Mary Elise Sarotte, Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, leads the conversation on Russia’s global influence. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Welcome to today’s session of the Fall 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I am Irina Faskianos, Vice President of National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic. As always, CFR does not take institutional positions on matters of policy. & # xD; & # xD; We are pleased to have Mary Elise Sarotte with us to talk about Russia’s global influence. Professor Sarotte is the Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at the Henry Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. She is also a research associate at Harvard University’s Center for European Studies. She previously taught at the University of Southern California and the University of Cambridge and served as a White House fellow. & # xD; & # xD; She is the author or editor of six books. Her latest book is titled Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. And it was published by Yale University Press. Thank you, Mary. She has already won the Pushkin House prize for the best book about Russia, and she is on the shortlist for the CFR’s Arthur Ross Book Award, and the Cundill History Prize. So we’re very excited to have you here with us, Professor Sarotte, to talk about this and be with us. And congratulations on your awards for previous books as well as this one. So good luck with the next two book awards. & # xD; & # xD; So I thought maybe we could start with you n, to give us your analysis of what exactly is happening with Russian global influence, as we look at the war in Ukra ine and Russia, of course, on the world stage. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Absolutely. First of all, I would like to say a big thank you to you, Irina, to your staff and to all the people who took the time to sign up. At a time like this, which is a time of war, the council is more essential than ever. It is essential to have a place where we can meet, either in person or virtually, and talk about these very critical issues. So thank you for doing this. And thanks to all the students and educators who took the time to zoom in today. I looked at the list last night and, as of last night, we have people from eleven time zones signing – from London, to Hilo, Hawaii. So in these days when there is a lot of concern, it is a silver lining that there are intelligent young students and that there are intelligent educators who take the time to inform and learn about this. & # xD; & # xD; Yes. So the name of today’s session is the global influence of Russia. My feeling is that as — what’s happening is that the global influence of Russia is going down, as the global influence of the Ukraine war is going up. So in other words, they are on opposite tracks. So as the duration, significance, brutality and bloodiness of the war increases, Russia becomes more and more isolated. You can go through this in a number of factors. Looking at it in energetic terms, for example, this is the last winter that Russia could plausibly put Europe in the cold and in the dark. Europe is making great strides in finding alternative sources of energy – whether that is alternative suppliers or renewable energies. Dramatic changes are happening. & # xD; & # xD; There’s a famous saying, I think it’s attributed to Lenin, I believe it’s been a few decades gte becomes where nothing happens and then a few weeks where decades happen. And there have been many, many weeks this year where decades have happened. And I think we’ve seen decades of progress in terms of energy renewables, and so on. & # xD; So, one out of five. So, number one, energy requirements. Russia will have less influence over Europe. Number two, in trade and economic affairs we have already seen what is referred to as the great decoupling of Russia, cut off from what used to be major trading partners. In military terms, the recent retaliation against Ukraine for the putative attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge – putatively in that they subscribe to the authority of Ukraine – this is, again, also self-evident for Russia. It uses a supply of precision-guided munitions, which in military terms are better used against military targets, not against playgrounds. And to say nothing of the incredible moral crime of doing so. Just in purely military terms it doesn’t make sense. What it also did was further strengthen the Ukrainian opposition. As historians, we see this over and over again. When you bomb a people – such as the Blitz in London, the reaction tends to be a sense of solidarity and a sense of sticking together to survive and persist. And this is also happening in Ukraine. & # xD; & # xD; There is also such confidence in Ukraine’s request for air defense systems that the New York Times just now, as I was just getting ready for this session, just reported that Germany is now shipping an air defense system that is so new, it is never used in Germany or anywhere else. It is called the IRIS-T SLM system. It has already crossed the Ukrainian border from Poland. It apparently includes mobile launchers, a 360-degree radar, and a separate command vehicle from which you can launch the system can stir. & # xD; & # xD; This was in development in Germany, and it was – it is capable, apparently – it is effective at distances of up to twenty-five miles. It can hit targets twelve miles up. It was basically still in development, but now they’ve jumped the Ukraine queue and shipped it directly to Ukraine. The idea that this would have happened even, you know, a week ago is unthinkable. So to back it up, in terms of energy, economy, military, Russian influence has actually declined because allies are coming together to fight against it. Soft power from before, that is – in the West, the soft power of Russia is basically non-existent at this point. & # xD; & # xD; The fifth and final category, and this is the real wild card, is nuclear. That is, of course, the big concern. Russia’s global influence in that category remains strong. There are only two strategic nuclear powers, and those are the United States and Russia. More than thirty years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States still control 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. They are the only two states with civilization-ending capabilities, with the ability to kill most life on Earth, within practically a few minutes, if they choose to do so. They are in a nuclear class by themselves. So that’s why we’re hearing so much nuclear saber rattling from Russia right now. & # xD; & # xD; So just to summarize, because of the immense self-inflicted damage of this war to Russia – to say nothing of the terrible damage to the Ukrainians who are fighting bravely against a truly brutal aggressor – because of this war, Russian global influence is declining, which of course the risk increases that they will lean heavily on the one way they still have global influence, which is as a strategic nuclear power. So I think you have gen au the right topic chosen for us to talk about today. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you, Mary, for that. We want to get to all of you and your questions. So we will now turn to you. & # xD; & # xD; (Give queue directions.) & # xD; & # xD; And we’ve already raised four hands, so I’ll go to Morton Holbrook first. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Professor Sarotte, a somewhat obscure question. Russia early claimed to recognize two new countries in eastern Ukraine, which Russia did not do with regard to Georgia or with regard to Crimea. And the question is, is it a complete charade? Or has anyone, besides Russia, actually recognized them. Someone like Belarus, maybe, or China, or any other country? Or is it just a complete charade, these two new countries? & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Morton, can you give us your affiliation? & # xD; & # xD; Q: Kentucky Wesleyan College in Kentucky. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: OK. Thanks for calling from Kentucky. So we have a time zone down, for those of you making a time zone bingo chart. We can conclude one. Thank you, Morton Holbrook, for your question. & # xD; & # xD; Yes, things are moving so fast, it’s hard to keep up. Initially, as you pointed out, Putin indicated that he would recognize the people’s republics in eastern Ukraine. But now things have moved on, and now he has said that he has annexed these areas. There is a bit of a gray zone because, of course, no one is quite sure what the annexed borders are, what the borders of the annexed area are. Of course, no other countries recognized this. So this is, of course, all very contested. & # xD; & # xD; I would actually, rather than analyze the recent terms – whether it is a recognized republic, or a country or an annexation – I would actually go back to a vote that took place in 1991, while the Soviet Union still existed irt, even though it had fallen apart. And in December 1991, Ukraine held what was essentially a free election to decide – to basically confirm among the population the decision of the parliament to leave the Soviet Union and become an independent state. And that vote, the Ukrainian vote for independence, was hugely successful. It was over 90 percent in favor of independence. & # xD; & # xD; And the relevant fact here to your question, Morton, is that in no constituency was support for independence below 50 percent. In other words, there was majority support for independence in every single part of Ukraine – whether it was Crimea, whether it was Donetsk, whether it was Luhansk, whether it was the areas that Putin now calls new countries , or new annexations. And so if we take this as an expression of popular will about whether Ukrainians want to be part of Russia or not, it was really clear that the desire was overwhelming to be independent. & # xD; & # xD; So that is, I think, an important data point. That when the question was actually voted, an overwhelming number of Ukrainians voted for independence, and a majority voted in every single district. Now, of course, there are Ukrainian separatists who feel – sorry – there are pro-Russian people in Ukraine who feel differently. But I think that the election is the information that we should really look at when we try to find out the feelings of the people. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Thank you. I go next to Julian Reich. And you have to unmute yourself. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes. Hello, Prof. Yes, I’m Julian Reich from the Macaulay Honors College at Hunter College. & # xD; & # xD; I have read several of your articles on NATO enlargement and the post-Cold War settlement. Do you think that the renewed revisionism of Russia is so much a sense of their impossibility for the world achieving economic growth after the Cold War? Or do you think it depends mainly on the unsatisfactory nature of the post-Cold War settlement? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Hmm. Yes. Thanks, Julian, calling from Hunter College. Yes, as I like to tell my own students – so if any of them are on this call, they’ll cry when they hear me say this – the one phenomenon I’ve never observed as a historian is mono-causality. Important events happen for various reasons. They are not necessarily significant reasons. There is a big role for accident and chance in history. But there is usually a mixture, often a dramatic mixture over time change, reasons. & # xD; & # xD; So I don’t think there’s an easy answer to why wh this is happening now – why Putin has become an aggressive invader of Ukraine. Certainly, the economic difficulties of Russia in the 1990s, the economic difficulties of other parts of the Soviet area, they are all a factor, because they then give Putin a base of support. When he came in and the economy started to do better, putting aside for a moment the question of whether or not he was responsible for that, people then associated him with moving into a really terrible time. & # xD; & # xD; The 1990s were a terrible time in the post-Soviet space. Any of the indicators you’re looking at are just really depressing. For example, life expectancy for men in Russia decreased in the 1990s. The population decreased. These are numbers that hide a lot of suffering. And so Putin coming in and improving the economy meant that there was a certain base of support for Putin, which then meant that when he started to dismantle the fragile democracy in Russia, he had support for what he did, what he placed in the position in which he is .& # xD; & # xD; But of course you also have to look at his personal beliefs and fixations. It seems like he sadly, tragically, spent far too much time alone during the pandemic talking about the history of what he believes belongs to Russia. I hear reports from archivists from Russia that there have been all kinds of requests from the Kremlin, presumably from Putin personally through his subordinates, for evidence and documents. And he, Putin, published articles, or at least allowed articles to be published under his name, about the history of World War II, the history of relations with Ukraine. I don’t agree with all of them; I just notice that he is fixated on the story. And so he has this fixation on the idea that he can restore Russian greatness, he can restore land that belonged to Russia. So that is also a factor. & # xD; & # xD; Then, of course, there is the factor that the settlement after the Cold War has not defined p laces in its security structure for Ukraine. There were early discussions about this, and I talk about it in my book Not One Inch, but they did not lead to a fixed safe birth for Ukraine in the European security structure. So that means that it was outside of what was essentially the new front line in Europe, which was the Article 5 front line. Article 5 is of course the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is the article that states that each member state should treat an attack on one state as an attack on all. It is a very, very strong security guarantee. And NATO, of course, as I describe in my book Not One Inch, expanded, enlarged, in the 1990s, and expanded and enlarged its Article 5 territory, but not into Ukraine. & # xD; & # xD; One of the biggest surprises of my research was that President Bill Clinton recognized in the early 1990s, when he said that Ukraine was the quote “linchpin” of Europe, the key to Europe. I’m paraphrasing, but the exact quotes are in my book, Not One Inch, if you’re interested. So in early discussions of NATO expansion, Clinton went to Central and Eastern Europeans and said: I understand. You have every right to want to join NATO. You are new, free democracies. We greatly admire how you threw away Soviet control. But you have to understand, when we give you Article 5, we basically draw a new line. We just got rid of the Cold War line. If we give you Article 5, we will draw a new line, and that will leave Ukraine on the wrong side. & # xD; & # xD; And Ukraine is a big country in terms of geography, in terms of population. At the end of the Cold War, it had a population of over fifty million, which meant it was about the size of Great Britain or France. It is geographically huge. There was also a new democracy. And Clinton said, you know, we can’t let Ukraine get caught like that. It’s too big a leap to put it straight into NATO, but we can’t let Ukraine go so easily. & # xD; & # xD; But then Boris Yeltsin, Putin’s predecessor, did a lot of self-harm, made bad mistakes. He started using bloodshed to fight what should have been political fights. In October 1993, Boris Yeltsin decided to fire tanks at his own parliament. I mean, we’re thinking about in the United States we had January 6. Imagine if Trump had sent tanks to shoot at the Capitol, right? Then Yeltsin allowed a very brutal invasion of Chechnya. There is a question whether he understands how extensive this invasion would be, and how brutal it would be. But he allowed it. He was the president of the country. & # xD; & # xD; And so suddenly he started blood again in Russia, so soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europeans who were willing to listen to what Clinton said about Ukraine, who had been prepared to vote, to perhaps also try an intermediate solution for Ukraine, said: No. Forget it. We need Article 5. And you see this sort of parting of the ways between the post-Cold War path for Central and Eastern Europeans and the Ukrainians. And so Ukraine is left out. & # xD; & # xD; So I could continue. There are, like, five more reasons. But basically, when you look at a story, you try to see what the main factors are and how they interact with each other. So I think there are many factors, and the ones you mentioned are part of them that led to where we are today. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Thank you. I will take the next question from Victoria Williams who wrote her question. But why don’t you ask? & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello, how are you? Hello. So I’m very curious to understand how we can de-escalate the situation and move away from the kind of nuclear option or nuclear threat. How can we do this without basically empowering him and allow him to just take Ukraine-take pieces of it? & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Victoria, you’re with Alvernia University? & # xD; & # xD; Q: In Reading, Pennsylvania, that’s right. So I east coast zone. (Laughs.) & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: East Coast, OK. (Laughs.) Okay. Well, thank you, Victoria. And, yes, of course that is the big question. So the big question is how do we avoid nuclear escalation. That is the essential question. The challenge is to balance that with reacting to Putin, who is basically an aggressive bully, right? And who at this point, it is clear, only understands the language of power. What in the last few What has happened for weeks has really, unfortunately, excluded opportunities for de-escalation. The announcement of the annexation of the territory, which I spoke about in response to Morton Holbrook’s question, which, for example, removed the option that there might be a negotiated settlement. Because now Putin says, no, no, this is Russian territory. It’s not even Ukraine anymore. And Ukrainians obviously don’t accept that. & # xD; & # xD; So the possibilities for de-escalation have unfortunately decreased in recent weeks. And that is really tragic because, as I said, we have the nuclear shadow hanging over all of this. So the real challenge is how to push back against a bully. And this, by the way, is not only, of course, about Ukraine and Russia. Of course, there are discussions about what the People’s Republic of China might do for Taiwan after its de facto takeover of Hong Kong. So there are other countries around the world looking at this to see what might happen. So it is important to push back and be firm, but to do so in a way that does not lead to nuclear escalation. That is a very, very difficult task. & # xD; & # xD; The one thing that makes me happy is that we have some experience with it. The experience was called the Cold War. So we have a record to deal with this challenge. Some of the big differences that make me nervous are that the Cold War unfolded over decades, and there was time to build safeguards, which were arms control treaties. We, in contrast, now seem to be returning to Cold War-like conditions in a few months, but we lack protective shields. We miss—and we miss—popular understanding of what that means. & # xD; & # xD; Let me talk a little about both of them. So during the Cold War there was a whole bunch of weapons control treaties that limited the types of weapons that Washington or Moscow could build and where they could be deployed, and a whole host of things. Currently, there is only one nuclear agreement that restricts Washington and Moscow in any way. It will expire soon. And my opinion is it probably won’t be renewed. And then Moscow and Washington will be completely unrestricted in nuclear terms. That is jaw-dropping and extremely frightening. & # xD; & # xD; So during the Cold War, of course, you had the ABM Treaty – the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – Intermediate Nuclear Range Forces Treaty, and a whole bunch of alphabet-soup treaties that put up at least some guardrails. We don’t have those. What we also had during the Cold War was a more cultural understanding of what nuclear war meant, the sheer destruction that would be involved. I remember as a child seeing a movie called The Day After, about the nuclear devastation that would result when Soviet missiles hit the United States. I was actually just listening to Ian Bremmer the other day. And Ian Bremmer said he woke up and thought about that movie, The Day After, for the first time in decades. & # xD; & # xD; We, as children, those of us who are old enough, at least have memories of the potential horror of nuclear war. My students don’t have that at all now. There is really no understanding of that. And that’s not their fault, but it means there’s just no cultural awareness of how dangerous this is. In fact I heard a report – it must have been on the BBC, just a stray report. But one – it was a few months ago – some ethhing about Russia tested several nuclear systems, but they did not – and the journalist added: But they do not actually have nuclear weapons on them. They just tested the systems. And I thought, of course they don’t have nuclear weapons on them. (Laughs .) I mean, you know, of course they didn’t blow up large segments of Europe in a test. But just the fact that the person kind of didn’t know what she said but I, Wow, we really just lost, like, the cultural understanding of what it means. & # xD; & # xD; So we have these risks and we don’t have the guardrails, and we don’t have the cultural understanding. So we must proceed with caution. I think the Biden administration has done a good job with this immense challenge. I think the answer was to move incrementally, which is what happened. So there is a gradual escalation in the amount and sophistication of the weaponry that is provided. As I said, literally just in the last few hours there has been a big step forward with Germany now supplying air defense systems. There were obviously meetings of the G-7 and NATO. I think that the incremental approach has become a strong one in a very, very dark situation. & # xD; & # xD; The Finnish and Swedish memberships in NATO continue gradually. And it seems that this incremental approach has so far, at least from the wider world’s perspective, kept the conflict contained. Now, of course, it did not limit it in any way to Ukraine. And I really have to express my admiration for the Ukrainians for how bravely they fight, for what they suffer. It is really remarkable. And this recent strike, with precision-guided munitions hitting kindergartens, just, inexplicably. So obviously the war is not limited to Ukraine, but it has not become a global thermonuclear war. There has not been a bigger war. & # xD; & # xD; I am concerned about this pipeline destruction that is going on. I heard reports this morning about some kind of – I don’t even know if this is true, so don’t quote me on it. I don’t even have time for to look at this. But I heard reports this morning that there was pipeline damage in Poland. If that’s true, that’s Article 5 territory. That would be – things that start to happen in Article 5 territory increase the risk of escalation. So the best way to escalate it is to keep it away from Article 5 territory, to give the Ukrainians the means to defend themselves, to increase the pressure incrementally. & # xD; & # xD; I don’t really know that there are many offrampes left for Putin. I think at this point we’re probably looking at some kind of a grind to a stalemate process. I think that’s probably the best case scenario. It’s not good, but it’s probably the best of bad options. Of course, the worst option would be an escalation in some way to nuclear use. So thank you, Victoria, for the question. Long answer, but it is an important and complicated question. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Thank you. I will go to the University of New Mexico next to Manuel Montoya. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello, Dr. Sarot. I am Manuel Montoya. I’m a professor here at the University of New Mexico, here in Albuquerque. So Rocky Mountains, Mountain time zone. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Well, thank you. (Laughter.) & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes, thank you very much for your presentation. And thank you, everyone, for all your questions. I have recently been thinking about the health of international institutions in the next chapter of what follows what is happening now. And my question is about the global influence of Russia, not in terms of its military power or even its social power, but also the influence it will have on the stability of international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court. & # xD; & # xD; If there is a political will to try Russia in the International Criminal Court System or hold them accountable through any other P o litical devices that the international global governance community has, what do you think are the vulnerabilities or the risks associated with it? And how does that affect the stability or legitimacy of those institutions going forward? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Well, mountain time in the house. excellent. Thank you so much. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Thank you. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Yes. Thank you, Manuel, for your question. Yes, it’s a good question. I guess I would answer your question in two different ways, short term and long term. And, preview, I’m actually going to answer the long-term part. So in the short term, I think one of the silver linings is — of these terrible events that are happening — one of the silver linings is that Putin’s actions have created a new sense of solidarity, purpose, mission, and togetherness in international organizations. And this is not unusual. Theorists know that a clear enemy focuses the mind. Having an enemy the size of Russia really focuses the mind. So this is not surprising, but it is heartening. & # xD; & # xD; NATO, in particular, has a new sense of purpose and mission. There is speculation about this – in February – oh, there is a sense of unity now but it will fall apart as soon as the leaves start to turn in autumn. Well, the leaves are turning, at least here in Washington, D.C., and that sense of unity has not fallen apart. And I think other international institutions feel new life in their limbs, feel new strength in their veins, feel a new sense of purpose. So in the short term, I think what’s happening – even if it’s again, I can’t say this enough, it’s deeply tragic for the world, incredibly dangerous, terrible for the Ukrainians – there are some silver linings, like this new feeling of solidarity. & # xD; & # xD; Now, to your question about holding Russia accountable, I would do that in the K category of longer-term questions. Because now what is essential is to avoid the loss of life in Ukraine, to somehow find a way to end the violence and bloodshed. This is the most urgent way. But obviously holding Russia accountable and prosecuting what happened here, the war crimes that are happening, is obviously hugely important. It is somewhat difficult to predict exactly how, when and where this will happen while the conflict is still ongoing. Because obviously the continuation of the conflict itself makes it difficult to collect evidence etc. & # xD; & # xD; So your question is an insight. It is an important one. But it’s just really hard to answer right now. As a historian, I am interested in the interplay between contingency, i.e. individual decisions, individual actors who make decisions, and structures. And right now we are in a war. And a war is a time when contingency dominates. Many unpredictable factors come into play. So it’s just a little bit — a little bit — it’s very difficult to say what the conditions are, what the parameters are going to be for the kind of accountability initiative that you’re talking about. So I think it’s the right question, but I just think I’d be lying if I said I had a good answer for you. The only thing I can say for sure is it is not a question that can be answered right now. It is an important question, but it is something that has to stop for a while. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Great. I attend University College London. I don’t know who is asking the question, but please say who you are and unmute yourself. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes. Hello. We are from UCL, from the IPP master program. My name is Dr. Aboudouya and I have a number of students who have really interesting questions. They are just on their way, just a second. (Laughs.) & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Okay. So we have bri tic summer time in the house, excellent. Very good. How many people do you have in your classroom? & # xD; & # xD; Q: So at the moment we have about eight people participating. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Excellent. & # xD; & # xD; Q: And we have a number of questions. So the first will – & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello. I have two questions. & # xD; & # xD; The first question is, is our world still in the process of globalization, especially with the United States economic pressure on Russia and how Russia put war on Ukraine and they cut off the energy to Europe, and also the situation of proliferation of COVID-19? This is my first question. & # xD; & # xD; And then my second question is, without Russia, how can Europe solve its energy problem? & # xD; & # xD; Q: Thank you very much. We just have another question, sorry. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: One more and then we will go to answers, and then we have so many other questions, we have to stick to that. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello. I also have a question. That is, if the war continues, will Russia change its public policy with other developing countries, such as Malaysia or India? Will they cooperate together to solve their current issues, or will they take other actions? Thank you & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Okay. Well, thank you, UCL, for putting on a good show there. You can check British Summer Time. & # xD; & # xD; Let me – first, let me say – so, the second question first was Russia and its attitude towards the developing countries. Obviously, because Russia is now decoupled from itself, and also from the Western economy, this increases the importance for Russia of countries that are not in Europe, countries that are not in the United States, etc. So there is new leverage now for basically other countries. obviously, , I wouldn’t call China a developing country, but obviously China and India have huge leverage right now with Russia. & # xD; & # xD; So in a sense there is a kind of recalibration happening in the international system as the energy and economic ties between Europe are cut, it will then create new ties or stronger ties with developing countries. So there is a big realignment going on. Again, as with Manuel’s previous question, it is a little early to predict the outcome, but it is clear that the process is underway. & # xD; & # xD; And then the previous question about without Russia, how can Europe solve its energy problem, that is of course the right question. Europeans now have a lot of this calendar year to think about. So one of the self-harms that Putin did was to play his energy card too soon. In other words, he began to threaten and actually cut off supplies – energy supplies – to Europe in the early spring if the invasion did not stop in three days, as he had hoped. And that actually took the Europeans all summer to start making plans, trying alternatives, doing things like building floating ports to get liquefied natural gas to their customers, finding alternative sources. & # xD; & # xD; The sense, for example, from Germany, which is a country I have been to recently, is that even if it is a difficult winter, no one will freeze. The supply will be sufficient. It might – they won’t be able to keep the lights on, maybe in the evenings in the shops, and maybe the Christmas markets won’t be so bright, but no one will freeze. And they are ready for it. And this feeling also seems to cover other European countries. And if there are some difficulties, people are ready for it. And as I said before, this will be the last winter when Russia will be able to threaten Europe in the dark and in the cold. & # xD; & # xD; And renewable energy rgies will come online in a big way. Germany had to reverse course on some of its use of coal. It also needs to reverse course to cut some nuclear facilities. There will be a shift, but it will – Europe will be able to provide for its essential energy needs. There may be some non-essentials that will go away, but Europe will make sure that no one freezes. And I couldn’t quite hear the first question, but I understand there are other questioners, so please forgive me if I pass on the first question and move on to the next questions. But thanks for completing the British Summertime Box. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to go next to Zachary Hammerschmidt. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello. I’m Zach Hammerschmidt from Mankato State-Minnesota State University in Mankato. & # xD; & # xD; So my question to you is: Should we see this more of a continuation of the Cold War? Proxy wars were later more notable – as in Syria and Ukraine, with the influence of NATO. And if so, wouldn’t the expansion of NATO in Scandinavia and our support of Ukraine as a pro-Western democracy further exacerbate the problem with Russian aggression? Because that definitely makes Putin’s rhetoric, late. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: OK. OK. Are you Central Time? & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Okay. We can tick off Central Time. excellent. Very good. Well, so, well, Zachary, thanks for your question. Historical question. I love it. I am a historian, so history is the only true discipline. All you political science students out there, no one is perfect. All right. & # xD; & # xD; So, yes, Cold War. The whole thing really came up again. My colleague, Stephen Kotkin, the author of the biography of Stalin, recently said – I mean actually in foreign policy, Irina, I think, or in a foreign (affair) event – that the Cold War never ended. That it continues. That we joke that we had a break in it. I’m not quite sure I agree with that. I believe we are now back in cold war-like conditions. But unlike my colleague, Stephen Kotkin – I strongly disagree with him – but I believe that the thaw between the last Cold War and this new Cold War was real. & # xD; & # xD; The problem is that cold wars are not short-term affairs. So thaws are valuable. And neither Russia nor the West used the best that we had, that is over now. For example, it would be wonderful if there had been more progress in disarmament than there has been. That didn’t happen. It would be wonderful if it lasted longer. That didn’t happen. This is really what I examine in my book, Not One Inch. So because I know this is not supposed to be a seven hour or an eleven hour event, I’m not meant to cover all time zones, I’m not going to describe all the arguments in my book here. But if you are interested, you can definitely look at it more. & # xD; & # xD; I think what happened is we – the Cold War is over. We had a real moment when it would have been possible to establish a lasting collaboration. I know there are other people who think differently, but I believe it was a real moment of optimism. Maybe that’s because I’ve personally experienced some of it. I studied abroad in West Berlin in 1989. That is ultimately the reason why I do what I do. That is the reason why I became a historian, why I am interested in Cold War history, the history of the end of the Cold War, the history of what is happening now, because of the experiences I lived in West Berlin and traveled behind the Iron Curtain and then, of course, the Er experience of seeing that the iron curtain to open, unexpected. & # xD; & # xD; So I think it was a real thaw. I disagree with Stephen Kotkin. I think, as I said before, that we are spinning back to cold war-like conditions, but with some important differences. There are important differences in both the surrounding structure and context, and there are important individual differences. And the surrounding structure and context, obviously the previous Cold War was much more bipolar, Moscow-Washington. Now China is a very – a big player, certainly in economic terms, also in military terms. So that’s different. There are just – India, Brazil – it’s not as bipolar as it was. It is not an ideological conflict either. Putin is not a communist. He is far too rich for that. (Laughter.) He’s not trying to restore communism. & # xD; & # xD; So I admit that there are many, many differences to the previous Cold War. And yet, the key factor of the previous Cold War was the rise of this thermonuclear conflict – a potential thermonuclear conflict between Washington and Moscow, which, to repeat, would be a civilization-ending conflict. It would kill most life on Earth. This is a significant threshold in history for me. We crossed that with the development of thermonuclear weapons. And so that nuclear conflict between Washington and Moscow, for me, is what defines the Cold War, what made it unique and different from previous eras. The fact that we are now talking about a nuclear conflict again at this level – again, I hope that does not happen, but the rhetoric is bad – means that we have a cold war again. & # xD; And then, as you said, Zachary, there’s also this idea of proxy wars. That there is a stalemate between Washington and Moscow directly, or Moscow and NATO countries, but then there are other places where there is a hot war, not a cold war. The Cold War is a bit of a misnomer. There is an excellent book by Paul Chamberlin called The Cold War Killing Fields. Talk about all the people who died in hot wars during the cold war. And so, yes, you are right to say that we see this phenomenon again of a stalemate between Moscow and Washington, for now, but with a lot of blood and fighting in a proxy war situation. & # xD; & # xD; And then, to get to the last part of your question about NATO enlargement, I think you have to make a strong distinction between peacetime and wartime. So as you can see when you look at my book, I am not an opponent of NATO enlargement, am I? If you’re looking for the person who says everything that’s happening is NATO’s fault, that’s John Mearsheimer. That’s not me. So you can ask Irina to organize an event of an educator with John Mearsheimer and have with him. & # xD; & # xD; I am not against NATO enlargement. I think the problem with NATO enlargement was how it happened. There were opportunities not to let Ukraine get caught, for example. Alternatives were known at the time, which I describe in my book. And I wish that the alternatives would have dominated, the alternative methods for expanding NATO. NATO enlargement was not a thing. There were several possible ways to expand it known at the time, including ways that would have involved Ukraine. And I wish they had happened. So I think how it happened was problematic. & # xD; & # xD; But – and this is a big but – my critique referred to this peaceful thaw, which I really believe was a real thaw, a real opportunity for cooperation between the last Cold War and the one we’re coming up on. That time has changed. We are now in a time of war. War changes everything. So now that we have seen that Putin knows no boundaries, that Putin only responds to force, now that we have seen the brutality of what happened in Bucha, now that we are exposing the cruelty every time Ukraine another city freed, now we need war actions. It is clear that what we need to do now is to defend Ukraine, make it clear to either Putin or the people around Putin that there is no point in continuing this conflict, and try to somehow get over this bloodshed. & # xD; In the first instance, this requires showing as much military determination as possible. And, as I said, also, in response to an earlier question, this also shows the alliance’s unity in play, creating new opportunities for people to participate, like Sweden and Finland. So in the context of the war, now that we’re at war, I think it’s the right and appropriate thing to continue to expand NATO and to push back strongly against Putin to hopefully get back to a place where we’re not in wartime, we are in peacetime, and then diplomacy can take over again. & # xD; & # xD; FASK IANOS: Great. So we have a written question from Gail Evans, who’s at Georgia Tech, who referenced — and I don’t know if you saw it — the event that the CFR had with Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mary hosted, in which he suggested that we need. knowing how the Ukraine war ended would determine whether Russia was the far end of the West or the beginning of the East. And they asked what is your reaction to that. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Hmm, interesting. So no, I didn’t see that event. I mean, obviously Henry Kissinger is a very—is a smart man. I think whether Russia is the far end of the West or the near end of the East is up to the Russians. So I don’t know that it’s in our hands to decide that one. I’m not sure that’s a meaningful distinction either. Of course there are many countries between Europe and China. So what about them? I would — but I agree with him, absolutely, that the way this war ends is of monumental importance. The problem is, it’s hard to say how it will end. We can talk about how it won’t end, right? & # xD; & # xD; So, for example, it will not stop with Putin saying, oh, I don’t know what got into me, sorry. And everyone says: OK, no problem, let’s go back to where we were before February 24, 2022. That won’t happen. I mean, even though – I said this recently in a TV interview – even though – and that’s not going to happen. But even if we come down from this zoom and we find that somehow, wonderful, while we were on the zoom, Putin said: You know, what? Forget it. Let’s stop this sill invasion. Call it off. That doesn’t happen. And even if it happened, no one goes back, right? No one will say, oh, ok, ok. Let’s, you know, get the oil flowing again. I think, although there are holes in the pipelines now. & # xD; & # xD; This is a real turning point in history. So the question is, how will the war end? And there will be something new. I don’t know what it will be. It could be them. But it will be something new. Russia, as mentioned, is largely decoupled from the Western economy. That will not change immediately. There are questions, of course, big questions about the internal domestic politics in Russia. It seems that Putin has decided to really tie his fate to the fate of this war, which is another tragic decision. He seems to have ruled out other options for himself. So it’s not clear – it’s not clear to me how this war will end. But it is clear to me that it will be hugely significant. And that’s why I would be with D Okter Kissinger agrees that how this war ends is extremely significant. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Great. I go next to Konstantin Tkachuk. Please excuse my pronunciation. & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes. Many thanks also from myself. My name is Konstantin. I’m from – I’m half Russian, half Ukrainian. And this is a very insightful discussion for me. I choose from Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Well, Chinese time zones. excellent. All right. All right. Very good. (Laughs.) & # xD; & # xD; Q: And my question is, we offer good – or somehow already the topic of the war and what will happen in the short term. I’m more curious that, since the situation will resolve in a time, which of course we can’t predict now, and the war was definitely a political suicide for the current government in Russia, what do you think the settlement process would be for Russia worldwide, after the Size of Russian resource markets, according to the need in those resource markets still in many other countries, and the remaining impact on the various other industries? So how would you, from a historical perspective, see this? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Hmm, okay. Well, first of all, so thanks for adding the Chinese time zone. Second, thank you for sharing your personal background. I hope your family members are safe. And I’m so sorry about the experiences that the Ukrainian side of your family is obviously going through. & # xD; & # xD; On your third point, your statement that this war was political suicide for the current Russian regime, I wish that was obviously true. I hope that will be true. I hope we are approaching the post-Putin moment. It is still not clear to me that Putin committed political suicide. If you have a country in personal rule for decades, as he has it it – or, let me say it this way – when you have been at the head of a country for decades and you have created a situation of personal rule, have established deep roots through the institutions of loyalty and followers. Of course, there is no more freedom of the press, there is no more freedom of association. & # xD; & # xD; And among the tragic effects of the war for Russia is that it caused mass flight of people who led the opposition. So certainly the outbreak of war caused journalists and other writers to flee because the use of the word “war” was criminalized, and so their writing could land them in prison. More recently, botched efforts at mobilization have caused a huge number of young Russian men to leave Russia, as I’m sure you know. I haven’t – it seems like there are estimates jumping around, but it looks like the number is clearly in the hundreds of thousands. So I saw estimates that as many as half a million Russian men fled the country because of the mobilization. & # xD; & # xD; So in a system that already lacks places to express opposition, to call for change, the war has depleted the supply of people brave enough or inclined enough to make those calls. So it is not clear to me that in domestic Russian terms Putin has committed political suicide. I think what happened is scary for Russia as a country, as I said at the beginning. I think as the global impact and influence of this war grows, the global impact and influence of Russia will decline. I think everyone around Putin is starting to realize that they are living in a very large version of North Korea. But again, the leader of North Korea held out for a long time. & # xD; & # xD; So it is not clear to me that this is political suicide for Putin. That then relates to the second part of your question, which is, you know, what kind of settlement comes out of it. And this goes back to the earlier question we had about, you know, holding the ICC and Russia accountable. You are wise, Konstantin, Russia’s resources. Of course, the resources of Russia – its oil, its gas, and so on – together with its strategic nuclear power, give a certain weight in the international system. Russia is just too big to ignore, right? & # xD; & # xD; Before the war broke out, I would often go for talks and I would say: You know, there are growing tensions with Russia, and they really worry me. And I would often face audiences who would say, well, why is Russia important? It has the economy – it only has the economy the size of a small Chinese province or Spain. And I would answer, well, number one, Spain’s economy is not that small. And, number two, Russia is a strategic nuclear power, right? That doesn’t change whether its economy is the size of Spain or not. & # xD; & # xD; So, you know, can not just ignore Russia. It is simply too big and too nuclear to ignore. So it’s not as if the world will just be able to ignore Russia. There has to be, as you rightly said, some kind of settlement. But as I said with some of the other previous questions, I think we are now in a moment of emergency. And I think it would be – I’d be lying if I said, oh, I absolutely know what’s going to happen. It is clear that there must be a settlement. & # xD; & # xD; It is clear that Russia is just a big factor, a player in the international system to simply write. But what kind of settlement will come depends on whether this r ely turns out to be political suicide for Putin. out or not. And I think that is not clear yet. But thanks for the insightful question. And thanks for adding in some Chinese time zones to this call. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: I go next to Zinadid Simpson Crasiyah (ph). & # xD; & # xD; Q: Hello. Good afternoon and thank you for this conversation, Prof. I am a law student at the University of Oklahoma. & # xD; & # xD; I had a question about one of the articles you attached in your invitation to it, The World Putin Wants. And I was particularly interested in the conversation about Putin’s influence on the global south and, as the article described it, the rest of the developing world, and how he won the information war with them. So my question is, how does the West, the global West and I think the US, fight the information war if they have already started to do so? And how that could, in a sense, at least solve some problems? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Hmm, yes, good. So, excellent. University of Oklahoma. I’m guessing central time, yes? & # xD; & # xD; Q: Yes. Yes. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Okay. Central time. All right. We have another good – (inaudible) – from the central period. Good. & # xD; & # xD; Yeah, so the-I’m trying to remember how old this article is, I can’t remember exactly. Now I don’t think people are saying that Putin is winning the global information war. I think that headline has to go to the Ukrainians, don’t you? Pro tip, don’t go to war against a very online comedian who knows how to communicate effectively. The Ukrainians used information warfare very, very skillfully. As they should. They are at war. Again, wartime is different from peacetime. And so the conditions of information warfare have changed greatly since this article was written. & # xD; & # xD; Of course, there is another big factor that is a bit off topic for us today, but worth mentioning is, the impact of course the Chinese in the global south, the Belt and Road Initiative, their actions there. That, I think, has a lot of – had more traction than the Russian approach, and especially now because of the war Russia, because I – kind of just coming back to my topic – the global influence of Russia is, I would say, diminishing. So I think if that article was written today, it would have a slightly different focus. But that’s a bit outside the area we’re focusing on today. But thanks for the question. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Mary, there are many questions about China. So I guess maybe just to talk a little bit. You know, Russia’s relations with China, with a view to its global influence, and its growing-China’s growing bargaining power. What opportunities does this create for China to reshape power dynamics? And do you see this as a factor pressuring Russia to find a ramp? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Yes. In order. We’re just going to assume that there were, you know, questions from eleven time zones here and click them all off here as we wrap up. & # xD; & # xD; Yes. So I actually-on the topic of Moscow’s relationship with Beijing, I co-authored an article with Sergey Radchenko for foreign policy. So for those of you who are interested, please have a look. – I don’t know, maybe one of the staff here could put it in the chat or, you know, the link to it. Sergey Radchenko and I, a colleague of mine at SAIS, who is actually himself, Konstantin, he is actually also Russian-Ukrainian. We looked at historical parallels to the current relationship between Moscow and Beijing. And Sergey and I, we saw a cautionary tale. It is a story of a country that supported its destructive neighbor in an effort to threaten a smaller power. And in historical terms, that Germany rose at the beginning of the 20th century, under supports the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire, attacks Serbia. This did not end well for Imperial Germany. That ended in the First World War, which dragged Germany down as well. & # xD; & # xD; Germany, at the end – at the beginning of the 20th century was on course to be the dominant industrial military technological power of the century. If you had tried to guess at the beginning of the 20th century which country would dominate this century, the answer would have been Germany. And as a result of his foolish decision to support a destructive neighbor in his effort to restore a lost empire, Imperial Germany itself was dragged under. This is not a good precedent for a current rising power, namely China, supporting a former imperial neighbor, namely Russia, trying to restore-trying to start a war and restore imperial glory in a small country, namely Ukraine. & # xD; & # xD; So we think that it is not wise for Beijing to support Russia as far as it has been so far. There seem to be many signs that Beijing is starting to have second thoughts of its own. There seem to be many signs that Beijing is trying to communicate to Putin that this war has not gone well, is not going well, it would be a good idea. I suspect that Xi Jinping regrets the statement that his partnership with Russia had no limits, before the Olympics last fall – sorry – earlier this year. So I think the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is hugely important. As Russia becomes more and more cut off from European countries, its economic relationship with China becomes more and more important. Beijing currently has over Russia. Beijing also enjoys, you know, getting gas and oil at a discount. Beijing can now exploit Russia. That is not really in Russia’s interest. & # xD; & # xD; So the relationship is very important. I hope that Beijing will continue on the trend line that it is on, which is – what seems to be behind the scenes pressure on Moscow to start this. I don’t think that China, let me put it this way, would, you know, try to engage in some kind of muscle forcing by Putin. I think there are limits. B ut I think it is at least – heartening is the wrong word – but less terrible when Beijing says to Moscow – when Xi says to Putin: This is really not a good idea. This is better than what was said earlier this year, that is, our friendship has no boundaries. Do what you want, right? & # xD; & # xD; So it is an important relationship. Beijing has leverage. I hope Beijing will see that ultimately it is not in Beijing’s interest to be on the wrong side of this war. That is – I very much hope so. Again, as with so many other things, because we are in a moment with such an emergency, it is a little difficult to predict. But it is definitely essential to keep an eye on Beijing and China. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Thank you. We just dropped the link to that outside article in the chat. So I recommend it to all of you. We have so many questions, raised hands and written questions. Sorry, we couldn’t get them all. But I reserve the moderator’s right to ask for the latter. & # xD; & # xD; So, Mary, you mentioned a little bit earlier why you are a historian. So can you say a few words about, even if you are not a keen historian, why history is so important for all of us to have in our lives? & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Yes, absolutely. I believe that history is history – history is the best way to prepare for the future. I do not believe that it, or any other discipline, will allow you to accurately, down to the last detail, predict the future. I think that anyone who tells you students out there i can predict the future don’t believe them. But I think you can prepare for the future, right? If you think, for example, about, I don’t know what a football team, a soccer team, an American – you know, the New England Patriots and Detroit Lions, and, you know, England it might be Manchester United. The fact that they hold a practice – you know, in advance of the big game doesn’t guarantee they’ll win the game, but it greatly increases the chances, right? & # xD; & # xD; The fact, to use another example, that a pilot can spend many hours in a flight simulator before getting into a cockpit does not mean that the pilot is doing everything personally – that he or she will do everything personally – but it goes a long way increase the chances, right? And so, similarly, I would like to leave students with this consideration. History doesn’t provide us with clear and obvious lessons, a clear, you know, checklist of what to do. But it greatly increases the chances that we can meet the challenges that come. And, unfortunately, we are once again in an era of some very, very dangerous challenges – indeed, potentially existential challenges – for our planet. & # xD; & # xD; So I made a joke about it, but it actually really means a lot to me that students from all over the world are calling to talk about these issues, because our globe needs you and your efforts to keep us away from disaster. So thank you for a call to think about this, and help create a global community to talk about these problems. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Wonderful. Well, thank you, Mary, for this great hour, and to all the students and professors who try to get everyone interested in history on call. We appreciate your participation and we are sorry, again, that we could not answer all your questions. Once again, I commend Mary’s book to you, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. And we keep an eye on the book prices. Hope you are the winner. & # xD; & # xD; So the next Academic Webinar is on Wednesday, October 26, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time. Zongyuan Zoe Liu, fellow for international political economy here at CFR, will talk about global economics. In the meantime, please check out our CFR Fellowships for Educators at CFR.org/fellowships. The deadline for this is October 31. It IS a unique opportunity for nine to join the council for a few months, or to work in the government. Follow @CFR_Academic on Twitter and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. & # xD; & # xD; So thanks again to all of you for being with us. Thank you, Professor Mary Elise Sarotte. And we look forward to your joining us again in a few weeks. & # xD; & # xD; SAROTTE: Sounds great. Goodbye. & # xD; & # xD; FASKIANOS: Goodbye. & # xD; & # xD; (END) & # xD;
Webinar
