Shifting Sands: Why the United States Needs to Change Its Policy Towards Saudi Arabia
Rami Alkhafaji and Dr. Mahmut Cengiz
The background of the rise of Wahhabism
Among the sand dunes in central Arabia, a child was born who changed the course of the history of the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic world. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab was born in 1703 in ‘Uyayna, Arabia, in the Najd region of central Arabia.
Contrasted with the western part of Arabia, which enjoyed an influx of cultures, ideas and practices due to the annual Hajj pilgrimage to the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the eastern part of the country, al-Hasa, along the Persian Gulf coast which was also a bustling region exchanging ideas and cultures along with goods traded with Persia, India and beyond, the Nejd region was sparsely populated and experienced less exposure to other cultures and stuck to the harsh realities of the desert.
Abdul Wahab had a crisis of faith and traveled beyond Najd to cities in Iraq, Syria and Iran, but instead of softening his strict interpretation of the faith, he founded a dangerous cult that plagues the region to this day, a cult that condones violence against others, defines others Wahhabism as any individual or group that disagrees with any of Abdul Wahab’s extreme views.
Abdul Wahab presented his ideology in a book entitled The Book of Tawheed. In his book, Abdul Wahab wrote that anything that contradicts his faith should be destroyed, regardless of the object, whether it is “a king or a prophet, or a saint, a tree or a grave.” (Gold, 17-19). Abdul Wahab’s views were so extreme that both his father and brother condemned his book. Abdul Wahab’s brother, Sulaiman, wrote a treatise refuting his brother’s work entitled The Infallible Verdict in Refutation of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Shafiq and Donlin-Smith, 2021, p. 212).
Abdul Wahab took ibn Tayymiyah’s views to an extreme and called for the elimination of large sections of the population, whether Shia, Christian or even Sunni who did not agree with his ideology. Thus, from the beginning of its existence, Wahhabism was built to free the world from others who were perceived as different.
For any social, political or religious movement to be effective, three elements must be present: people, money and ideology. Abdul Wahab found support in Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of a nearby city. In 1744, the two formed an alliance of interest (Commins, 18). Ibn Saud and Abdul Wahab established a symbiotic relationship, where Abdul Wahab supplied the ideology and ibn Saud provided the military and financial support to spread their religious extremism and expand their political power in an unholy alliance of politics, money and pseudo-religion. The seed had been planted.
The alliance between the al-Sheikh family (descendants of ibn Abdul Wahab) and al-Saud continues to this day, lasting more than 250 years. The two families became intertwined and continue to control political and religious institutions in present-day Saudi Arabia. The families intermarried many times, and in today’s Saudi Arabia the minister of religion must always be a direct descendant of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (Ibrahim, 2002). Therefore, the Wahhabi faith cannot be distinguished from the Saudi state.
The Wahhabi establishment diligently and systematically destroyed all physical evidence of history in Arabia and beyond. Over 98% of the Kingdom’s historical and religious sites were destroyed with the attack on the Shia holy sites of Najaf and Karbala, a practice continued today by the modern descendants of Wahhabism, namely ISIS and al-Qaeda, and is clearly illustrated by the destruction of the holy mosque in Samarra by ISIS- and (Power, 2014). In addition, the Wahhabis destroyed the Buddhist statues of Bamyan in Afghanistan and the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud. Even the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad is not immune to Wahhabi attempts to erase Islamic history. The Wahhabi establishment has repeatedly declared its intention to raze the Prophet Muhammad’s tomb in Medina, exhume his remains and rebury them in a secret, unmarked grave. Their justification is the statement that people will worship the grave and not God.
The Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, France demonstrate the hypocritical nature of Wahhabi ideology. The attacks were carried out by Wahhabi terrorists who were outraged by an image in the magazine Charlie Hebdo depicting a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad; 12 people were killed. This points to extreme hypocrisy in Wahhabi ideology: a caricature of the prophet is a provocation deserving of death, but the destruction of his tomb is a religious duty (O’Toole 2015).
The United States may have had good intentions regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East by stemming the spread of communism after World War II. The colonial powers of the United Kingdom and France, and later the United States, supported the monarchies that ruled the former colonies after they withdrew from the Middle East region. By planting pro-American monarchies throughout the Middle East, the United States sought to contain the spread of communism throughout the Arab world while providing oil to fuel economic growth. Therefore, the United States provided political and military cover to the Saudi monarchy to ensure that the United States had adequate access to oil. In addition to the United States’ efforts to contain the spread of communism, the Saudi monarchy engaged in a platform of curbing democracy and secularism. The Saudi kingdom felt threatened by the secularist nationalism embodied in Nasser’s Egypt, and by liberal, socialist and Marxist currents within Arab and Islamic societies, particularly among the Shiites (Sells, 2016). While the United States may have had good intentions in supporting the Saudi monarchy, the unintended consequence was the strengthening of the Wahhabi cult. By ensuring that the Saudi monarchy had adequate weapons to counter the communist threat to oil reserves, the US administration gave the Wahhabis access to US weapons and money. Therefore, the unintended consequence of supporting the Saudi monarchy in ensuring adequate oil supplies has resulted in the United States becoming complicit in supporting Wahhabi terrorism. As a result, US policy in the Middle East region may have encouraged a monstrous ideology that it may not be able to combat.
The United States’ war on terror has failed because it neglects to address the sources of extremism. On the one hand, the United States is fighting terrorists, but it is not dealing with the main root of terrorism, the export of Wahhabist ideology from Saudi Arabia. The political decision to support a country that has entities that support Wahhabi terrorist organizations has directly led to the killing of Americans and the disruption of American interests abroad. Therefore, the political problem facing the United States is the alarming rise of Wahhabi terrorist organizations funded by wealthy Saudis that pose a threat to American interests and civilians at home and abroad.
Domestic issues aside, to understand the Middle East, the United States must examine the roots of the inner workings of Middle Eastern and Islamic societies to understand how they relate to contemporary politics and conflicts in the region. American media mainly portray extremists in one way, Wahhabist.
Sunni schools of thought emphasize the rule of Islamic law over societies, known as Sharia. Using ibn Taymiyyah’s school of thought as a mask, Wahhabi doctrine is the guiding principle of the radicalization of the Sunni population. They argue that if societies are not governed by Sharia as understood by the ibn Taymiyyah school of thought, then they are not considered Muslims. Donors who follow the Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia law have infiltrated Sunni mosques around the world through a network of books, imams, schools, and cultural centers to radicalize their followers (Alvi, 2014).
In Sunni society, there is no single authority that decides and gives an opinion on the implementation of Sharia. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of versions of Sunni Islam, leading to internal conflicts between the groups. This does not lead to unity within the institution. While Saudi Arabia claims to be the leader of the Islamic world, Saudi-funded Wahhabism attempts to organize and centralize extremist Sunni factions in pursuit of extremist-oriented goals.
Minorities in the Arab world have sought protection within their own sectarian identities as a means of protection against Wahhabi extremist groups. Their own sectarian identity is reinforced by the threat of Wahhabi radicals. This led Shia Muslims, who felt threatened by the Wahhabis, to seek Iranian support to establish equality with the Sunnis, if not supremacy.
Shia fears of Wahhabist extremist groups are not unfounded. The Wahhabi ulema sanctioned violence against the Shiites. Several fatwas by Saudi Arabia’s leading cleric, Abdul-Aziz ibn Baz, denounced Shias as apostates, and one by Abdul-Rahman al-Jibrin, a member of the Higher Council of Ulema, even authorized the killing of Shias—a call that was repeated in Wahhabi literature as recently as 2002. (Jones, 2005, p. 24).
The language and actions shown by Wahhabis towards the Shia population throughout the Middle East favors Iran. The Shiites have organized against the rise of Wahhabi extremist groups and are seeking support from Iran. Iranian groups have asserted newfound power across the Middle East in countries such as Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Thus, the spread of Wahhabism undermines American interests abroad by directly threatening American individuals through attacks, and American interests by allowing Iran to strengthen its presence in the Middle East as an opposition figure to the Wahhabi faith.
Wahhabi institutions recruit individuals around the world to indoctrinate them and spread Wahhabism in their communities. In addition to direct death threats and persecution, the ubiquity of Wahhabi ideology serves to marginalize or silence anyone who disagrees with it. This ideology operates in several ways in Saudi mosques and programs. Many technical workers, such as engineers and medical professionals, come to the oil-rich Gulf countries, often stay for years or decades, and return to their home countries with new economic status and destructive ideologies (Sells, 2016). In addition, Saudi Arabia offers scholarships to young Muslims around the world who do not have educational opportunities in their own countries and entices them to study Wahhabism in Saudi mosques. Students are provided with generous stipends that allow them to live well and stay for years, before returning home to serve as teachers or imams and spread Wahhabi ideology (Sells, 2016). In addition to funding students to learn and spread Wahhabi ideology, the Saudi state and wealthy individuals in the Gulf maintain or fund sophisticated publications and media networks dedicated to spreading Wahhabi doctrine and ideology (Sells, 2016). Finally, Saudi commercial and financial networks play a strong role worldwide and especially in the Middle East for those who need financing for small or large businesses on the front line (Sells, 2016). These companies believe that their chances of financing increase if they accept and profess certain ideologies. Therefore, Saudi society works in many ways to promote and reinforce an ideology that is firm in its belief that it will silence and drive out anyone who disagrees with it.
In addition to bringing individuals to Saudi Arabia to return home and spread Wahhabism, Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia exert influence abroad through financing mosques, schools, textbooks, imams, imam learning centers and exchanges, cultural institutions around the world, and money exchanges in the form of pseudo -businesses, banking and informal transport of cash through the hawala system (Alvi, 2014). This creates a complex and sophisticated system of Wahhabi jihadist networks that operate around the world, including the United States. Additionally, they use this money to establish Wahhabi control over Islamic institutions, subsidize extremist madrassas, and control Islamic publishing houses. Saudi entities currently control approximately four-fifths of all Islamic publishing houses (Terrorism, 2003).
Wahhabi schools and mosques were nurseries of extremist ideologies. In fact, a document released by Wikileaks describes Saudi Arabia as an ATM for terrorists, from a secret memo written by Hilary Clinton in December 2009, while she was Secretary of State (Walsh, 2010). It highlights the inability of Gulf countries to block funding to groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan’s LeT. The problem was particularly acute in Saudi Arabia. People would be disguised as pilgrims during the Hajj pilgrimage and receive money from charities certified by the Saudi government to set up fake companies to launder funds for their particular terrorist organization (Conesa, 2020). In recent decades, the Saudis have spent about 100 billion dollars on the spread of Wahhabism. In fact, the Saudis spend $2.5 billion a year exporting Wahhabism around the world (Terrorism, 2003).
According to data published by the RAND Corporation, the number of terrorist organizations with Wahhabi ideology has grown at an alarming rate since 1988. In fact, roughly half of the world’s Wahhabi terrorist organizations in 2013 were in Syria, where much of the US-made weapons and funding came from from Saudi Arabia (Jones, 2014). Additionally, in 2014, Saudi Arabia gave $500 million to extremist groups in Iraq under the guise of humanitarian aid (Conesa, 2020). In 2014, Iraq and Syria saw the rise of ISIS and were terrorized by their brutal acts. This drew the United States into the Middle East to wage new wars against Wahhabi terrorist organizations. Therefore, effectively redirecting the United States’ response to the alarming rise of Wahhabi terrorist organizations would mean addressing the root cause of the problem: Saudi Arabia’s channeling of money and weapons to these groups. Once upon a time, members of the Wahhabi tribe attacked cities to spread their religion. Now that job has become the task of financial institutions funded by the Saudi state and the Wahhabi ulama (Nasr, 2007, p. 155).
Since the mid-1960s, Wahhabi organizations have been very active in the United States. To spread Wahhabism in the United States, Saudi elements used their vast amounts of money obtained from oil revenues. Individuals use their money to spread their ideology in mosques around the world and succeed in doing so. The money is used to build mosques, madrassas, schools and Sunni cultural centers. All these places need people to lead them, and Saudi Arabia provides them. Saudi Arabia sends priests to these mosques and teachers to madrassas, schools and Sunni cultural centers. These institutions and priests are intended to preach Wahhabi ideology. The problem with Saudi funding of American mosques is that the people who accept the funds are more likely to convert to Wahhabism (Conesa, 2020). Since 1984, some embassies have religious attachés who derive directly from Wahhabi ideology whose mission is to promote their version of “Islam”. In the 1980s, the Saudi embassy office in Washington had an annual budget of $8 million and 35-40 employees to build mosques, distribute Qurans, and provide Wahhabi and Salafist training to foreign imams to lead congregations (Conesa, 2020). There are extensive networks of money and people traveling around the world to try to spread this extremist ideology, most successfully in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Shell Charities and Humanitarian Aid
Of course, there is no single mechanism for identifying what is known as “Saudi money” given to terrorist networks around the world. Funds come from public and private sources and are channeled through various foundations and charities that distribute assets, making it difficult to track. Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth has benefited Wahhabi extremists, who have capitalized on the social disruption and corruption generated by the oil economy to gain support and spread their radical views around the world. (The New York Times, 2009).
The Wahhabis seek to spread their doctrine among the struggling youth. Youth affected by poverty struggle with identity, which makes them particularly vulnerable to manipulation. Research has shown that extremist organizations, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, are exploiting the global identity crisis among Muslim youth to recruit individuals into their organizations (Suleiman, 2017). These groups promote a very specific set of ideas and a singular purpose – ideas that originate in the Gulf region, and in particular Saudi Arabia. By exploiting and indoctrinating the youth, the Wahhabis set up fake charities to manufacture and spread their network of extremism.
The guise of humanitarian aid and charities continues to be Saudi Arabia’s way of supporting the export of Wahhabism. For example, the then prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz established a commission to supposedly help Bosnian orphans from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 600 million dollars were collected. In October 2001, NATO forces raided the offices of the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia in Sarajevo. They found maps of Washington, D.C., with bull’s-eyes on government buildings, a computer program explaining how to use a duster (a method of spreading chemical weapons), and photographs of past American targets of terrorist attacks. This was quite indicative that this committee was a staging ground for planning terrorist attacks on Americans and American interests (Gold 146).
Additionally, in documents published by the New York Times, lawyers conducted a taped interview in 2008 with a former Bosnian prisoner, Ali Ahmad Ali Hamad, who says he was an al-Qaeda operative and met Osama bin Laden several times in training. in Afghanistan camps. In an interview, Mr. Ali Hamad claimed that the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, which is largely funded by members of the Saudi royal family, recruited him and other known al-Qaeda members and provided them with money, vehicles and supplies during and after the Bosnian conflict. (The New York Times, 2009).
The Muslim World League (MWL) was founded in Mecca with the status of a non-governmental organization. In 1962, when MWL was founded, the Saudi government remitted a quarter of a million dollars. In 1980, that contribution grew to $13 million, not including private donations. Based in Mecca, its secretary general must be Saudi. As of 2016, the MWL is present in 120 countries and controls about 50 major places of worship in Europe alone: Madrid, Grenada, Kensington, Mantes-la-Jolie, Copenhagen, Brussels, Geneva, Zurich, Rome and Sarajevo, among others (Schulze, 1990) . According to a 2008 New York Times report, MWL is a Saudi NGO with a history of links to terrorism (Macfarquhar, 2008).
Another organization that has been accused of financing terrorist operations is The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). IIRO is a charity based in Saudi Arabia, founded in 1978 by MWL. In August 2006, the United States Treasury Department accused the Philippine and Indonesian branches of the IIRO and its executive director, Abdul Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujila, of supporting Islamic militant groups, providing donor funds directly to Al-Qaeda, and raising funds for other entities. including the Abu Sayyaf group (US Congress, Senate, 2003). Lawyers for the 9/11 families and their insurers have amassed several hundred thousand pages of interview transcripts, government reports, financial records, court testimony and other material in an attempt to link members of the Saudi royal family to al-Qaida funding. An internal, top-secret Treasury Department report provided the intelligence details behind the decision to blacklist two of the IIRO’s branches – Indonesia and the Philippines – and one of its leaders. The report found that the IIRO supported terrorist organizations beginning in the early 1990s “until at least the first half of 2006.” (The New York Times, 2009). Lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Saudi suit, who received a partially redacted copy of the Treasury Department report, said other affidavits and statements from charity officials showed that IIRO was largely run by members of the Saudi royal family (The New York Times, 2009).
MWL and IIRO are part of the Saudi Relief Committee, the Saudi Red Crescent and the World Muslim Youth Assembly. Al-Haramain Foundation, based in Saudi Arabia and a partner of MWL, was also a member before being declared persona non-grata by international organizations after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Conesa, 2020 p. 72). The Al-Haramain Foundation has worked in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Comoros, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Tanzania and the United States. His funding allowed him to secure $40-50 million a year worldwide, with some of that money going to al-Qaeda (Conesa, 2020, p. 74). On June 2, 2004, the United States Treasury Department listed Al-Haramain as “one of the leading Islamic NGOs supporting al-Qaeda and promoting Islamist militancy on the planet” (Conesa, 2020 p. 74). The organization was put on the United Nations blacklist.
Some members of the United States Congress acknowledge that Wahhabism is an ideology that incites violence, and that Saudi support undermines security in the United States and the Middle East. Senator John Kyl stated at a congressional hearing on 9/11: “It is common knowledge that all 19 suicide pilots were Wahhabis. In addition, 15 of the 19 were Saudi nationals. Journalists and experts, as well as world spokesmen, said that Wahhabism is the source of the vast majority of terrorist crimes in today’s world, from Morocco to Indonesia, through Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Chechnya. In addition, Saudi media sources have identified Wahhabi operatives from Saudi Arabia as responsible for terrorist attacks on American troops in Iraq” (Terrorism, 2003). So members of Congress are aware that Wahhabism encourages terrorism, but mere acknowledgment without action does not solve the problem. More needs to be done to ensure America’s interests and security.
Estimates put 50% of mosques under Wahhabi control in the United States, with some estimates as high as 80% under direct Wahhabi control (Terrorism, 2003). This is very troubling in terms of American security. Elements within Saudi society have control over the inner workings of American society by supporting radicalization in mosques in the United States. Wahhabi ulama can unleash a terrifying wave of terrorism by radicalizing members of the mosques they control.
In fact, members of the Saudi royal family have threatened the United States with the well-known expressions of violence that terrorist organizations use to threaten the United States. After President Joe Biden said Saudi Arabia would face consequences for cutting oil production amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Saudi Prince Saud al-Shaalan, who is linked to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, attacked President Biden and the United States. He warned leaders not to threaten Saudi Arabia, saying: “Anyone who questions the existence of this country and this kingdom. All of us, we are products of jihad and martyrdom…that’s my message to everyone who thinks that it can endanger us” (Lee, 2022). This is pretty scary, a member of the Saudi royal family has threatened the United States with statements that mimic those of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Therefore, using threats of violence that mimic those of ISIS, Saud al-Shaalan insinuated that the Wahhabis have influence in the United States and can therefore influence people to take violent action if the Saudi royal family feels their position is threatened.
If Wahhabi clerics funded by Saudi Arabia are allowed to continue to preach in communities around the world, and Saudi Arabia continues to be a breeding ground for terrorist money launderers, then extremism in the United States and around the world will continue to grow. Importantly, if the United States wants to stop the spread of international terrorism, it must crack down on Saudi-funded mosque construction and Saudi-funded preaching in mosques in the United States (Pandith, 2019).
Policy proposals and conclusion
The most important step the United States can take toward eliminating extremism would be to combat Wahhabism worldwide by cutting off the Saudi money that funds it. Without funding, the Wahhabis would not be able to spread their interpretations around the world. The more money the Saudis get through oil revenues and huge stock portfolios, the more money Saudi elements invest in spreading Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia may be helping to counter Iran’s influence and power in the region, and they are buying billions of dollars in weapons systems from the United States, but at the same time they are taking actions that feed extremism and help it grow. If the United States allows the Wahhabi ideology funded by Saudi Arabia to prevail, extremists will continue to find fertile recruiting ground around the world. Although ISIS has been defeated territorially, other extremist groups will emerge in its place that are just as harsh because the same ideology remains (Pandith, 2019). If the United States does not act to prevent the growth and spread of Wahhabism, more extremist groups will form, more domestic terrorism will emerge, and American citizens at home and abroad will be threatened with attack.
Wahhabi fanatics are undermining American interests by allowing Iran to gain support as an opposition figure to the Wahhabi faith. Iran has increased its influence in the region by gathering support against terrorist groups such as ISIS. Iran exerted military influence in Syria and Iraq in direct response to the rise of ISIS (Boghani and Tsui, 2016). This is also a big issue because Iran is conducting operations against US interests in the Middle East. Therefore, if the United States is committed to fighting terrorist entities and not allowing Iran to gather support, then the United States must work with regional partners to stop the spread of Wahhabism.
Additionally, if the United States were to consider a more aggressive strategy to target Wahhabi groups, the United States could support pro-democracy entities within Saudi Arabia that oppose Wahhabi doctrine. If the United States supports reform movements—economically, logistically, or militarily—in Saudi Arabia, through democracy-seeking elements and marginalized elements of Saudi society, it could put pressure on the Saudis to allow elements at home to spread terrorism abroad, there would be consequences.
The United States government must strictly monitor the funds that the Saudis “donate” to mosques in the United States. Sanctioning organizations and individuals involved in money laundering for these “charities” could prove very effective. Additionally, the US government must hold Saudi Arabia accountable by cutting military aid to the Saudi kingdom if they continue to spread this ideology. Given the war in Yemen and fears of Iranian incursion into the region, US military assistance is critical to the safety and security of the Gulf region.
The US government may reconsider arms sales to Saudi Arabia if it believes that Saudi Arabia will not stop promoting policies that inevitably manifest in terrorist attacks against Americans and American interests. Arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been a cornerstone of typical American policy in the Middle East. In 2017, former President of the United States Donald Trump signed a $350 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (Starr, 2017). A deeply troubling circumstance that could develop from the enormous amounts of US arms sales, roughly $51 billion a year since Trump’s election, to countries that host terrorist-supporting institutions is that they could use those weapons to attack Americans and American interests ( Laforgia and Bogdanich, 2020). If the Saudi monarchy believes that the United States threatens its rule, then it will use any means to preserve its rule, even if that means using American-made weapons against Americans. Republican Senator Mike Lee stated in a New York Times article, “We don’t know how these weapons are actually being used or could be turned against US troops in the future” (Laforgia and Bogdanich, 2020).
History has proven that the sale of US weapons to other countries can result in the use of those same weapons against interests, such as the previous sale of weapons to Iran that are now being used to fight US interests in the Middle East and the sale of weapons to Iraq during Iran. of the Iraq War that were eventually used against American troops in the First Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq. Because elements in Saudi Arabia support the extremist view of Wahhabism and export this ideology around the world, if the United States continues to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, there will be a huge threat that American-made weapons will be directed to terrorist entities for use against American interests—which has already happened in Syria. Therefore, if the United States is committed to helping Saudi Arabia but does not want to face the growing threat of American-made weapons ending up in the hands of Wahhabi terrorists, then the United States should provide democracy and enlightenment, not bullets and fighter jets, to the Saudi population.
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