Half a century of experience indicates the need for stronger measures to address future challenges.
In Beijing on February 15, 1972, China and the United States opened official diplomatic relations for the first time since the Communist Party took over China in 1949. From left to right: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, interpreter Nancy Tang, President of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong, US President Richard Nixon and US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger .Keystone Press Agency / Zuma Wire / Alamy Live News
Since the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, this Chinese propaganda poster reads: “Viva Chairman Mao, the brightest sun in our hearts.” The crowd holds up his Little Red Book.Shawshots / Alamy
In its US Indo-Pacific Strategy (February 2022), the Biden administration highlighted the growing challenges in Asia, particularly as the People’s Republic of China pursues a sphere of influence in Indo-Pacific. Peaceful and looking to become the most influential in the world. power. ” The strategy paper states: “From Australia’s economic coercion to the conflict along the Current Line of Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and the bullying of neighbors in the -Eastern and southern China, our allies and partners in the region carry a lot. of the cost of the injurious conduct of the PRC. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific. “
Meanwhile, in the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, Beijing abstained on the UN resolution condemning the invasion, reiterating Russia’s statements on US responsibility and NATO to the crisis, and refused to join the United States and the European Union in imposing economic sanctions on Russia. In fact, following their meeting in Beijing earlier this month, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced that the two countries “oppose further NATO growth” and “oppose the formation of structures.” of closed blocks and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region. and remain very vigilant about the negative impact of the US Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region. ” In addition, they “reaffirm that the new relations between the States between Russia and China are superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era,” and that “there is no no ‘prohibited’ areas of cooperation. “
Thus, US-China relations appear to be at a critical stage as an increasingly strong and authoritarian China has become more aggressive in pursuing its irredentist regional goals in an alliance with Putin’s Russia. which not only threatens the democratic allies of the United States and its partners in Asia but can also undermine the rules and values of the US-led liberal international order around the world. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — following its previous military operations in Georgia and Crimea, as well as intervention in Syria — serves as a useful wake-up call for the United States and the United States. its allies in Asia.
In this article, I will reflect on U.S. policy toward China over the past 50 years and outline my thoughts on the lessons we have learned that will, hopefully, be useful in addressing the growing challenges we will face from China. In this I rely in part on my own experiences during a 32-year career in Foreign Service that focused primarily on US-China relations.
Was U.S. Engagement Policy a Mistake?
In Foreign Affairs of November / December 2021, John Mearsheimer called the US policy of commitment to China a “colossal strategic mistake”, arguing that in recent history “there is no comparable example “It is too late to do much about it.” Mearsheimer wrote: “Washington has promoted investment in China and welcomed the country into the global trading system, thinking it will become a peace-loving democracy and a responsible stakeholder in a US-led international order. To see also : World Refugee Day 2022 – US State Department. . ” Despite this, he argued, “China has always had revisionist goals” that were against this order, and “the mistake was to allow it to become strong enough to act on them.”
In a subsequent rebuttal, G. John Ikenberry pointed out that the U.S. policy of engagement with China was part of a largely successful effort to create a post-war order that in it “the United States pushed and pulled the international system in a direction that broadly aligned with its own. interests, values, enact rules and institutions to foster liberal democracy, expand security cooperation with European and East Asian allies, and generate international coalitions to address the most serious threats to humanity. ” In the process, he noted, “Washington has built counterweights to Chinese power through a strengthened and deepened alliance system” and “regional institutions in the wider Asia-Pacific region.” Ikenberry concluded: “The main failure of the US strategy towards China was that the integration of the country into the liberal capitalist system would not become more conditional.” And he called on the United States “to work with its allies to strengthen liberal democracy and a secure global system — and to do so while seeking opportunities to work with its main rivals.”
While Beijing has been open to dialogues and negotiations, we have little to show for them.
As I see it, accepting Mearsheimer’s basic thesis would essentially be to reject the fundamental goals of U.S. post-war foreign policy that we in the Foreign Service have worked to advance, even if very much. times without success. Even during my station in Hong Kong during the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, when we assisted and offered aid to the flooding of political refugees fleeing the mainland, we kept hoping to keep the door open. China’s open will eventually lead to its transformation into one more country. an open and just society. We continued to work to promote bilateral ties during my tours in Shanghai in the mid-1990s, and then in Beijing in the early 2000s when China joined the World Trade Organization, and a decade later even when China began to assert and expand its regional presence. and the global range.
At the same time, it also became increasingly clear to me, especially during my last tour in Beijing (2011-2013) and over the past decade, that US engagement policy had failed to change. China’s autocratic political system or transforming Beijing into a “responsible stakeholder” in the international arena, while encouraging its rapid economic and military growth and enabling it to pursue increasingly assertive foreign policy. Nevertheless, I continue to argue that while this policy has so far failed, its long-term goals remain valid and achievable. As Richard Nixon himself wrote in an article in the October 1967 Foreign Affairs article: her hatred and threaten her neighbors. At the same time, he pointed out, this policy requires “recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China, and taking measures designed to counter that danger.” Nixon warned: “We could be disastrously wrong if, as we continue to pursue this long-term goal, we have failed in the short term to read the lessons of history.”
Learning Lessons
Signs for a protest in Hong Kong show South China Sunday Morning Post coverage of the People’s Republic of China government crackdown on protesters on June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. To see also : Health inequality leads to $320 billion in unnecessary health spending. Brian Harris / Alamy
So what went wrong, and what are the “lessons of history” we now need to learn so that we can take the necessary measures to confront China’s “present and potential danger”? I focus here on two critical lessons I have learned over the years.
1. Do not underestimate the determination and ability of the Chinese Communist Party in government to maintain its absolute power and resist political change.
I believe this is the most fundamental “history lesson” we have learned since US policy of engagement began 50 years ago. From the Wall of Democracy (1979) and the Tiananmen Massacre of June 4 (1989) to the repression of Falun Gong (1999), the Jasmine Revolution (2011) and the Movement of the Hong Kong Democracy (2019-2020), the CCP has shown widely. its determination and ability to stifle political dissent, suppress individual freedoms and resist political change in China. This process included in particular the cleansing of some of its own top leaders, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. In fact, even as Deng Xiaoping sparked economic reforms after 1989, the CCP actually tightened political control, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union that year.
The CCP has imposed draconian measures in Tibet and Xinjiang in its effort to curb “separatist” movements among ethnic minorities in China. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP’s quest for control doubled and returned to the economic field, targeting not only state-owned enterprises but both domestic and foreign private companies operating in China, and expanding into society. in general with widespread surveillance and censorship and initiation. “social credit scores” to assess citizens ’political loyalty. Finally, Beijing set aside Deng’s “hide and seek” caution and began to distort the growing economic and military power abroad to advance Xi’s “China dream.”
However, as an open letter to President Donald Trump shows in 2019, many Chinese analysts, including former U.S. diplomats, reject a contradictory stance toward Beijing. They continue to believe, as they wrote to Trump, that while “China’s challenges require a firm and effective response from the United States,” the recent measures taken by the United States “are fundamentally counterproductive” and contribute “directly to down in relations “that” we believe does not serve American or global interests. ” In the letter these authors argued that U.S. policy “should be based on a realistic assessment of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals, and behavior,” and that China is not a “monolith,” or the views of its leaders set in stone. “
They stated: “Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing to a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach to the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s opposing position toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, US actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs. ”
But the question remains: Why did the United States not respond earlier to China’s egregiously unfair trade practices?
While I also want to keep the hope that Beijing will eventually carry out political reforms and adopt constructive policies abroad, I now believe that it has become too dangerous to assume that the CCP will allow this to happen in the absence of a very difficult situation. a stronger — and even “adversary” —response from the United States and others. In opening up our markets and encouraging investment in China, we had assumed that an increasingly prosperous and internationally connected Chinese middle class and intelligence would eventually call for political reforms, as we have seen elsewhere in the Asia, and more cooperative ties with the West. Many were — and still are — convinced that the “end of history” and the rise of higher democracies from within were and are near.
This clearly did not happen, and China has even moved back under the current CCP leadership. However, we continued to facilitate China’s economic growth, which allowed the CCP to proclaim the “Beijing model” to its own people (“socialism with Chinese characteristics”) as superior to Western democracies and allowed strengthen the CCP’s internal controls. Ironically, the CCP has now teamed up with Russia to accuse the United States of adopting a “Cold War approach,” while further mobilizing nationalist sentiments to support its aggressive foreign policy goals.
To arrive at the “realistic assessment of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals, and behavior” called for by critics of Trump’s policy, it may also be useful to look back at the long history of CCP of violent political struggles, such as the right-wing anti-campaigns of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. The review of this story to date should strongly suggest that political changes will not take place without much more significant repression, even if this results in increased tension and deterioration in relations. Our continued unwillingness to accept this reality and the risks of confrontation over the years have led us to where we are today. I think it is time to readjust our expectations and consider new measures to confront China’s challenges.
2. Don’t assume that China’s internationalization and growing interdependence with the world will transform it into a “responsible stakeholder.”
“Our policy has been remarkably successful in expanding China’s international role,” then-Deputy Secretary of State (and former U.S. Trade Representative) Bob Zoellick said in a 2005 speech . But noting an “unacceptable” bilateral trade deficit of $ 162 billion with China, he added: “The U.S. business community, which in the 1990s saw China as a land of opportunity, now has an assessment more mixed. Smaller companies worry about Chinese competition, rampant piracy, counterfeiting and currency manipulation. Even larger U.S. businesses — once the backbone of economic commitment support — are concerned that Chinese mercantilist policies will seek to target controlled markets instead of opening up competitive markets. ”
Zoellick warned that China “cannot take its access to the U.S. market for granted” because “the U.S. will not be able to sustain an open international economic system — or U.S. domestic support for such a system.” this — without greater cooperation from China. ” Zoellick said: “As a responsible stakeholder, China is more than just a member — working with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.”
Now, almost twenty years later, there is little doubt that China has not become the “responsible stakeholder” that Zoellick thought. For starters, while in itself not an indicator of trade practices, the U.S. trade deficit with China will reach $ 355.3 billion in 2021. More to the point, as reported in the 2018 USTR Section 301 report, the U.S. Intellectual Property Commission estimated that “Chinese. U.S. IP theft is currently worth between $ 225 billion and $ 600 billion in year. ” The commission found that China is “the worst breach of the US IP” and that “China carries out a forced transfer of technology and theft including through industrial espionage, conditioning market access on a transfer of technology, tactical employment of regulations and vague laws to put pressure on US firms to transfer their. IP to avoid litigation and location requirements that force U.S. firms to host sensitive data in mainland China. ” The USTR report concluded: “The evidence brought in this investigation establishes that China’s technology transfer regime continues, despite repeated bilateral commitments and government statements.”
We must be prepared to take stronger measures — and accept the necessary costs and risks — to achieve the long-term goals of US engagement policy that began 50 years ago.
Even more worrying for the future, the USTR report explains that “China has issued a large number of industrial policies, including more than 100 five-year plans, science and technology development plans, and sectoral plans during the the last decade ”to achieve global leadership in key strategic industries, including information technology, robotics, aircraft, energy and the pharmaceutical industries. The Made in China 2025 Plan (MIC 2025), says the report, “sets out clear principles, tasks and tools to implement this strategy, including government intervention and substantial government, financial and other support for industries. Chinese targeted, “as well as” acquisition of foreign technology through various means. “
In an August 2020 “Focus” update, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that “Chinese government guidance funds (GGFs) send state funding to Chinese companies in support of Domestic R&D and overseas procurement, “and” as of March 2018, it is estimated that 1,800 GGFs linked to the 2025 MIC have been collectively valued at $ 426 billion. ” CRS stated: “GGFs target and fund strategic acquisitions that appear to build Chinese capabilities through the control of foreign corporate expertise, IP, talent pools, and links with suppliers and customers.”
Based on these assessments and after several rounds of negotiations, the United States has finally taken action to raise tariffs on more than $ 350 billion of Chinese imports in different portions. It has taken steps to order a national security review of Chinese investments in 27 “critical technology” industries and strict scrutiny of Chinese business operations in the United States.
But the question remains: Why did the United States not respond earlier to China’s egregiously unfair trade practices, as Zoellick suggested we can, and why do many continue to oppose current and future measures? One answer is provided in the USTR Section 301 report: “U.S. companies have stated for more than a decade, fearing they will face retaliation or the loss of business opportunities if they come forward to complain about China’s unfair trade practices. In addition, US companies lobbied against and sought exclusions from the recent tariff measures applied to Chinese imports affecting their business operations.
Beijing has long recognized the important role of the private sector in Western democracies and has not hesitated to use its leverage to put pressure on the United States to take action not only against China’s trade practices but also on political and security issues. In my experience in China, we have been expecting visits from U.S. businesses under pressure from the Chinese government whenever bilateral tensions have escalated, and this has now been extended to individuals and businesses in the United States. We have also seen such pressures applied by Beijing against other countries, as in the cases of Australia (on the investigation of the origin of COVID-19) or Korea (on the use of EU defense systems). United States missiles). So while we hoped that increased global interdependence would encourage China to be more responsible, it seems, on the contrary, that it primarily increased Beijing’s leverage against the rest of the world.
At the same time, while Beijing has been open to dialogues and negotiations, we have little to show for them. I recall that an official of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out at the end of my last tour in Beijing that China and the United States had conducted more than 90 annual dialogues by 2013 on a full range of topics from trade and security for work, law enforcement and man. rights. Sometimes “successful” talks have led to “commitments” and “agreements” —but, as we have been advising American companies, the actual negotiation begins after the contracts are signed. Our bilateral history is replete with such examples, dating back to the 1996 Sino-US Intellectual Property Agreement and the recent “historic and enforceable” First Phase Trade Agreement between the United States and China. Beijing has been able to use dialogues and agreements — as well as the WTO — to delay and divert retaliatory actions from other parties, while China continues its policies and practices.
Finally, Beijing has consistently used cooperation on “common interests”, such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation (North Korea and Iran), as a lever to demand US concessions on bilateral issues. As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi openly told US Presidential Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry in September 2021: “Climate change cooperation cannot be divorced from the general situation of China and the United States. relationships. The United States should work with China to meet in the middle and take positive action to bring China-U.S. relationships back on track. ” He urged the United States to “stop looking at China as a threat and a rival, and no longer suppress and curb China worldwide” and “actively respond to the” two lists “and” three lines of “put forward by China, and take concrete steps to improve China-U.S. relations.”
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, pictured here addressing the Munich Security Conference in 2017, insists that cooperation should involve US concessions to China.Kleinschmidt / MSC
Moving Ahead
From the above, it is clear that it will be very difficult for the United States to convince Beijing to carry out political reforms or assume the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in the current international order. See the article : The best Netflix movies and shows: trends June 23, 2022.
Former Assistant Secretary and current Coordinator of the Indo-Pacific National Security Council Kurt Campbell wrote in 2018: “The starting point for a better approach is a new degree of humility about the capacity of States Replacing China, neither seeking to isolate and weaken it nor trying to transform it for the better should not be the lodestar of U.S. strategy in Asia.Washington should instead focus more on strength and his own conduct, and the power and conduct of his allies and partners. ” Similarly, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy of 2022 emphasizes that “our aim is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, by building a balance of influence in the a world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share. ” Indicates that we will continue to work with the PRC in areas such as climate change and non-proliferation, believing that “it is in the interests of the region and the wider world that no country maintains progress on existing transnational issues due to bilateral differences. “
Made in China 2025 is a long-term PRC plan to strengthen China’s international competitiveness.www.gov.cn
As I see it, however, the lesson we have learned is not that we cannot and should not seek to change China, as it continues to violate the rules and laws of international trade and the universal principles of trade. human rights. Rather, it is that we must be willing to take stronger measures — and accept the necessary costs and risks — to achieve the long-term goals of US engagement policy that began 50 years ago. In his 1967 article, Nixon warned: “The world cannot be safe until China changes. So our goal, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China to change: that it cannot meet its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest needs to move away from foreign adventures and turn inward to the solution. of its own domestic problems. If we allow China to continue to take advantage of the current global order to pursue its economic growth, then I believe we are simply postponing the day of calculations, as we now see more clearly in the case of Russia.
So what should the United States do specifically? I argue here that, apart from defensively “shaping the strategic environment” around China, we can and should start by taking direct and stronger measures to ensure that China is no longer able to pursue the egregious trade practices that have enabled its economic and military growth and strengthening. its internal controls. It is critical that President Joe Biden maintained the Section 301 trade measures taken by the previous administration, but more needs to be done, including immediate action to enforce the Beijing First Phase Agreement clearly not carried out. The United States should act to impose stronger sanctions on Chinese entities that violate U.S. intellectual property rights and promote China’s industrial policies. While remaining open to working on “common interests,” the United States should reject any link with other bilateral issues and minimize further dialogues and negotiations that are simply intended to delay U.S. action. To enhance the impact of these measures, the United States must collaborate with our allies and within the WTO; but we must not refrain from acting alone as soon as possible.
At the same time, the United States should work with the European Union and other democracies, as well as with relevant non-governmental organizations, to document and publicize even more widely the serious human rights violations of democracy. ‘Beijing within China, especially against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, and its. policies supporting authoritarian regimes abroad, including its indirect support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ultimately, it will be up to the Chinese people to decide on their own political system, but we must continue to support those in China who seek to advance more constructive political reforms and policies abroad. We cannot do this by just avoiding confrontation. We must take further steps to support the individual rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as well as assist the people of Taiwan in their struggle to determine their own political future. As Martin Luther King wrote in 1963: “Injustice everywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”
The clear message we should be sending with these actions is not that the United States is seeking to weaken China, but that China can only continue to succeed if it abides by the rules of the international order from which greatly benefited. Because of China’s interdependence with the world, the United States and its allies have an important influence, but only if we are able to mobilize domestic and international support to use it. Doing so will be very difficult; and, frankly, I’m not confident it can be done the way things are in the United States today. In addition to Beijing’s retaliation against U.S. businesses and industries, as well as more recent concerns about inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy, there will continue to be opposition from those concerned about the risks of an “adversarial” approach. ”And the dangers of“ New Evil ”. War. ” But I still argue that we can’t expect much more. As Nixon warned in 1967, “we could be disastrously mistaken if, in continuing this long-term goal, we failed in the short run from reading the lessons of history.”
Robert S. Wang, a retired Foreign Service officer, is a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. During a 32-year career with the State Department, he served abroad in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Taiwan and Beijing, where he was deputy head of mission from 2011 to 2013. His last assignment to the Foreign Service before retiring in 2016 was as the senior US officer for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (2013-2015). He was a senior consultant at Covington & amp; Burling LLP (2016-2018) and fellow visitor with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2009-2010).
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