In a world of constant change, the endurance of the transatlantic partnership stands out. NATO is older than me, and I am not young. It has been around even longer than Queen Elizabeth II ruled Britain. Its original rationale – “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down” – is less relevant than it was (notwithstanding Russia’s war in Ukraine), but still commands reflexive respect on both sides of the Atlantic. . If you’re an aspiring politician hoping to make your mark in Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, etc., learning to extol the enduring virtues of NATO is still a smart career move.
This longevity is especially remarkable when you consider how much has changed since NATO was formed and the idea of a “transatlantic community” began to take shape. The Warsaw Pact disappeared and the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States has spent more than 20 years fighting costly and unsuccessful wars in the greater Middle East. China has risen from an impoverished nation with little global influence to the world’s second most powerful country, and its leaders aspire to an even greater global role in the future. Europe itself has also undergone profound changes: demographic changes, repeated economic crises, civil wars in the Balkans and, in 2022, a destructive war that seems likely to continue for some time to come.
To be sure, the “transatlantic partnership” was not entirely static. NATO has added new members throughout its history, starting with Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by Spain in 1982, then a number of former Soviet allies starting in 1999, and most recently Sweden and Finland. Burden-sharing within the alliance has also fluctuated, with most of Europe drastically reducing its defense contributions after the end of the Cold War. NATO has also undergone various doctrinal changes, some more consequential than others.
In a world of constant change, the endurance of the transatlantic partnership stands out. NATO is older than me, and I am not young. It has been around even longer than Queen Elizabeth II ruled Britain. Its original rationale – “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down” – is less relevant than it was (notwithstanding Russia’s war in Ukraine), but still commands reflexive respect on both sides of the Atlantic. . If you’re an aspiring politician hoping to make your mark in Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, etc., learning to extol the enduring virtues of NATO is still a smart career move.
This longevity is especially remarkable when you consider how much has changed since NATO was formed and the idea of a “transatlantic community” began to take shape. The Warsaw Pact disappeared and the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States has spent more than 20 years fighting costly and unsuccessful wars in the greater Middle East. China has risen from an impoverished nation with little global influence to the world’s second most powerful country, and its leaders aspire to an even greater global role in the future. Europe itself has also undergone profound changes: demographic changes, repeated economic crises, civil wars in the Balkans and, in 2022, a destructive war that seems likely to continue for some time to come.
To be sure, the “transatlantic partnership” was not entirely static. NATO has added new members throughout its history, starting with Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by Spain in 1982, then a number of former Soviet allies starting in 1999, and most recently Sweden and Finland. Burden-sharing within the alliance has also fluctuated, with most of Europe drastically reducing its defense contributions after the end of the Cold War. NATO has also undergone various doctrinal changes, some more consequential than others.
Therefore, it is worth asking what form the transatlantic partnership should take in the future. How should you define your mission and distribute responsibilities? As with a mutual fund, past performance is no guarantee of future performance, which is why smart portfolio managers looking for the best returns will adjust fund holdings as conditions change. Given past changes, current events, and likely future circumstances, what broad vision should shape the transatlantic partnership in the future, assuming it continues at all?
I can think of at least four different models in the future.
One obvious approach – and given bureaucratic rigidity and political caution, perhaps the most likely – is to keep current arrangements more or less intact and change them as little as possible. In this model, NATO would remain primarily focused on European security (as the term “North Atlantic” in the name implies). The United States would remain Europe’s “first responder” and the undisputed leader of the alliance, as it was during the Ukraine crisis. Burden sharing would still be skewed: US military capabilities would still be smaller than European military forces, and the US nuclear umbrella would still cover the other members of the alliance. The “out of area” mission would be scaled back in favor of a renewed focus on Europe itself, a decision that makes sense in light of the disappointing results of past NATO adventures in Afghanistan, Libya and the Balkans.
To be fair, this model has some obvious virtues. This is known and keeps the European “American pacifier” in place. European countries won’t have to worry about conflicts between them as long as Uncle Sam is still around to blow the whistle and break up the fights. European governments unwilling to cut their generous welfare states to pay for rearmament will be happy to let Uncle Sam bear a disproportionate share of the burden, and countries closest to Russia will especially want a strong American security guarantee. Having a clear alliance leader with disproportionate abilities will allow for faster and more consistent decision-making within what could otherwise be an unwieldy coalition. So there are good reasons why die-hard Atlanticists sound the alarm bells whenever someone suggests tinkering with this formula.
However, the business-as-usual model has some serious drawbacks. The most obvious is the opportunity cost: keeping the United States as Europe’s first responder makes it difficult for Washington to devote sufficient time, attention, and resources to Asia, where threats to the balance of power are much greater and the diplomatic environment particularly complicated. A strong US commitment to Europe may mitigate certain potential causes of conflict there, but it did not prevent the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and US-led efforts to bring Ukraine into the Western security orbit helped provoke the current war. That’s not what anyone in the West intended, of course, but the results are what matter. Ukraine’s recent successes on the battlefield are extremely gratifying and I hope they continue, but it would have been far better for all involved if the war had never happened.
Moreover, the business-as-usual model encourages Europe to remain dependent on European protection and contributes to general complacency and a lack of realism in the conduct of European foreign policy. If you’re convinced that the world’s strongest power will jump to your side as soon as trouble starts, it’s easier to ignore the risks of over-dependence on foreign energy supplies and over-tolerance of creeping authoritarianism closer to home. And although few want to admit it, this model has the potential to drag the United States into peripheral conflicts that may not always be critical to the security or prosperity of the United States itself. At the very least, business as usual is no longer an approach we should support uncritically.
Model 2: Democracy International
The second model of transatlantic security cooperation emphasizes the common democratic character of (most) NATO members and the growing gap between democracies and autocracies (especially Russia and China). This vision is behind the Biden administration’s efforts to highlight shared democratic values and its openly expressed desire to prove that democracy can still trump autocracy on the global stage. The Alliance of Democracies Foundation of former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reflects a similar conception.
Unlike the usual model, which is primarily focused on European security, this conception of the transatlantic partnership encompasses a broader global agenda. He imagines contemporary world politics as an ideological competition between democracy and autocracy and believes that this struggle must be fought on a global level. If the United States is “turning” toward Asia, then so should its European partners, but for the broader purpose of defending and promoting democratic systems. In line with that vision, Germany’s new Indo-Pacific strategy calls for strengthening ties with the region’s democracies, and Germany’s defense minister recently announced an expanded naval presence there in 2024 as well.
This vision has the merits of simplicity—democracy is good, autocracy is bad—but its flaws far outweigh its virtues. To begin with, such a framework will inevitably complicate relations with autocracies that the United States and/or Europe have chosen to support (such as Saudi Arabia or other Gulf monarchies, or potential Asian partners such as Vietnam), and expose the transatlantic partnership to the charge of rampant hypocrisy. Second, dividing the world into friendly democracies and hostile dictatorships will certainly strengthen the ties between the latter and discourage the former from playing divide and rule. From this perspective, we should be glad that then-U.S. President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger did not accept this framework in 1971, when their rapprochement with Maoist China gave the Kremlin a new headache to worry about.
Finally, putting democratic values front and center risks turning the transatlantic partnership into a crusading organization that seeks to instill democracy wherever it can. However desirable that goal may be in the abstract, the past 30 years should show that not a single member of the alliance knows how to do it effectively. Exporting democracy is extremely difficult and usually fails, especially when outsiders try to impose it by force. And given the poor state of democracy in some of NATO’s current members, accepting this as the alliance’s primary raison d’être seems downright quixotic.
Model 3 is a close cousin of Model 2, but instead of organizing the transatlantic relationship around democracy and other liberal values, it seeks to include Europe in a broader US effort to contain a rising China. In fact, it seeks to unite America’s multilateral European partners with the bilateral core arrangements already in place in Asia, and bring European power potential against the only serious competitor the United States is likely to face for many years to come.
At first glance, this is an attractive vision, and one can point to the AUKUS agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia as an early manifestation of it. As Michael Mazarr of the Rand Corp. recently noted, there is growing evidence that Europe no longer sees China as just a lucrative market and valuable investment partner, and is beginning to “soft balance” against it. From a purely American perspective, it would be highly desirable for Europe’s economic and military potential to confront a primary challenger.
But there are two obvious problems with this model. First, states balance not only power but also threats, and geography plays a key role in these assessments. China may be increasingly powerful and ambitious, but its army will not march across Asia and attack Europe, and its navy will not sail around the world and blockade European ports. Russia is far weaker than China, but much closer, and its recent behavior is troubling even if its actions have unwittingly revealed its military limitations. Therefore, we should expect the softest soft balancing from Europe, and not a serious effort to counter China’s capabilities.
European NATO members do not have the military capacity to affect the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region in any significant way and are unlikely to acquire it anytime soon. The war in Ukraine may prompt European states to get serious about rebuilding their military forces—finally—but most of their efforts will go toward acquiring land, air, and surveillance capabilities designed to defend against and deter Russia. This makes sense from a European perspective, but most of those forces would be irrelevant to any conflict involving China. Sending a few German frigates to the Indo-Pacific region may be a good way to signal Germany’s expressed interest in the evolving security environment there, but it won’t change the regional balance of power or make much of a difference in China’s calculations.
Europe can help balance China in other ways, of course—by helping to train foreign militaries, selling weapons, participating in regional security forums, etc.—and the United States should welcome such efforts. But no one should count on Europe having a hard time balancing in the Indo-Pacific theater. Trying to put this model in place is a recipe for disappointment and increased transatlantic anger.
Model 4: New division of labor
You knew this was coming: a model that I think is real. As I have argued before (including recently here at Foreign Policy), the optimal future model for the transatlantic partnership is a new division of labor, with Europe taking primary responsibility for its own security and the United States paying much more attention to the Indo-Pacific region. The United States would remain a formal member of NATO, but instead of being Europe’s first responder, it would become its ally of last resort. From now on, the United States would plan to return to the mainland in Europe only if the regional balance of power erodes dramatically, but not otherwise.
This model cannot be implemented overnight and must be negotiated in a cooperative spirit, with the United States assisting its European partners in designing and acquiring the capabilities they need. Since many of these states will do everything in their power to convince Uncle Sam to stay, however, Washington will need to make it crystal clear that this is the only model it will support going forward. Until European NATO members really believe that they will be mostly on their own, their determination to take the necessary steps will remain fragile, and backtracking on their promises is to be expected.
Unlike Donald Trump, whose arrogance and bravado during his time as US president futilely annoyed allies, his successor Joe Biden is in an ideal position to initiate this process. He has a well-earned reputation as a committed Atlanticist, so encouraging a new division of labor would not be seen as a sign of resentment or anger. He and his team are in a unique position to tell our European partners that this step is in everyone’s long-term interest. Mind you, I don’t expect Biden & Co. take this step – for reasons I’ve explained elsewhere – but they should.
Did France rejoin NATO?
In 2004, France moved a step closer to NATO’s military structure by assigning personnel to the permanent headquarters of SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters, and in 2009, France formally rejoined NATO’s integrated military command structure.
Did France ever leave NATO? NATO HAS LEFT PARIS, BUT FRANCE HAS NOT LEFT NATO. Read also : Victory for asylum seekers in the US Supreme Court – USA.
How long did France leave NATO?
But France did not withdraw from the NATO political alliance and gave behind-the-scenes assurances to the United States – the Lemnitzer-Ailleret Agreements – that it would support NATO in the event of a nuclear war in Europe. It took France 43 years to change course.
Why did France leave NATO?
In 1966, due to strained relations between Washington and Paris over its refusal to integrate France’s nuclear deterrent with other North Atlantic powers, or to accept any collective form of control over its armed forces, French President Charles de Gaulle reduced France’s membership in NATO and France withdrew. On the same subject : Rethinking How the United States Trains Foreign Soldiers…
Why is Russia not in NATO?
In March 2015, Russia, citing NATO’s de facto violation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, said the suspension of its participation in it, announced in 2007, was now "complete" by ceasing participation in the consulting group for the Agreement. This may interest you : The Supreme Court saves politics.
Did the USSR try to join NATO? The USSR, fearing the renewal of German militarism in West Germany, proposed in 1954 to join NATO, but the USA and Great Britain refused. The Soviet request to join NATO appeared after the Berlin Conference in January-February 1954.
Is Russia member of NATO?
Membership decisions are made by consensus of all allies. None of the treaties signed by the United States, Europe and Russia contained provisions on NATO membership.
Is Russia apart of NATO 2021?
No, Russia is not part of NATO.
Who are the best friends of India?
Countries considered closest to India include the United Arab Emirates, the Russian Federation, Israel, Afghanistan, France, Bhutan, Bangladesh and the United States.
Why is Ukraine not a member of NATO?
Ukraine rejected plans for NATO membership after the 2010 presidential election that elected Viktor Yanukovych as president, who preferred the country to remain non-aligned. In the midst of the unrest caused by the Euromaidan protests, Yanukovych fled Ukraine in February 2014.
Is Ukraine a NATO ally? Ukraine is not a member of NATO. Ukraine is a NATO partner country, which means that it cooperates closely with NATO, but is not covered by the security guarantee in the founding treaty of the Alliance.
Is Russia a part of the NATO?
No, Russia is not part of NATO. In fact, the perceived aggressiveness of the Russian government is the main issue that NATO was established to counter. Despite this, throughout history, Russia has at least given the appearance of cooperation with NATO.
What countries have not joined NATO?
Six EU member states, all of which have declared that they are not members of military alliances, are not members of NATO: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. In addition, Switzerland, which is surrounded by the EU, has also maintained its neutrality by remaining a non-EU member.
Is NATO helping Ukraine?
In June, NATO leaders agreed on an enhanced aid package for Ukraine, and Mr. Stoltenberg emphasized that the Alliance will support Ukraine in the long term. The Secretary General said that the war in Ukraine is entering a critical phase: ‘In the coming months, our unity and solidarity will be tested.
