Before February 24, 2022, most Americans agreed that the United States had no vital interests at stake in Ukraine. “If there is anyone in this town who would claim that we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine,” US President Barack Obama said in an interview with The Atlantic in Year 2016, “they should talk.” Few have.
But the consensus changed when Russia invaded Ukraine. Suddenly, the fate of Ukraine was important enough to spend billions of dollars in resources and sustain rising gas prices; enough to expand security commitments in Europe, including bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO; enough to make the USA a virtual co-balligert in the war against Russia, with consequences yet to be seen. All these steps have so far had substantial support both in political parties and among the public. A poll in August last year found that four out of ten Americans support sending US troops to defend Ukraine if necessary, although the Biden administration insists it has no intention of doing so.
The Russian invasion changed Americans’ views not only about Ukraine, but also about the world in general and the role of the United States in it. For more than a dozen years before the invasion of Russia and under two different presidents, the country tried to diversify its overseas commitments, including in Europe. A majority of Americans believed that the United States should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries do the best they can on their own,” according to the Pew Research Center. As pollster Andrew Kohut put it, the American public “felt little responsibility and inclination to deal with international problems that were not seen as immediate threats to the national interest.” But today, Americans are dealing with two international disputes that do not pose a direct threat to the “national interest” as commonly understood. The United States joined a war against an aggressive great power in Europe and promised to defend another small democratic nation against an autocratic great power in East Asia. US President Joe Biden’s commitments to defend Taiwan if it is attacked – in “another action similar to what happened in Ukraine,” as Biden described it – have grown stronger since Russia’s invasion. Americans now see the world as a more dangerous place. In response, defense budgets increase (marginally); economic sanctions and limits on technology transfer are increasing; and alliances are shored up and expanded.
HISTORY REPEATS
The war in Ukraine has widened the gap between the way Americans think and talk about their national interests and the way they behave in times of perceived crisis. It is not the first time that Americans have changed their perception of their interests in response to events. For more than a century, the country has oscillated in this way, from periods of withdrawal, withdrawal, indifference and disillusionment to periods of almost panicked global engagement and interventionism. On the same subject : Tom Clancy’s The Division 3 is set to leave the US. The Americans were determined to stay out of the European crisis after war broke out in August 1914, only to send millions of troops to fight in World War I three years later. They were determined to stay out of the growing crisis in Europe in the 1930s, only for many millions to fight in the next world war after December 1941.
Then as now, Americans acted not because they faced an immediate threat to their security, but to defend the liberal world beyond their shores. Imperial Germany had neither the capacity nor the intention to attack the United States. Even the Americans’ intervention in the Second World War was not a response to a direct threat to the homeland. In the late 1930s and up until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, military experts, strategic thinkers and self-described “realists” agreed that the United States was innocent of foreign invasion, regardless of what happened in Europe and Asia. Before the shocking collapse of France in June 1940, no one believed that the German military could defeat the French, much less the British with their powerful navy, and the defeat of both was necessary before any attack on the United States can even be imagined. As the realist political scientist Nicholas Spykman argued, with Europe “three thousand miles away” and the Atlantic Ocean “calming” in between, the United States’ “frontiers” were secure.
These assessments are ridiculed today, but the historical evidence suggests that the Germans and Japanese did not intend to invade the United States, not in 1941 and probably never. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a preemptive effort to prevent or delay an American attack on Japan; it was not a prelude to an invasion of the United States, for which the Japanese had no capacity. Adolf Hitler mused about an eventual German confrontation with the United States, but such thoughts were put to rest after he became embroiled in the war with the Soviet Union after June 1941. Doubtful, as the anti-interventionists did at the time, that either would be able to consolidate control over major new conquests at any time, giving the Americans time to build the necessary forces and defenses for a future invasion prevent Even Henry Luce, a leading interventionist, admitted that “as a pure matter of defense—defense of our homeland,” the United States “could make itself such a hard nut to crack that not all tyrants in the world would dare face to come. us.”
President Franklin Roosevelt’s interventionist policy from 1937 was not a response to an increasing threat to American security. What worried Roosevelt was the potential destruction of the wider liberal world beyond American shores. Long before either the Germans or the Japanese were in a position to harm the United States, Roosevelt began arming their opponents and declaring ideological solidarity with the democracies against the “bandit nations.” He declared the United States the “arsenal of democracy.” He deployed the US Navy against Germany in the Atlantic, while in the Pacific he gradually cut off Japan’s access to oil and other military necessities.
In January 1939, months before Germany invaded Poland, Roosevelt warned Americans that “there comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare not to defend their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and Mankind on whom their churches, their governments, and their whole civilization are founded.” In the summer of 1940, he warned not of invasion, but of the United States becoming a “lonely island” in a world dominated by the “philosophy of force,” “a people imprisoned in prison, handcuffed, hungry , and was fed through the bars. day after day by the contemptible, unsympathetic masters of other continents. It was these concerns, the desire to defend a liberal world, that led the United States into confrontation with the two autocratic great powers before either posed a threat to what Americans traditionally understood as their interests. In short, the United States was not just minding its own business when Japan decided to attack the US Pacific Fleet and Hitler decided to go to war to explain in 1941. As Herbert Hoover said at the time, if the United States insists on “putting pins in rattlesnakes,” it should expect to be bitten.
DUTY CALLS
The traditional understanding of what constitutes a country’s national interest cannot explain the actions the United States took in the 1940s or what it is doing in Ukraine today. The interests should be about territorial security and sovereignty, not about the defense of beliefs and ideologies. West’s modern discourse on interests can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when first Machiavelli and then seventeenth-century Enlightenment thinkers, responding to the abuses of ruthless popes and to the horrors of interreligious conflict in the Thirty Years’ War, have searched for excise duty. Religion and faith from the conduct of international relations. According to their theories, which still dominate our thinking today, all states share a common set of primary interests for survival and sovereignty. A just and stable peace requires that states set aside their beliefs in the conduct of international relations, respect religious or ideological differences, refrain from interfering in any other internal affairs, and accept a balance of power between states that alone maintains international peace guarantee This way of thinking about interests is often called “realism” or “neorealism,” and it permeates all discussions of international relations.
For the first century of their country’s existence, most Americans largely had this way of thinking about the world. Although they were a highly ideological people whose beliefs were the foundation of their nationalism, American foreign policy was realist for much of the 19th century. They conquered the continent, expanded their commerce, and as a weaker power in a world of imperial superpowers, they focused on homeland security. Read also : FACT PAGE: United States Strengthens Partnership with Middle East Partners to Address 21st Century Challenges.. Americans could not support liberalism abroad even if they wanted to, and many did not want to. For one thing, there was no liberal world out there to support before the middle of the 19th century. For another, as citizens of a semi-democracy and semi-totalitarian dictatorship until the Civil War, Americans could not even agree that liberalism was a good thing at home, much less in the world.
Then, in the latter half of the 19th century, when the United States was unified as a more coherent liberal nation and amassed the necessary wealth and influence to have an impact on the entire world, there was no apparent need to to make. From the mid-1800s onwards, Western Europe, especially France and Great Britain, became increasingly liberal, and the combination of British naval hegemony and the relatively stable balance of power on the continent ensured a liberal political and economic peace of which the Americans were more have benefited. like all other people. However, they do not bear any of the costs or responsibility for maintaining this order. It was an idyllic existence, and although some “internationalists” believed that with growing power should come growing responsibility, most Americans preferred to remain free riders in another liberal order. Long before modern international relations theory entered the discussion, a view of the national interest as the defense of the homeland made sense to a people who wanted and needed nothing more than to be left alone.
A fence painted in Ukrainian flag colors in Washington, DC, July 2022
Tom Brenner / Reuters
A fence painted in Ukrainian flag colors in Washington, DC, July 2022
Everything changed when the British-led liberal order began to collapse in the early twentieth century. The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 revealed a dramatic shift in the global distribution of power. The United Kingdom could no longer maintain its naval hegemony against the rise of Japan and the United States, along with its traditional imperial rivals, France and Russia. The balance of power in Europe collapsed with the rise of a unified Germany, and by the end of 1915 it became clear that not even the combined power of France, Russia and Great Britain would be enough to defeat the German industrial and military forces. machine. A balance of global power that had favored liberalism has shifted to anti-liberal forces.
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
The result was that the liberal world, which Americans enjoyed virtually at no cost, would be overrun unless the United States intervened to shift the balance of power back in favor of liberalism. It suddenly fell to the United States to defend the liberal world order that Britain could no longer maintain. Read also : Happy 247th Birthday to the United States Marine Corps!. And it fell to President Woodrow Wilson, who, after struggling to stay out of the war and remaining neutral in the traditional way, finally concluded that the United States had no choice but to enter the war or destroy liberalism in Europe to see American distance from the world was no longer “feasible” or “desirable” when world peace was at stake and when democracies were threatened by “autocratic governments supported by organized force,” he said in his declaration of war to Congress in 1917. supported the war to “make the world safe for democracy”, by which Wilson did not mean to spread democracy everywhere, but meant to defend liberalism where it already existed.
Americans have since struggled to reconcile these conflicting interpretations of their interests—one focused on homeland security and one focused on defending the liberal world beyond the shores of the United States. The first corresponds to the preference of Americans to remain alone and to avoid the costs, responsibility and moral burden of exercising power abroad. The second reflects their fear as a liberal people of becoming a “lone island” in a sea of militaristic dictatorship. The oscillation between these two perspectives has produced the recurring whiplash in US foreign policy over the past century.
What is more right, more moral? What is the better description of the world, the better guide to American politics? Realists and most international theorists have consistently attacked the more expansive definition of US interests as lacking in setbacks and therefore likely to both exceed American capabilities and risk a dire conflict with nuclear-armed great powers. These fears have never proved justified – the aggressive pursuit of the Cold War by the Americans did not lead to nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and even the wars in Vietnam and Iraq did not fatally undermine American power. But the core of realist criticism, ironically, has always been moral rather than practical.
In the 1920s and 1930s, critics of the broader definition of interest focused not only on the cost to the United States in terms of lives and treasure, but also on what they considered the hegemony and imperialism involved in the project were inherent. What gave the Americans the right to insist on the security of the liberal world abroad if their own security was not threatened? It was an imposition of American preferences, through violence. However disturbing the actions of Germany and Japan may have seemed to the liberal powers, they, and Benito Mussolini’s Italy, sought to change an Anglo-American world order that left them as “non” nations. The settlement reached at Versailles after World War I and the international treaties negotiated by the United States in East Asia denied Germany and Japan the empires and even the spheres of influence enjoyed by the victorious powers. Americans and other liberals may have viewed German and Japanese aggression as immoral and destructive of the “world order,” but it was, after all, a system imposed on them by superior power. How else were they supposed to change it except by having their own power?
As the British realist thinker E. H. Carr argued in the late 1930s, when disaffected powers like Germany voted to change a system that disadvantaged them, then “the responsibility to see that these changes take place . . . on an orderly way” appeased the supporters of the existing order. The growing power of the disaffected nations was to be accommodated, not resisted. And that meant the sovereignty and independence of several small countries had to be sacrificed . The growth of German power, Carr argued, made it “inevitable that Czechoslovakia would lose part of its territory and eventually its independence.” George Kennan, then serving as the senior US diplomat in Prague, agreed that Czechoslovakia was “after all a Central European state” and that its “long-term fortunes lie with – and not against – the dominant powers must lie in this area. ” The anti-interventionists warned that “German imperialism” would simply be replaced by “Anglo-American imperialism”.
Critics of American support for Ukraine have made the same arguments. Obama has often emphasized that Ukraine is more important to Russia than to the United States, and the same could certainly be said of Taiwan and China. Critics on the left and right have accused the United States of engaging in imperialism for refusing to rule out Ukraine’s possible future accession to NATO and encouraging Ukrainians in their desire to join the liberal world.
THE RULEMAKER
There is a lot of truth in these charges. Whether US actions deserve to be called “imperialism”, during the First World War and then in the eight decades from the Second World War to the present day, the United States has used its power and influence to defend the hegemony of liberalism and support The defense of Ukraine is a defense of liberal hegemony. When Republican Senator Mitch McConnell and others say that the United States has a vital interest in Ukraine, they do not mean that the United States will be directly threatened if Ukraine falls. They mean that the liberal world order will be threatened if Ukraine falls.
Americans are fixated on the supposed moral difference between “wars of necessity” and “wars of choice.” In their retelling of their own history, Americans remember the country that was attacked on December 7, 1941, and Hitler’s declaration of war four days later, but forget the American policies that led the Japanese to Pearl Harbor. attack and led Hitler to declare war. In the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, Americans could see the aggression of the communists and their country’s attempts to defend the “free world”, but they did not recognize that their government’s insistence on communism to stop everywhere was a form of hegemony. Equating the defense of the “free world” with the defense of their own security, Americans viewed every action they took as a necessity.
Only when the wars went badly, as in Vietnam and Iraq, or ended unsatisfactorily, as in the First World War, did the Americans retrospectively decide that those wars were not necessary, that American security was not in immediate danger. They forget the way the world looked to them when they first supported these wars – 72 percent of Americans polled in March 2003 agreed with the decision to go to war in Iraq going to. They forget the fears and the feeling of insecurity they felt at the time and decide that they were led by a conspiracy.
The irony of both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq is that although in later years they were portrayed as plots to promote democracy and therefore as prime examples of the dangers of the more expansive definition of US interests, Americans at the time were not even think about the liberal world order. They only thought about safety. In the post-9/11 environment of fear and danger, Americans believed that both Afghanistan and Iraq posed a direct threat to American security because their governments either harbored terrorists or possessed weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the Terrorists stopped. Right or wrong, that was why Americans initially supported what they later derided as “perpetual wars.” As with Vietnam, it wasn’t until the fighting dragged on without victory in sight that Americans decided that their perceived wars of necessity were actually wars of choice.
But all of America’s wars have been wars of choice, the “good” wars and the “bad” wars, the wars won and the wars lost. Not one was necessary to defend the immediate security of the United States; all in one way or another concerned the shaping of the international environment. The 1990-91 Gulf War and the interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Libya in 2011 were all about managing and defending the liberal world and implementing its rules.
REALITY SETS IN
American leaders often talk about defending the rules-based international order, but Americans do not recognize the hegemony inherent in such a policy. They do not realize that, as Reinhold Niebuhr once observed, the rules themselves are a form of hegemony. They are not neutral, but are designed to maintain the international status quo, which has been dominated for eight decades by the American-backed liberal world. The rule-based order is a supplement to that hegemony. If disaffected great powers like Russia and China stuck to these rules as long as they did, it was not because they had converted to liberalism or because they were satisfied with the world as it was or had an inherent respect for the rules. It was because the United States and its allies exercised overwhelming power in the name of their vision of a desirable world order, and the disaffected powers had no safe choice but acquiescence.
The long period of great power peace that followed the Cold War presented a misleadingly comforting picture of the world. In times of peace, the world may appear as international theorists describe it. The leaders of China and Russia can be treated diplomatically at conferences of equality, enlisted to maintain a peaceful balance of power, because, according to the ruling interest theory, the goals of other great powers cannot be fundamentally different from the United States. goals. All seek to maximize their security and preserve their sovereignty. All accept the rules of the proposed international order. All spurn ideology as a guide for politics.
The presumption behind all these arguments is that however indeterminate Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping might be as rulers, as state actors they can be expected to behave as all leaders have always supposedly behaved. They have legitimate grievances about the way the post-Cold War peace was concluded by the United States and its allies, just as Germany and Japan had legitimate grievances about the postwar settlement in 1919. Graves would lead to a more stable peace, just as France’s accommodation after Napoleon helped preserve the peace of the early 19th century. In this view, the alternative to American-backed liberal hegemony is not war, autocracy and chaos, but a more civilized and just peace.
Americans have often convinced themselves that other states voluntarily follow their preferred rules—in the 1920s, when Americans welcomed the Kellogg-Briand Pact “outlawing” war; in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when many Americans hoped that the United Nations would take over the burden of keeping the peace; and again in the decades after the Cold War, when the world was assumed to be moving relentlessly towards peaceful cooperation rather than the triumph of liberalism. The added benefit, perhaps even the motive, for such beliefs was that if they were true, the United States could cease to play the role of the world’s liberal enforcer and be freed from all the material and moral costs.
But this comforting image of the world was periodically exploded by the brutal realities of international existence. Putin was treated as a wise statesman, a realist who was only trying to repair the injustice of the post-Cold War settlement and with some reasonable arguments on his side – until he launched the invasion of Ukraine, which did not only proved his will. To use violence against a weaker neighbor, but in the course of the war to use all the methods at his disposal to destroy the civilian population of Ukraine without the slightest scruple. As in the late 1930s, events forced Americans to see the world for what it is, and it is not the neat and rational place that the theorists posited. None of the great powers behave as realists suggest, guided by rational judgments about maximum security. Like great powers in the past, they act out of convictions and passions, anger and resentment. There are no separate “state” interests, only the interests and beliefs of the people who inhabit and govern states.
US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi displays a pin in Washington, DC, March 2022
Tom Brenner / Reuters
US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi displays a pin in Washington, DC, March 2022
Consider China. Beijing’s evident willingness to risk war for Taiwan makes little sense in terms of security. No reasoned assessment of the international situation should cause Beijing’s leaders to believe that Taiwan’s independence poses a threat of an attack on the mainland. Far from maximizing Chinese security, Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan raises the possibility of a catastrophic conflict with the United States. Should China declare tomorrow that it no longer demanded unification with Taiwan, the Taiwanese and their American supporters would stop arming the island to the teeth. Taiwan could even disarm significantly, just as Canada remains disarmed along its border with the United States. But such simple material and security considerations are not the driving force behind Chinese policy. Matters of pride, honor and nationalism, along with the justified paranoia of an autocracy trying to hold on to power in an age of liberal hegemony – these are the engines of Chinese policy on Taiwan and on many other issues.
Few nations have benefited more than China from the US-backed international order, which has provided markets for Chinese goods, as well as the financing and information that have allowed the Chinese to emerge from the weakness and poverty of the past century. ‘recover. Modern China has enjoyed remarkable security in recent decades, which was why, until a few decades ago, China spent little on defense. But this is the world China aims to build.
Similarly, Putin’s serial invasions of neighboring countries have not been driven by a desire to maximize Russia’s security. Russia has never had greater security on its western border than in the three decades after the end of the Cold War. Russia was invaded from the West three times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, once by France and twice by Germany, and it prepared for the possibility of a Western invasion throughout the Cold War. But at no time since the fall of the Berlin Wall has anyone in Moscow had reason to believe that Russia faced the possibility of attack from the West.
BREAKING THE CYCLE
That the nations of Eastern Europe wanted to seek the security and prosperity of membership in the West after the Cold War is perhaps a blow to Moscow’s pride and a sign of Russia’s post-Cold War weakness. But it did not increase the risk to Russian security. Putin opposed the expansion of NATO, not because he feared an attack on Russia, but because this expansion would make it increasingly difficult for him to restore Russian control in Eastern Europe. Today, as in the past, the United States is an obstacle to Russian and Chinese hegemony. It is not a threat to the existence of Russia and China.
Far from maximizing Russia’s security, Putin damaged it – and that would have been so even if his invasion had succeeded as planned. He did this not for reasons related to security or economy or to make any material gain, but to overcome the humiliation of lost greatness, to satisfy his sense of his place in Russian history, and perhaps for a certain set of Faith to defend. Putin despises liberalism as much as Stalin and Alexander I and most autocrats throughout history despised it – as a sad, weak, even sick ideology devoted to nothing but the small pleasures of the individual, if it is the glory of the state and the nation is, which should have. the people’s commitment and for whom they should sacrifice.
That most Americans should regard such actors as threatening to liberalism is a sensible reading of the situation, just as it was reasonable for Hitler to be cautious even before he committed an act of aggression or began the extermination of the Jews . When great powers with a record of hostility to liberalism use armed force to achieve their goals, Americans generally rise from their inertia, abandon their narrow definitions of interest, and embrace this broader view of what their sacrifices are worth. .
This is a truer realism. Instead of treating the world as consisting of impersonal states operating according to their own logic, it understands basic human motivations. It understands that every nation has a unique set of interests, peculiar to its history, its geography, its experiences and its beliefs. Also, all interests are permanent. Americans did not have the same interests in 1822 as they did two centuries later. And the day must come when the United States can no longer contain the challengers of the liberal world order. Technology may eventually make oceans and distances irrelevant. Even the United States itself could change and stop being a liberal nation.
But that day has not yet arrived. Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, the circumstances that made the United States the decisive factor in world affairs a century ago persist. Just as two world wars and the Cold War confirmed that autocratic hegemons could not achieve their ambitions as long as the United States was a player, so Putin has discovered the difficulty of achieving his goals as long as his weaker neighbors can seek. virtually unlimited support from the United States and its allies. There may be reason to hope that Xi also believes that the time is not right to directly and militarily challenge the liberal order.
The bigger question, however, has to do with what Americans want. Today they have been called upon again to defend the liberal world. It would be better if they were lifted earlier. Putin spent years checking to see what the Americans would tolerate, first in Georgia in 2008, then in Crimea in 2014, while building up his military capacity (not well, as it turns out). The careful American reaction to both military operations, as well as to Russian military actions in Syria, convinced him to push forward. Are we better today because we didn’t take the risks then?
Is Lutheran part of Russia?
“Know thyself” was the advice of the ancient philosophers. Some critics complain that the Americans have not seriously discussed and debated their policies towards Ukraine or Taiwan, that panic and anger have drowned out dissenting voices. The critics are right. Americans should have a frank and open debate about what role they want the United States to play in the world.
The first step, however, is to recognize the taxes. The natural trajectory of history in the absence of American leadership was perfectly obvious: it was not toward liberal peace, a stable balance of power, or the development of international laws and institutions. Instead, it leads to the spread of dictatorship and continuous great power conflict. This is where the world went in 1917 and 1941. Should the United States reduce its involvement in the world today, the consequences for Europe and Asia are not difficult to predict. Great power conflict and dictatorship have been the norm throughout human history, liberal peace a brief aberration. Only American power can keep the natural forces of history at bay.
What country are Lutherans from?
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were part of the Russian Empire since the end of the 18th century, but after the Russian Revolution of 1917 they became independent states.
Is the Lutheran Church in Russia?
What religion is considered Lutheran? Lutherans are Christians We believe that Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and true man, is the savior of the world from sin, death and the power of evil. He alone won life for us through His perfect life, death and resurrection from the dead.
What is the upper age limit for a Supreme Court judge?
The Lutheran faith was first established in some states of the Holy Roman Empire and now in Germany.
The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia has about 40,000 members and is headed by 34-year-old Dietrich Brauer, the youngest archbishop in the Lutheran World Federation.
Is there an age limit for the Supreme Court?
In India, a Supreme Court judge retires at 65 and a High Court judge at 62. The retirement age of High Court judges, which was initially set at 60, was revised to 62 in October 1963.
How many years can you be a Supreme Court judge?
What is the age of the oldest Supreme Court Justice? The current Supreme Court is no different from those of the past and its current members range in age from 50 to 74! As of October 2022, this list is as accurate as possible and will be updated as necessary.
Can a Supreme Court justice be removed?
No retirement age; Limit can be set by statute. Limit can be reduced to as low as 70 by statute or initiative. Judges can finish the year they turn 75.
How long is the term of a Supreme Court Justice? The constitution states that judges “hold their office during good behavior.” This means that justices can hold office as long as they want and can only be removed from office by impeachment.
How does a Supreme Court justice get removed?
The constitution states that the judiciary "hold their offices during good behavior." This means that justices can hold office as long as they want and can only be removed from office by impeachment. Has a justice ever been impeached? The only justice to be impeached was Associate Justice Samuel Chase in 1805.
On what grounds can a Supreme Court justice be impeached?
How many votes does it take to impeach a Supreme Court Justice? If a majority of the members of the US House of Representatives vote for impeachment, the impeachment is referred to the United States Senate for an impeachment trial. A conviction requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
Has a Supreme Court justice ever been removed?
Are Supreme Court Justices ever removed? Justices can only be removed by impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate.
