The scenes that emerged from Baghdad last week, as protesters dismantled concrete slabs and stormed an Iraqi parliament building, put the country’s political dysfunction in sharp relief. The loud but peaceful protesters shouted chants condemning the corruption that has kept one of the world’s largest oil producers on the list of the most corrupt nations in the world, suffering from electricity pollution, mass unemployment, and a lack of basic services. They emphasize the fact that the empty parliament building they stormed had 24-hour electricity, with air conditioning running while ordinary Iraqis suffer from the sweltering heat.
But despite appearances — including many demands similar to those that drove the 2019 protest movement — this was not a grassroots event. The demonstrators answered the call of the Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the sadistic movement. The storming of Parliament has now developed into a sit-in in the vicinity of Parliament to ensure that no legislative sessions can be held. In calling for the protests, Sadr demonstrated his ability to galvanize at least part of the Iraqi people. In response, Sadr’s opponents – mainly Islamist Shiite political parties backed by Iran and many with their own militias – declared their own counter-protests on Monday and marched into the Green Zone, announcing a sit-in at a key bridge over the Tigris.
The immediate cause of these competing protests is the ongoing dispute over who will form Iraq’s next government. Although Sadr’s bloc won the largest number of parliamentary seats in last October’s election, political maneuvering by his opponents prevented him from forming a government led by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Under these blocking maneuvers, enough newly elected members of parliament were convinced to stay away from parliamentary sessions, so that a quorum to vote for a new government could not be reached. Frustrated by these moves, Sadr declared that his deputies would resign, which they did, and that he would not oversee the formation of a new government, although it was his bloc’s constitutional right.
The scenes that emerged from Baghdad last week, as protesters dismantled concrete slabs and stormed an Iraqi parliament building, put the country’s political dysfunction in sharp relief. The loud but peaceful protesters shouted chants condemning the corruption that has kept one of the world’s largest oil producers on the list of the most corrupt nations in the world, suffering from electricity pollution, mass unemployment, and a lack of basic services. They emphasize the fact that the empty parliament building they stormed had 24-hour electricity, with air conditioning running while ordinary Iraqis suffer from the sweltering heat.
But despite appearances — including many demands similar to those that drove the 2019 protest movement — this was not a grassroots event. The demonstrators answered the call of the Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the sadistic movement. The storming of Parliament has now developed into a sit-in in the vicinity of Parliament to ensure that no legislative sessions can be held. In calling for the protests, Sadr demonstrated his ability to galvanize at least part of the Iraqi people. In response, Sadr’s opponents – mainly Islamist Shiite political parties backed by Iran and many with their own militias – declared their own counter-protests on Monday and marched into the Green Zone, announcing a sit-in at a key bridge over the Tigris.
The immediate cause of these competing protests is the ongoing dispute over who will form Iraq’s next government. Although Sadr’s bloc won the largest number of parliamentary seats in last October’s election, political maneuvering by his opponents prevented him from forming a government led by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Under these blocking maneuvers, enough newly elected members of parliament were convinced to stay away from parliamentary sessions, so that a quorum to vote for a new government could not be reached. Frustrated by these moves, Sadr declared that his deputies would resign, which they did, and that he would not oversee the formation of a new government, although it was his bloc’s constitutional right.
Sadr had tried to form a narrow coalition government that controls just a narrow majority of seats, a significant departure from the usual so-called national unity coalition that includes the majority of competing sides. The formation of a narrow coalition government, a normal procedure in other parliamentary systems around the world, was fiercely opposed by Maliki and others because it meant leaving them outside the billion-dollar patronage networks that control the government. .
But much more than access to government aid is at play here. It is also a struggle between Iraq’s main Islamist Shiite leaders over who will emerge as the country’s ultimate power broker – and the head of the heterogeneous Shiite Islamist political class. If both look to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s iron grip over Lebanese Shiite politics as a model, Iraq has too many political actors who do not accept being subjugated by a single leader.
On Wednesday, Sadr appeared on television calling for the dissolution of parliament and new elections – and declaring that his supporters would not give up their sit-in until his demands were met. He also called the current struggle a “revolution”. While other parties rejected his call, former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi threw his lot behind Sadr and declared support. The coming days will see further polarization as other political actors decide whether re-election will improve or hurt their position.
This latest faceoff is dangerous: All sides are heavily armed, and the possibility of a violent confrontation is high. Already, calls for de-escalation and a national dialogue have been issued by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the United Nations and a number of foreign governments. But if previous attempts at a national dialogue are anything to go by, any new effort is unlikely to yield serious results. The disagreement between those on the street is not about the substance or direction of the country – that can be negotiated – but who controls the country, a zero-sum game. It would only be a matter of time before the next political crisis shocks the country.
In the meantime, Kadhimi’s government is likely to continue in its caretaker role. In this it is very limited: No budget has been adopted for 2022, and despite much higher state revenues from oil due to increased prices, little of that money flows down to benefit Iraqis.
The Iraqi political system is broken – and it is surprising that it has survived this long. New elections would likely lead to the same situation unless one or two political blocs emerge with clear majorities to control parliament.
Iraqi politicians claim that all this dysfunction is a result of the parliamentary system. But in reality, the constitution has been repeatedly violated, the judiciary has been politicized, and corruption has permeated all levels of government.
Sadr has capitalized on the frustration with Iraq’s political class, which led to the victory of his bloc in last year’s elections on a platform of a complete “reform” of the political system. How such a reform would come about is not clear. What is clear is that the political entities that benefit from the current dysfunction are unlikely to want to fix it. Some Iraqis are hoping for an outside savior to force change in Iraq. While no one is seriously advocating a 2003-style invasion and takeover, there are hopes that an outside force could break the momentum created by those who have ruled the country for the past two decades. Sadr has intervened on the possibility of the UN, but this seems unlikely due to a divided UN Security Council and the general weakness of the organization.
A complete reform of the political system would benefit Iraq, but looks unlikely. And so political parties will try to get leverage where they can in the run-up to potential re-election. With an ongoing stalemate, but guaranteed, the growing fear in Iraq is that the adversaries will try to eliminate each other at gunpoint.
