“Oh no, they didn’t!” came the collective gasp from Washington when Saudi Arabia decided last month to cut oil production and send gas prices skyrocketing just in time for the US midterm elections. The reaction seems justified when you look at Saudi Arabia’s decision to join other Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations and Russia to cut supplies purely through the lens of a celebrity smackdown, US President Joe Biden vs. bin Salman (aka MBS) or Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But viewed through a broader lens, the kerfuffle is overblown. Washington is of course wise to resist any strengthening of Riyadh’s relationship with Moscow. Biden’s open statement about possible US action in response to OPEC+ was measured and practical; we really don’t know what the best course of action is because most of the options have serious downsides for the US.
Those who remember the King Abdullah era of US-Saudi relations lament that Saudi Arabia’s approach to the US has become purely transactional, and they are not wrong. They should be sure that what looks like a growing strategic relationship between Moscow and Riyadh is also transactional for Riyadh. The kingdom is hoping for some things from Russia that the United States cannot provide—and they all relate directly to its critical challenges.
What does Riyadh want from Moscow?
Doing Russia a favor with its oil vote presents interesting opportunities for Riyadh vis-à-vis Iran, with which the Saudis cut ties in 2016. Consider the case of Russia’s recent acquisition of Iranian drones, which were used to attack Kyiv. It looks on the surface like the perfect reason for Saudi Arabia to kick Russia out of court. This may interest you : LeBron James criticizes US efforts to bring Brittney Griner home from Russia. But it also presents a rare opportunity when the Saudis play their cards right with Moscow — just ask Israel — to closely examine these drones or obtain data on their battlefield performance. Saudi Arabia also has a great interest in preventing Iran from using these drones to integrate with Russia.
Saudi Arabia hopes that the wedge between Russia and Iran will also bear fruit in Syria. Riyadh has accepted that Bashar al-Assad is holding, although the US and Saudi strategies originally aimed for his departure from the political scene. Riyadh’s new goal is to draw Damascus back into the Arab fold and away from Tehran. But no amount of Gulf bigwigs will do the job and no effort to reduce Tehran’s influence will succeed unless Arab countries are willing to supply paramilitary forces and weapons to Assad to secure his place at the top of the government and to replace Iran’s peace of mind. kind of help is given to him. Riyadh did not like this. In the absence of an international strategy to reduce Iranian influence in Syria, or an achievable vision for the future of Syria from the US administration, Riyadh is pinning its hopes on aligning its interests in the future of Syria with Moscow.
Russia’s role in potentially blocking new United Nations Security Council resolutions limiting the transfer of arms to the Houthis in Yemen has frustrated Saudi Arabia for years. Gaining the leverage to reverse Russia’s position would address what Saudi Arabia sees as an existential threat. Russia’s dominance of the wheat market is also important for the wider Middle East, a region struggling with food insecurity. This includes Saudi Arabia, where less than 2 percent of the land is arable, according to the World Bank.
In addition to what Washington cannot provide, Riyadh is looking for some things that Washington cannot provide. Saudi Arabia has flirted with Russia’s SU-57 and China’s FC-31, both unproven attempts to catch up with the US’s F-35 next-generation fighter jet. Neither would interoperate with the rest of the Saudi US and European military aircraft. But Saudi Arabia’s interest in rapid military modernization is in direct conflict with Congress and the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which are putting the brakes on foreign arms sales.
Not to mention that an unscrupulous operator like Saud al-Qahtani – an adviser suspected of directing the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who remains in the good graces of MBS – will probably like Moscow (under a good information sharing agreement, of course) some of his best practices on global assault tactics.
Political and fiscal handcuffs
Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States should feature as prominently in its OPEC+ decision as Riyadh’s recent ties with Moscow. See the article : Statement by President Biden on Russia’s attempts to annex Ukrainian territory. What did that side of the deliberation probably take into account?
To begin with, the United States and Saudi Arabia have endured eighty years of ups and downs; the relationship will not implode under its current strain. As Landon Derentz, the head of the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council, reminded me recently, the United States and Saudi Arabia worked together like pros to keep energy markets stable when the pandemic began, to the benefit of the world. This is part of an ebb in US-Saudi cooperation on oil that is meeting other pressures. In Washington, these pressures are often political; in Riyadh they are often taxed.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have endured eighty years of ups and downs; the relationship will not implode under its current strain.
This time, fiscal concerns are focused on financing the Vision 2030 plan to develop the kingdom across a number of sectors. MBS has a lot riding on the success of this plan. Strong warnings about a coming global drop in oil demand have the Saudis asking why they are working against their own bottom line to meet their production quotas – at the behest of the US – when other producers are not. Saudi Arabia’s oil ministry warns that with time production at record high levels, US requests will make spare capacity zero. It could also mean the ministry cannot take facilities temporarily offline for scheduled maintenance, increasing the risk of facilities failing suddenly, shocking the market.
Separate but related, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia pays special attention to foreign policy talks in Germany after spending many years there. Currently, these talks include fears that the United States will refuse to reduce gas prices despite pleas from friends in Europe. The irony is not lost on Riyadh.
Other talks in Europe about the structure of oil price caps sound ominous for energy producers in the Gulf worried about such caps becoming commonplace. And the expectations of rising public pressure on these European governments, when winter heating oil needs spike, are causing some in Saudi Arabia to question how serious Europe will be about maintaining sanctions on Russia.
Add to these domestic concerns that few Saudis are currently in the mood to appease the US because they feel that Washington cannot hold up its end of a deal. The US-Saudi transaction surrounding Biden’s visit to Riyadh this summer involved Saudi Arabia and OPEC slightly increasing production while Biden authorized the sale of defensive weapons to Saudi Arabia. But world events disrupted that gentlemen’s agreement. When Putin attacked Ukraine, European nations made independent decisions to donate weapons, expand their own defenses, which now require replacement. As NATO countries, they jump to the head of the line of nations awaiting the delivery of US defense items. Delivery of items to Saudi Arabia may be pushed back an additional two years as a result.
Although this is not a situation where the US is deliberately neglecting the Gulf partners, it is a very real problem for the kingdom, which is regularly attacked with drones and missiles by armed groups supported by Iran. require the United States to abdicate its end of the deal a little, Washington should not forget if the desperation of circumstances (such as a projected global decrease in oil demand) Riyadh does the same. Saudi analysts, who do not understand the cumbersome process of US arms transfers, look at the speed with which the US moved defense weapons to Ukraine and ask why Washington did not do the same after the 2019 Iran-backed attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq or further attacks after that. Watch this space, as Riyadh claims Tehran is planning an imminent attack on Saudi energy infrastructure again, and this time the White House says the US won’t hesitate to act – although “act” is undefined.
Punishing the whippersnapper in Riyadh
With a burst of energy, Washington began to look for options to respond to OPEC’s striking small. There is a flurry of talk about 9/11-based laws, embargoes on arms sales, the removal of Patriot air defense systems from the peninsula, and “NOPEC” legislation that opens the door to confidence-busting legal action against OPEC and its member countries. On the same subject : United States editorial summary: Saturday, August 20, 2022. Riyadh has pushed back on each of these potential actions for a decade – this is not the first time US politicians have floated these punitive measures – through official, lobbying and media messaging channels.
Congress doesn’t agree on much, but there is support on both sides of the aisle to teach the whippersnapper in Riyadh a lesson — as evidenced in May when a Senate committee passed NOPEC.
According to my conversations with Saudi officials, one of the promises the Biden team makes when meetings occur in Riyadh is that Saudi will help with oil prices (or restrictions in Yemen, or silence on the Iran nuclear deal, or aid for Afghan evacuees, or sidelining Assad in Damascus) is rewarded with friendly treatment in Congress. Riyadh feels like the US administration never delivered that. Not even a little bit.
One of the promises the Biden team makes when meetings occur in Riyadh is that Saudi help with oil prices … will be rewarded with friendly treatment in Congress. Riyadh feels like the US administration never delivered that. Not even a little bit.
Riyadh is now convinced that this promise of congressional expansion was made because the administration did not have much more to offer, due to constraints imposed by powerful members of the Biden party vehemently against negotiations with the government that murdered Khashoggi. Without the ability to bring much to the table ahead of the midterm elections, Riyadh wonders what the administration will be able to offer if at least one chamber of Congress is likely to be controlled by the opposing party?
So what options does the US have?
NOPEC appears every time the US is upset with the Kingdom. The Saudi government fears that there will be a law, but it has prepared for that scenario. Although NOPEC becoming law will certainly create instability in the oil market, there is no guarantee that the implementation of NOPEC would lead to the dissolution of OPEC. But for the sake of argument, let’s say it did. Splitting OPEC in the near future will not change Saudi Arabia’s ability to raise oil prices. The kingdom is, after all, the world’s largest oil producing state. Meanwhile, other oil-producing states are already unable to meet their OPEC quotas and cannot increase production further, even if they are exempted from them. If anything, NOPEC could increase Saudi Arabia’s ability to raise prices by taking refineries offline, perhaps with the polite excuse that these facilities suddenly require more than the regular amount of maintenance.
Saudi Arabia also took action in September that limited US options to punish its leadership. The king made MBS prime minister just days before a State Department opinion was due in a US court on whether the Commonwealth Act gives the crown prince immunity from criminal charges in the US. Now that he is prime minister, with the legal protections that exist, there is much less room for the administration to say that he has no immunity.
One of the few levers the US currently has is on arms sales. Some lawmakers argue that stopping these sales could change Riyadh’s mind about its relationship with Moscow. Those sales are for defensive munitions loaded onto F-16 fighter jets and Patriot batteries to defend the kingdom against ongoing drone and missile attacks by groups Iran’s president calls non-negotiable elements of Tehran’s foreign policy. Therefore, as an unintended but problematic consequence, in reverse the arms sale Biden approved in August would convey the message: “We condemn the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, but we support that of Iran.”
Since the United States has raised the prospect of blocking arms sales to the kingdom for the duration of the current administration, this does not send as strong a message as its proponents intended. Riyadh probably anticipated that Congress would make moves in this direction, has worked through the possible permutations of this scenario several times before, and in some cases has the possibility of falling back on alternative suppliers.
Saudi Arabia may not be the loudest voice against proposals to prevent its patriots from restocking. The US military’s Central Command has been working with the Kingdom for some time, at a brisk pace, on bilateral missile defense. From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, the US military contradicts its own plans – including a calendar of regular meetings with two- and four-star generals in the Gulf – contradicts actions by members of Congress to prevent the restocking of their patriots, or other more drastic actions such as withdraw troops and patriots from the kingdom. (This is not being seriously considered. It would be expensive to do and would be detrimental to the US’s own goals in the region. But it is an option.)
All of this is to help explain how Riyadh views the issues that anger Washington and how Saudi officials interpret their own foreign policy options and likely US reactions. They follow US politics, the economy and American public opinion much more closely than Washington follows the kingdom. So how do we wind up here, with careful Saudi calculations that nevertheless underestimate the irritation with which the OPEC+ decision was received? In short, it’s a generational divide. MBS is thirty-seven; 60 percent of the Saudi population is under thirty-five. They cannot relate to the emotional weight of a Russian invasion on the American zeitgeist.
The young leadership that populates most of the inner circle in Riyadh has no memory of the Cold War, but most US leaders were shaped by it. When a country invades a sovereign neighbor, it hits a nerve in the United States. If that country is Russia, it becomes the United States sciatica. Even the first Gulf War cannot help young Saudi politicians understand why their oil market alignment with Russia has aroused such vitriol. MBS was five years old when the US went to war to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – and the US did not go to war for Ukraine.
It’s never too late for solutions
Congress will immerse itself in details, debating what should be done to respond to Saudi Arabia’s willingness to allow Russian cash flow while Russia tries to wipe Ukraine off the map. A close review of US-Saudi relations is likely an option, but whether Congress can agree this time on how tough it should be – after failing to do so in 2019 in the run-up to the Khashoggi assassination – remains an open question. Re-evaluating politics is never a bad idea; a focused assessment is always valuable. The White House has already pledged a review of the US-Saudi relationship after the OPEC+ decision, but it has not specified a point person or a timeline. Saudi observers of all stripes expected Biden to review the US relationship with Saudi Arabia early in his administration (because he said he would).
Such a review should not be seen as a threat in Riyadh. A thorough review of the relationship at all levels – not only on defence, but in areas such as water and food security; education; renewable energy; law enforcement; women’s rights; Human rights, civil rights and press rights; trading in illegal finance; and cultural preservation—will undoubtedly feature some low notes but some high notes that many officials in both capitals will find surprising and helpful in updating US policy. If Washington’s moves to punish Riyadh’s OPEC+ decision are phased out – and, for example, have no impact on the supply of defensive weapons such as Patriot ammunition – MBS advisers should work discreetly with US colleagues to assess the impact of the oil deal on Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This could include funding defensive weapons for Ukraine or cooperating in efforts to prevent Iranian material from being available for Russian use.
MBS’s advisers should work discreetly with US colleagues to assess the impact of the oil deal on Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This could include funding defensive weapons for Ukraine or cooperating in efforts to prevent Iranian material from being available for Russian use.
To echo a suggestion made by Derentz at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, Saudi Arabia should also offer ideas to improve global access to affordable oil supplies. “In the context of a major global energy crisis, the Kingdom would benefit from taking the lead on international efforts to increase supply, helping to redirect the conversation with the United States and Europe in a way that both customers and Producers benefit,” he said. . Saudi Arabia is the only nation with leverage over Russian oil policy and output at the moment, so it is in a good position to help with that – and Washington should insist that it does so.
The problem for US policymakers now is not that Saudi Arabia is choosing Moscow over Washington. The problem is that Saudi Arabia feels it has the upper hand over Moscow and Washington. Moscow and Riyadh played King of the Mountain over energy sector dominance in March 2020, waging a price war that Saudi Arabia won. And that was before Russia started a war it sanctioned. So the Saudis are now very confident that they control Russia’s options on energy policy. But transactional foreign policy is the order of the day, the US and Europe must bring something to the table to make it Riyadh’s time. Right now, that could be as simple as choosing not to impose penalties (which come with blowback) on Saudi Arabia for being a swing state.
De-escalate the policy review
US inaction after the 2019 attack on Abqaiq and blocks on arms sales in years since indicate that Washington is over the Carter Doctrine to protect Gulf countries against external threats. This OPEC+ decision shows that Riyadh is too.
In both capitals, there are diametrically opposed views on how to reframe the relationship. Resolving these internal differences will be more difficult than reaching an agreement between the two countries on mutual interests.
Therefore, a possible first step could be an informal track 1.5 process with both nations sending policy experts to discuss cooperation and redlines. The agreements signed during Biden’s summer trip to the Kingdom represent a solid list of sectors in which cooperation creates value for both countries, so some of the legs have been done.
The deliverable would be a draft framework based not on a transaction to secure two individual critical goals (energy for security), but on a set of common goals critical to both capitals. These actually exist: Both countries have an interest in a smooth energy transition, regional security and stability, the free flow of commerce, and the use of technology to promote development. The work of the dialogue should be based on the recognition that each country can move much faster and further in cooperation with the other.
This framework should also include a number of negotiated redlines, the intersection of which would invalidate the agreement and require a new convening of the track 1.5 process. Decision makers in both countries should agree to continue implementing the framework, regardless of cabinet shuffles or administration changes.
There is a second step Washington could take that would provide a win-win for all sides. A reassessment of the US-Saudi relationship is a great excuse to clean up the US military footprint in the Kingdom. It is past time. To quote a former official of the US Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Riyadh, “the 80s called and they want their security cooperation back.” Saudi Defense Ministry officials made it clear to the Pentagon during a visit to Washington this year that there is support in the Kingdom for a reorganization of USMTM. This is because Saudi Arabia pays over fifty million dollars for USMTM operations. Riyadh could cut this off tomorrow, as they did six years ago to the US military organization that manages activities with Saudi Arabia’s National Guard. Military leaders in Riyadh are asking why they have to fund about 250 Americans with the mission to train Saudis on the use of US military systems if Washington refuses to sell them more US military systems. Add to this that USMTM operates under State Department authorities rather than the Department of Defense (DOD).
“A reevaluation of the US-Saudi relationship is a great excuse to clean up the US military footprint in the Kingdom. It’s past time.”
To achieve a win for all sides, the Biden administration could convert USMTM into a standard security cooperation office under the DOD Senior Defense Official for Saudi Arabia (as has been discussed since at least 2015), reducing the personnel needed to to operate foreign military sales. (FMS) cases, and remaining remaining FMS administration billets to other places. This would reduce the number of DOD personnel in Saudi Arabia, a win for members of Congress from both parties, who are pushing Biden to reduce US military support for Saudi Arabia. It would modernize the structure of US security cooperation in the Kingdom, a win for the DOD. It would free up tens of millions of dollars in the Saudi defense budget, a small gain for the Saudi Ministry of Defense. And it would preserve the US-Saudi strategic relationship, a win for the US administration.
If the vibe in Washington is that this approach is too soft, let’s remember who the adversary is actually at the root of the kerfuffle over energy production and prices. (Hint: It’s not Saudi Arabia.) Strengthening US partnerships abroad is a pillar of the new National Security Strategy precisely because it is a proven method of securing US interests. Severing is not.
Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She is president of the consulting firm Red Six International and a former senior director for the Gulf at the US National Security Council.
Further reading
Image: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman chairs the meeting of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs via video conference. Photo via Reuters.
Which countries are fighting now?
- Afghanistan. Despite development progress in recent years, Afghanistan remains an extremely unstable and fragile country after nearly four decades of instability. …
- Syria. …
- Somalia. …
- Burkina Faso & Sahel. …
- Democratic Republic of Congo. …
- Central African Republic. …
- South Sudan. …
- Ukraine.
What war is going on now in 2022? On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war that began in 2014.
Who is Saudi Arabia currently at war with?
On March 26, 2022, Yemen’s Houthis announced a three-day ceasefire and offered Saudi Arabia the prospect of a “permanent” ceasefire. The Saudi-led coalition responded by unleashing a barrage of airstrikes on Sanaa and Al-Hodeidah.
Why are Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other? Tensions between the two countries have waxed and waned. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have particularly soured following the Iranian revolution, the nuclear program, the 2011 alleged Iranian assassination attempt and, more recently, the execution of Nimr al-Nimr.
Who are Saudi Arabia at war with?
The biggest rivalry in the Arab-Iranian conflict is between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been waging a severe proxy war against each other since the late 1970s.
Who bombed Yemen 2022?
The devastating air campaign alone â carried out by a Saudi-led coalition â has killed nearly 24,000 people, a number that includes fighters and nearly 9,000 civilians, according to conservative estimates from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) ), which covers war zones around the world monitored.
Who are the two sides in the Yemen war?
The Yemeni Civil War (Arabic: اÙØرب اÙØ£ÙÙÙØ© اÙÙÙÙÙØ©, romanized: al-ḥ arb al-ʾahlÄ«yah al-yamanÄ«yah) is an ongoing multilateral civil war that in the late 2014 began mainly between the Rashad al-Alimi-led Yemeni government and the Houthi armed movement, together with their supporters and allies.
Is Saudi Arabia rich or poor?
| Rank | Country | GDP-PPP ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 27 | Saudi Arabia | 55,368 |
| 28 | united kingdom | 55.301 |
| 29 | Malta | 54,647 |
| 30 | South Korea | 53.051 |
Is Saudi Arabia a developed country? With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.854, Saudi Arabia counts as one of the highly developed economies according to the UN definition.
Is Saudi Arabia considered a poor country?
Facts About Poverty in Riyadh The Saudi family is the richest royal family in the world, with a net worth of around $1.4 trillion due to abundant oil reserves, but the country itself can be considered poor, with an estimated 20 percent of its people living in poverty.
