It contributed to the outbreak of the War of 1812 fought against Great Britain. Before long, the desire to protect the nation’s maritime rights drew the US Navy into the Pacific with the establishment of the East India Squadron in 1835. Except for a brief interlude during the American Civil War, US naval vessels have operated continuously in Asia ever since.
Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, particularly to historic rights along the so-called nine-dash line, threaten the centuries-old US commitment to freedom of the seas. This commitment helped guarantee American prosperity and security. Today, it stabilizes international trade, reduces naval tensions and guarantees equal access to resources.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) represents the work of decades spent negotiating and codifying these freedoms. The Treaty has unparalleled legitimacy as a truly global effort. China had as much say in its creation as any state. And the same goes for most of China’s neighbors, which is why they cling so fiercely to it. In the US, a small but vocal minority stands in the way of ratification. But for every American involved in maritime affairs, whether naval, commercial or scientific, UNCLOS is effectively the law of the land.
China’s claims are so contrary to the Convention that it could not long survive their acceptance. If Beijing could lay claim to 1,000 miles of ocean and seabed, why shouldn’t others? The effects of a unraveling UNCLOS would threaten American interests from the Arctic to the Persian Gulf. Russia is already toying with the idea of historical rights in the former. And Iran would seize any opportunity to legitimize its efforts to control the latter.
But China’s claims undermine more than just this one convention. They affect the most fundamental principle of international law: the equality of states. China’s leadership would treat international law as it does domestic law—as a tool of power, but never a constraint on it. Allowing UNCLOS to be undermined without significant cost would only confirm that. Beijing will rightly conclude that if something as widely respected as the law of the sea can be dispensed with, then more contentious norms are fair game. And that would inform its approach to competition across the board, from finance to space and everything in between.
The other persistent US interest in the South China Sea, at least since the end of World War II, has been to maintain defense commitments without being drawn into US allies’ arguments about disputed sovereignty. The US alliance network, along with US territories in the region, has made the US a resident power and helped maintain stability in Asia. They allow the country to deploy significant military forces thousands of kilometers from the homeland, deterring aggression and responding quickly to regional security challenges. This, in turn, keeps the United States and its allies safe and their shared interests protected.
America’s earliest involvement in the South China Sea during the pre-war decades stemmed from its colonial presence in the Philippines. When the Philippines gained formal independence in 1946, neither side wanted American forces to leave due to fears of Soviet intervention in Asia. They entered into a military bases agreement in 1947 and a mutual defense treaty in 1951, creating America’s earliest security alliance in the Pacific. This was the first step in the creation of the American alliance system that exists in Asia to this day.
The United States soon entered into similar defense treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Then came semi-formal alliances with Thailand and South Vietnam. Among this club, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Vietnam all staked claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea. During this time, the top American priority in the disputes was to maintain credibility without alienating any of the three allies. And that meant remaining neutral and encouraging calm.
That changed during the 1970s. Saigon fell, North Vietnam’s victorious forces moved into the Spratly Islands, China vastly expanded its footprint in the Paracel Islands, and the United States abrogated its treaty with the Taiwanese government. Within a few years, Manila found itself as Washington’s only ally left in the dispute, facing potential aggression from either Hanoi or Beijing. At the same time, the perceived abandonment of South Vietnam and Taiwan raised concerns about the credibility of other US defense commitments. Philippine officials wondered if the alliance had become a one-way street — were they making themselves a target by hosting US bases without even a credible US support commitment in the South China Sea, where they faced potential violence? This set in motion a cycle of negotiations on the scope and value of the alliance. In many ways, that cycle continues to this day.
Over the past four decades, Washington has slowly clarified that the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to any attack on Philippine forces in the South China Sea. It continues to balance this commitment with its longstanding neutrality regarding territorial claims. There have been some close calls on both sides, but Washington has time and again decided that its oldest alliance in Asia is too valuable to let go. Manila has repeatedly reached the same conclusion.
The relationship between the United States and the Philippines is at once vital and fraught with conflict. It is built on more than a century of cultural exchange, deep personal connections, shared sacrifices and common interests. But it is also obscured by the history of colonization, political interference, unequal economic relations and a huge power differential. The latter leaves one side, often fearing to be abandoned and the other to be caught.
Manila would find it almost impossible to defend its maritime rights against growing Chinese encroachment without US military support. And if the US were to be seen as surrendering the Philippines to Chinese aggression, it would ripple far beyond the South China Sea. The US’s ability to project power and respond to crises in Southeast Asia would be severely compromised if it lost access to Philippine territory. Other allies and partners would naturally question America’s ability and willingness to remain a regional security provider. The US alliance network would face a crisis – of both confidence and capacity – at a time when it is most needed. The rise of Chinese power and its clear revisionist intent would make the rapid decline of American influence in Asia far more destabilizing than it was even in the 1970s.
The United States has been involved in disputes in the South China Sea almost from its conception. It has occasionally taken the form of clear-eyed, proactive defense of American interests. But more often policy makers have been entangled by circumstances. Their attention elsewhere would be unexpectedly drawn by a crisis or demands from regional allies. They must quickly assess the national interest. And so the disputes would return to the margins of American politics until the next crisis. The results were unsurprisingly mixed.
This time the stakes are higher, and the conflicts in the South China Sea are not going to fade into the background. If the United States is to secure its national interests, it will need to be more conscious of identifying and pursuing them. It has long defended the freedom of the seas and a credible alliance network in Asia. The maintenance of both has helped ensure the national security and prosperity of the United States and its partners. These interests were challenged from time to time in the South China Sea. But now China’s actions in the disputes threaten to fatally undermine them. Faced with this challenge from a peer competitor—the first in decades—the United States must maintain a realistic assessment of its own interests.
As Austin said, “Today, the Indo-Pacific is at the heart of American strategy.” And that strategy cannot succeed without defending the rules and alliances at stake in the South China Sea.
