China’s leaders in 2023 face numerous domestic social, economic and public health stresses. If past is prologue, it makes sense that China’s leaders will respond by trying to calm their external environment in order to concentrate on domestic challenges. To counter scrutiny of their record of domestic governance, they will want to present an image of dignity and respect to their people abroad. Nowhere will such symbolism be more important than in the US-China context. How Chinese leaders manage relations with the United States is often a factor in how they are perceived at home. While the broad competitive landscape of the U.S.-China relationship is unlikely to change, opportunities may emerge for the U.S. to advance discrete positive priorities with China next year.
To put it bluntly, there is no credible indication that China is softening its foreign policy toward the United States, or accommodating American concerns about Chinese behavior. In the work report of the 20th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed that China will have to “struggle” in the face of Western opposition to China’s rise. Other Chinese officials also said at the Party Congress that the spirit of “struggle” will define the country’s foreign policy.
Don’t bet on lessening of tensions
Well, next year China will probably redouble its pressure on Taiwan and its efforts to impose its will on Hong Kong. Beijing will continue to exercise an iron fist against any signs of domestic dissent. It will support regions with large ethnic minority populations, including Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Beijing will continue to favor state intervention in its economy and will likely step up its efforts to acquire intellectual property from abroad by hook or by crook. Read also : The expert group calls for a renewal of the U.S. Public Health System. China’s diplomatic activism is unlikely to abate. The People’s Liberation Army will expand the range and frequency of operations as its capabilities grow. China will not favor the US over North Korea. Xi’s relationship with Putin and Russia and China will continue to invest.
Washington will also take actions that increase the competitive dynamics of the relationship with Beijing. There will be more high-level Congress visits to Taiwan. A Republican-controlled House will expand public criticism of China’s activities, including by looking into the origins of COVID-19. The Republican presidential candidates will be competing to outdo each other in their hawkishness about China. The Biden administration will invest in coalition efforts in the Asia-Pacific to strengthen deterrence and limit China’s technological advances in areas sensitive to national security.
Even so, Beijing may still see virtue in easing tensions with the US. In the 1950s, Mao used a strategy of “fight, fight, talk, talk” to regroup, analyze the opponent, and gather strength to re-enter the protracted struggle. A similar effort can now be made in Beijing.
Such an approach would allow Beijing to reassert its governing authority. It would also reduce America’s ability to form coalitions based on issues that challenge China’s interests. And with Xi traveling to the US in November for the APEC leaders’ meeting, a more relaxed environment would fuel his interest in US President Joe Biden’s preferential treatment.
Beijing wants to give as little as possible to gain the benefit of stabilized relations and preferential public treatment for its leaders. From China’s perspective, the next natural step in advancing these goals will be to negotiate with American counterparts the guiding principles for the US-China relationship. Xi has previously stated that relations should be guided by mutual respect, mutual benefit and a shared commitment to peaceful coexistence. It is of little benefit to the diplomats of the United States to lead them into negotiations on these principles. Even if mutually accepted, they would not constrain Chinese behavior or resolve any underlying tensions in the relationship.
How the United States should respond to China
Rather than reacting to China’s efforts to negotiate guiding principles for the relationship, the Biden administration would be wise to lay out its specific goals for next year. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to China in the first quarter of 2023 gives the US an opportunity to set the agenda. This may interest you : United States: Parole process for Venezuelan citizens opens today. By setting specific goals and signals for moving them forward, Blinken can focus the relationship on America’s top priorities and concerns. China’s focus on positive optics for Xi’s visit to the US in November will offer an opportunity to boost form.
In terms of security, both sides can take practical measures to reduce the risk. Among other things, reaching agreement on limits on the use of new and emerging technologies in areas where both sides are vulnerable and where there are currently no rules. For example, both sides would benefit from imposing limits on the use of autonomous weapon systems enabled by artificial intelligence. As a first step, both sides could agree that humans should be responsible for all nuclear launch decisions and that those decisions should never be delegated to artificial intelligence-enabled systems. Both sides have also demonstrated destructive anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). They may agree to limit future testing of ASAT weapons to avoid creating orbital debris.
Both countries are also vulnerable to future pandemics. They have a mutual interest in creating a global disease surveillance network to detect future virus outbreaks before they spread. A similar logic applies to climate change. Methane plays a major role in the rise in temperature. Both sides would benefit from pooling capabilities to advance research into the challenges and solutions to reducing methane emissions.
America’s opioid epidemic also demands attention. Chinese officials say the problem is one of demand, not supply. However, US and Chinese officials need to think more creatively about practical steps to reduce the flow of fentanyl to the United States with precursor chemicals of Chinese origin.
This list of priority issues is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. There are other critical areas where mutual interests must compel common goals, such as limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities, ensuring seamless energy flows and greater food security, combating ocean pollution, and coordinating debt relief in the developing world. The point is that there is a robust menu of issues where both sides can take parallel or coordinated actions that would serve their mutual interests.
Is the risk worth the benefit?
Skeptics will say that there is no point in pursuing a positive agenda with China, given the inherent competitiveness of the relationship and China’s inability to respond favorably to American proposals. This skepticism may be true, but it should be tested first. In 2022, such pessimism would prevent the United States from successfully lobbying China for material support to sustain Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. To see also : NAVAF Joins Allies and Partners for Grand African NEMO 22. Biden would have prevented China’s Xi from drawing opposition to Putin’s nuclear saber. It would also have prevented America’s Public Enterprises Oversight Commission from successfully ensuring full transparency by Chinese regulators on the books of Chinese companies listed on American stock exchanges.
Others will warn that China will insist on issue nexus, meaning that it can demand that the United States reduce pressure on China in other sensitive areas as a precondition for coordinating on common challenges. The upshot of these warnings is that Washington should not be squeamish about softening its stance on Taiwan or Xinjiang for cooperation. In fact, this is not new. The way for the United States to overcome China’s requests to “create favorable conditions for cooperation” is first that Washington is willing to improve or worsen the relationship according to China’s choices, and second, that Washington will consider and welcome China’s contributions. leadership to face challenges. This allows China to enjoy international recognition, as the United States considers China’s specific contributions to US priorities.
At the strategic level, American leaders are receiving a strong signal of demand from international partners to responsibly manage competition with China. Thus, even if Beijing refuses its efforts to advance a positive American agenda, the world will be alerted to where the obstacle lies. This, in turn, will open up American political space to bring together partners in common projects in Asia.
Situating China among global challenges
Finally, China will be one of the challenges that the Biden administration will face in the new year. The White House would be in a stronger position to manage its many challenges — such as the pandemic, mass migration, the global recession, global warming, Ukraine, food and energy shortages, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran — if it is able to navigate it. As part of a set of global challenges that China has to face. This does not mean giving in to China or taking a chance on sensitive issues like Taiwan, technology or human rights. America must continue to stand firm in defending US interests and the values it shares with its closest allies. Rather, it means recognizing that there are few major challenges in the world that China does not consider a partner or a problem.
Ultimately, the United States and China are locked in a long-term competition to determine which model of government can best solve global problems and improve the lives of citizens. Performance will drive the perception of power. America is strongest at home when it is improving its situation and driving global efforts to address common challenges, not when it is consumed by the rivalry of an ambitious but limited power.
