PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN calls this the “defining decade.” Yet the label barely captures the moment: the beginning of a post-Cold War era in which Russia and China can violently undo the US-shaped world order. “Great Power Competition” is too tame amid Russia’s destruction of Ukraine; the “new cold war” too reductionist given the complex economic interdependence of the West with China.
The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has shattered the norm, established after World War II, that borders should not be changed by force. It has revived the specter of nuclear war for the first time since the end of the cold war, with a twist: Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, has wielded the threat of nuclear weapons not as a last resort, but as an opening tactic to protect your war. of aggression
However, Russia represents only the “acute” problem, as the United States sees it. The biggest threat to world order, what the Pentagon calls its “pace” challenge, comes from China, the only country with the potential to unseat the United States as the world’s preeminent power. China’s military is expanding rapidly. It already has the world’s largest navy, the third largest air force, a wide variety of missiles, and the means to wage war in space and cyberspace.
What if the “no limits” friendship between Russia and China turns into a real alliance? Right now there is little evidence of China helping Russia’s war. But the Eurasian autocracies regularly hold military exercises, and some top US officials believe the two are bound to grow closer. As China increases its nuclear arsenal to perhaps 1,500 warheads by 2035, approaching the size of the US and Russian arsenals, the US will have to learn the novel art of a three-way nuclear deterrent. That, in turn, may lead to a new arms race, particularly if the New START treaty, which limits US and Russian nuclear weapons, expires in early 2026 without a follow-up deal.
The transformation takes place at a time when the relative weight of the United States in the global economy has diminished. Over the past century, the United States’ GDP has been far greater than that of its rivals: Germany and Japan in World War II, the Soviet Union and China in the Cold War. These days, however, China’s GDP is not far behind that of the United States (and already exceeds it when measured in purchasing power parity). US defense spending, while gigantic in absolute terms, has been near record lows as a percentage of GDP. That is beginning to change, after Congress voted Dec. 23 to approve a substantially larger defense spending increase than Biden had requested.
Heartland v Rimland Old geopolitical theories are being reexamined. In 1904, the British geostrategist Halford Mackinder argued that whoever controlled the core of Eurasia, roughly between the Arctic Sea and the Himalayas, could rule the world. In that analysis, an alliance between Russia and China could pose a serious threat. By contrast, Mackinder’s American contemporary, Alfred Thayer Mahan, viewed control of commercial sea lanes as the key to global power. Somewhere in the middle, Nicholas Spykman, another American, argued in 1942 that what mattered was not the heart of Eurasia but its edge. He held that the maritime borders stretching from the Atlantic, across the Mediterranean, around South Asia to Japan, were the vital terrain. “Whoever controls Rimland rules Eurasia,” he wrote. “Whoever rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.” By seeking to leverage its alliances to counter its Eurasian rivals, the United States appears to be moving closer to Spykman’s thesis.
In the far West, NATO has been reinvigorated to strengthen Europe and confront Russia. US forces and other allied forces have been reinforced along the border with Russia. Abandoning the last vestiges of neutrality, Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO. Assuming the final hurdles to ratification, from Turkey and Hungary, can be cleared, the new members should join in 2023.
Above all, the Western allies have extensively armed and supported Ukraine to begin to push back the Russian attack. Despite complaints from “America First” devotees of Donald Trump, Biden’s predecessor, Congress has agreed to provide $7 billion more than the $37.7 billion Biden requested in aid to Ukraine in the fiscal year that it ends in September 2023. Far from weakening the Western alliance, Mr. Putin has strengthened it. Aaron David Miller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an American think tank, lists two other unintended consequences: “It has created a moment of bipartisanship in the United States. And it has offered Biden a moment of redemption after the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, on the eastern edge of the rim, rumors of a future war with China over Taiwan have intensified, especially since US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to the island in August. Biden hopes that his recent in-person meeting (his first as president) with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has put a “floor” on the deterioration of relations. Xi may be worried about problems at home, particularly the slowdown in the economy and the upheaval of his covid policies. But US military officials, in particular, say it wants to build the military capability to seize Taiwan by 2027.
The United States does not have a NATO-like alliance in Asia to restrain China. Instead, it operates a hub-and-spoke system of bilateral defense agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand; these countries have no obligations to each other. To create greater coherence, the United States has been working on expanding ad-hoc schemes. The “Five Eyes” (with Australia, Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand) share intelligence; AUKUS (with Australia and Great Britain) seeks to develop nuclear-powered submarines and other weapons; and the Quad (with Australia, India and Japan) discusses everything from vaccinations to maritime safety. South Korea and Japan are putting aside old grievances for joint exercises, amid intense missile fires (and an expected nuclear test) by North Korea.
Japan has announced plans to double defense spending over the next five years, but is still hamstrung by its tradition of pacifism. The autonomous island of Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations with most countries and is excluded from the many regional US military exercises. Biden has repeatedly suggested that he would defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, but much remains to be clarified. Under the “strategic ambiguity” doctrine, the US will not say precisely under what circumstances it might intervene and what it would do, especially in the case of “grey” attacks, such as a blockade. That makes it difficult for Taiwan to heed the US call to switch more fully to a “porcupine” defensive strategy. Congressional budget makers, moreover, have largely ignored a bipartisan bill to provide Taiwan with billions of dollars in grants to buy military equipment, similar to aid given to Ukraine and Israel.
The middle of Spykman’s rimland is tricky. The Biden administration has worked hard to appeal to members of ASEAN, the regional grouping for Southeast Asia. But for the most part they do not want to be forced to choose between China, their main trading partner, and the United States, the main guarantor of regional security.
India remains the grand prize for American strategists. It has a tradition of nonalignment and pro-Soviet leanings, but has grown closer to the United States as its relations with China have frayed. The annual Malabar naval exercises between the United States and India have grown to include all members of the Quad. The differences persist. India has been coy in directly criticizing Putin’s attack on Ukraine. Yet, says Kurt Campbell, a senior White House adviser on Asia, it represents “by far the most important bilateral relationship for the United States in the 21st century.”
Meanwhile, in the Middle East and Central Asia, successive US presidents have tried to reduce their military commitments after decades of fruitless war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Expect a new Republican-dominated House of Representatives to hound the Biden administration over the chaotic exit from Afghanistan. But the drone strike in Kabul in July that killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri underscores Biden’s claim to keep an “over the horizon” fight against terrorism.
In addition, the spike in oil and gas prices earlier this year, aggravated by the war in Ukraine, has reaffirmed the geopolitical importance of the Gulf. Having once declared Saudi Arabia a “pariah,” Biden visited the country in July and punched Muhammad bin Salman, the country’s crown prince and de facto ruler, with his fist. “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum for China, Russia or Iran to fill,” Biden told Arab leaders in Jeddah. He got little in return, either in terms of lower oil prices or Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel. In December, Gulf leaders gave Xi a noticeably warmer reception.
US relations with Israel may also be tested by the return of Binyamin Netanyahu at the head of a coalition that includes far-right ministers. Biden’s hope of curtailing Iran’s atomic program by reviving a nuclear deal has been dashed. Any agreement to lift the sanctions is now impossible given the extensive anti-regime protests in Iran. However, Iran’s work on uranium enrichment continues apace, challenging Biden’s promise to prevent mullahs from acquiring nuclear weapons.
As for the rest of the world, the United States and its allies have won a succession of mixed votes denouncing Russia in the UN General Assembly. However, support for the West in the global south is fragile. Many countries see themselves as victims of a distant war in Europe that has raised fuel and food prices and diverted international attention from other crises. Furthermore, they do not want to be caught in the middle of a cold war between the United States and China.
The West has responded to such concerns in a number of ways: by pushing for a mechanism that would allow Ukraine to export grain from its Black Sea ports; try to impose a cap on Russian oil prices; promote global health initiatives; and the creation of a Western mechanism to finance infrastructure projects and challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative. More broadly, Biden has toned down his initial effort to divide the world into democracies and autocracies. It has hosted a succession of large regional summits, mostly with leaders from Asia, the Pacific Islands, Latin America and Africa.
The big hole in his strategy is the lack of an attractive economic and trade policy to further unite allies and friends. The US-EU Council on Trade and Technology is a useful conversation place for emerging technology. The 14-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework promises future initiatives on the digital economy, supply chain resilience, clean energy, and equity (i.e., rules on tax, money laundering, and bribery). But these do not amount to substantial trade agreements. The United States, for example, will pay no attention to the desire of Asian allies to join the 11-country Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (formerly the TPP).
In fact, Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class” features a lot of protectionism and industrial policy. Recent measures include subsidies for green technology and semiconductors, and restrictions on China’s access to advanced chips. These policies are causing tension with European and Asian allies by limiting access to the US market, restricting exports to China and diverting investment. The European Union can respond by subsidizing its own green technology and semiconductor industries. But Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, seems to see the prospect of a subsidy war as a good outcome. He told the Carnegie Endowment that the United States was helping the middle classes elsewhere by encouraging “a virtuous cycle of investment in other parts of the world.”
The other lingering concern is about democracy in the West, particularly in the United States, nearly two years after a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol. The United States appears to be moving away from Trump and his fellow election deniers, but their politics remain intensely polarized. The health of American democracy is essential to its ability to attract friends and assert leadership. Sullivan recounted how in November, when Biden attended an Asian summit in Phnom Penh, other leaders wanted the details of midterm elections in places like Nevada. As Mr. Sullivan said, “It was a reminder that the rest of the world is looking at the state of American democracy…and saying, ‘What does this tell us about America’s staying power on the international stage? ‘” ■
The economic fallout from the war has not been contained in Ukraine, as spiraling food and energy costs have taken a painful toll across the global south. Russia’s invasion has wrecked Ukraine’s economy, which is projected to contract by as much as 35 percent this year, according to World Bank estimates.
What is the global impact of war?
War, in all its dimensions, has exacerbated a global cost-of-living crisis not seen in at least a generation, compromising lives, livelihoods and our aspirations for a better world by 2030. This may interest you : U.S. National Statement of the UNGA 77 Second Committee.
How can war affect the global economy? The war also increases the risk of a more permanent fragmentation of the world economy into geopolitical blocks with different technological standards, cross-border payment systems and reserve currencies.
What is the global impact of Ukraine war?
Countries that depend on this grain suffered as a consequence. Several grain-receiving countries in the Middle East and Africa were already experiencing hunger crises due to conflict and climate change. The war in the Ukraine made these hunger crises worse.
What are the global effects of war?
The effects of war also include the massive destruction of cities and have lasting effects on a country’s economy. The armed conflict has important indirect negative consequences on infrastructure, public health provision and social order. Read also : US Announces Over $170 Million in Humanitarian Assistance for the Rakhine State/Rohingya Refugee Crisis – US Department of State. These indirect consequences are often overlooked and not appreciated.
What are the effects of Russia and Ukraine war on the world?
Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war against Ukraine has had a major impact on the energy and food markets. EU countries are closely coordinating actions to address rising prices and tight supplies. On the same subject : Joe Biden Sells the United States to Iran | Opinion. On this page: Energy prices and security of supply.
How can war affect a person?
During war, people can be exposed to many different traumatic events. That increases the chances of developing mental health problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety and depression, and poorer life outcomes as adults.
How does the war affect human rights? In recent decades, armed conflicts have ruined the lives of millions of civilians. Serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are common in many armed conflicts. Under certain circumstances, some of these violations may even amount to genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.
How does war affect civilians?
Civilians in conflict zones experience physical harm, psychological distress, destroyed infrastructure, and forced displacement. As conflicts have shifted from war between countries to war within countries, they have tended to be concentrated in low-income countries and have increased in intensity (Levy et al.
How do wars affect people’s lives?
Death, injury, sexual violence, malnutrition, disease, and disability are some of the most threatening physical consequences of war, while post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety are some of the emotional effects.
What is the impact of Russian Ukraine war on India?
The war and the sanctions imposed on Russia affected economies and threatened a further slowdown in the volume of world trade. In addition, the sharp increase in crude oil prices negatively affected inflation in India.
What is the impact of the Ukrainian war on India? 22 by 2022: The Great Trillion Dollar Tech Crash “The conflict worsened the mix of growth and inflation for India. It pushed up crude oil prices and caused bottlenecks on the supply side, thus putting significant upward pressure on inflation.
How does Russia and Ukraine war affect India?
India would have to deal with a significant increase in inflation as a result of rising crude oil prices. For every increase in the price of crude oil, there is an increase in the price of edible oil, which in turn has a negative impact on the economy as a whole.
