US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin flew to Singapore in June for the first in-person talks since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was officially the headliner, but Austin’s contrasting speeches with Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe drew the most attention.
Wei delivered a tone-deaf address in which he threatened Taiwan, warning the US to stay away from that path, and fired the third-party agency. Austin, in contrast, focused on alliances, cooperation, and international norms as important. He praised the US for its “unparalleled network of alliances and partnerships” as a “source of stability” in the Indo-Pacific. He announced the United States’ commitment to a region “in which all countries – large and small – are free to develop and pursue their legitimate interests, free from oppression and intimidation.”
Reflecting on these American commitments, Austin returned to one issue more than any other: the South China Sea. Even when he didn’t directly address the waterway, his speech referred to “freedom of the seas,” “maritime security cooperation,” “gray zone threats,” and so on. In this, Austin was the latest in a long line of US officials going back decades to express confidence in the alliance and the defense of the law of the sea as the primary interests of the US in the South China Sea.
This article is adapted from On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea by Gregory B. Poling (Oxford University Press, 336 pp., $39.95, July 2022).
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin flew to Singapore in June for the first in-person talks since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was officially the headliner, but Austin’s contrasting speeches with Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe drew the most attention.
Wei delivered a tone-deaf address in which he threatened Taiwan, warning the United States to stay away from that path, and fired the third-party agency. Austin, in contrast, focused on alliances, cooperation, and international norms as important. He praised the US for its “unparalleled network of alliances and partnerships” as a “source of stability” in the Indo-Pacific. He announced the United States’ commitment to a region “in which all countries – large and small – are free to develop and pursue their legitimate interests, free from oppression and intimidation.”
Reflecting on these American commitments, Austin returned to one issue more than any other: the South China Sea. Even when he didn’t directly address the waterway, his speech referred to “freedom of the seas,” “maritime security cooperation,” “gray zone threats,” and so on. In this, Austin was the latest in a long line of US officials going back decades to express confidence in the alliance and the defense of the law of the sea as the primary interests of the US in the South China Sea.
Looking back at that history helps explain why Washington is so interested in the controversy over rocks and reefs halfway around the world. And it suggests what will be lost if China forces the United States to give up these traditional interests. Given the military and coercive campaign of Beijing in the last decade, that is the first time the real possibility, which makes it important to understand the stakes involved.
America’s oldest interest in the disputed waterway is freedom of the seas and the law of the seas. American leaders have seen the protection of the high seas as vital to the nation’s prosperity and security for more than two centuries. Few interests have been consistent throughout American history.
That promise prompted the young United States to launch its first overseas military campaign in two wars with the Barbary States. It contributed to the outbreak of the War of 1812 against the British. Long ago, the desire to protect the nation’s maritime rights drew the United States Navy to the Pacific Ocean with the 1835 creation of the East India Squadron. With the exception of a brief engagement during the American Civil War, US Navy ships have operated continuously in Asia ever since.
Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea, particularly the historic rights along the so-called nine-dash line, threaten America’s centuries-old promise of freedom of the seas. That commitment helped ensure the prosperity and security of the United States. Today it stabilizes international trade, reduces maritime tensions, and guarantees equal access to resources.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) represents decades of work in negotiating and codifying these freedoms. The Convention has incomparable legitimacy as a truly international effort. China has had its innovations as much as any government. And it’s like most of China’s neighbors, that’s why they’re so tight-lipped. In the United States, a small but vocal majority opposes ratification. But for any American involved in maritime affairs, whether maritime, commercial, or scientific, UNCLOS is effectively the law of the land.
China’s claims are against the agreement and cannot long survive their acceptance. If Beijing can claim 1,000 miles of sea and ocean, why should others? Unfolding UNCLOS threatens US interests from the Arctic to the Persian Gulf. Russia is already playing with the idea of historical rights in the past. And Iran will seize every opportunity to legitimize its efforts to control the latter.
But China’s claims undermine more than just one conference. They strike at the most fundamental principle of international law: the equality of states. The Chinese leadership will treat international law as it does domestic law – as a tool of power but never as a deterrent. Allowing UNCLOS to be undermined without much cost ensures that. Beijing will rightly conclude that if it can offer something as widely respected as the law of the sea, then more disputed rules are fair game. And that informs its competitive approach across the board, from finance to space and everything in between.
A secondary US interest in the South China Sea, at least since the end of World War II, has been to maintain defense commitments without drawing US allies into disputes over disputed sovereignty. America’s network of allies, along with American territories in the region, have made the United States a stable power and helped maintain stability in Asia. They allow the country to deploy military forces thousands of miles from the homeland, preventing aggression and quickly responding to regional security challenges. This will protect the United States and its allies and protect their security and common interests.
America’s first involvement in the South China Sea in the decades before the war stemmed from its colonial presence in the Philippines. When the Philippines gained formal independence in 1946, neither side wanted American troops to leave for fear of Soviet intervention in Asia. They signed the Military Bases Agreement in 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, creating America’s first alliance in the Pacific. This was the first step in creating the US alliance system that exists in Asia to this day.
The United States has recently signed similar defense agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Then came semiformal alliances with Thailand and South Vietnam. This club includes the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Vietnam all interested in claiming disputed islands in the South China Sea. During this time, America’s top priority in the conflict was to maintain credibility without alienating any of the three allies. And that means being neutral and urging you to stay calm.
That changed during the seventies. Saigon fell, the victorious North Vietnamese forces moved to the Spratly Islands, China aggressively expanded its footprint in the Paracel Islands, and the United States canceled its agreement with the government of Taiwan. Within a few years, Manila found itself as Washington’s only remaining ally in the conflict, facing potential aggression from either Hanoi or Beijing. At the same time, the perceived abandonment of South Vietnam and Taiwan raised concerns about the credibility of other US defense commitments. Philippine officials wonder if the alliance has become a one-way street — are they making themselves a target by hosting US bases without even a credible US pledge of support in the South China Sea, where they face potential violence? This started a round of negotiations on the scope and value of the alliance. In many ways, the cycle continues to this day.
Over the past four decades, Washington has gradually clarified that the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to any attack on Philippine forces in the South China Sea. It continues to balance that commitment with its long-term neutrality on territorial claims. There have been close calls on both sides, but Washington has decided time and time again that its oldest alliance in Asia is too valuable to let go. Manila has repeatedly reached the same conclusion.
The relationship between the United States and the Philippines is at one time important and controversial. It was built on more than a century of cultural exchange, deep personal connections, shared sacrifices, and common interests. But it is also clouded by colonial history, political interference, unequal economic relations, and power alienation. The last one leaves a side that is often afraid of being abandoned and attached to others.
Manila will find it impossible to defend its maritime rights from China’s growing encroachment without US military support. And if the United States is seen to be abandoning the Philippines to China’s aggression, it will turn well in the South China Sea. The ability of the United States to manage and respond to crises in Southeast Asia will be severely reduced if it loses access to Philippine territory. Other allies and partners will naturally question the US’s ability to remain a provider of regional security. America’s network of allies will suffer—both in confidence and capability—at a time when it is most needed. The rise of China’s power and its clear intention of revisionism will make the rapid decline of US influence in Asia even worse than it was in the 1970s.
The United States has been involved in disputes in the South China Sea almost since its inception. That sometimes took the form of a clear-eyed, active defense of American interests. But more often than not, policymakers are faced with a dilemma. With their attention elsewhere, they will inevitably rise to tensions or demands from regional allies. They would need to quickly assess the national interest. And then the conflicts will return to the limits of American politics until the next crisis. The results were unsurprisingly mixed.
This time, the stakes are high, and disputes in the South China Sea are not going away. If the United States is to secure its national interests, it will need to be very careful in identifying and pursuing them. It has long defended the freedom of the seas and a reliable alliance network in Asia. Protecting both has helped ensure the national security and prosperity of the United States and its partners. These interests have been repeatedly challenged in the South China Sea. But now, China’s actions in the dispute threaten to seriously undermine it. Faced with this challenge to a peer competitor—the first in decades—the United States must keep a reasonable assessment of its own interests.
As Austin said, “Today, the Indo-Pacific is central to US grand strategy.” And that strategy cannot succeed without defending the rules and alliances in the South China Sea.
Does China have the right to claim the West Philippine Sea?
Mr. President, China claims "historical rights" areas beyond 200 M of the coast of its territory, or any feature of land that it claims as its sovereignty, and 200 M of the coast of the Philippine Islands, and exploit the resources of those areas while preventing the Philippines from doing so. .
What are the claims of China and the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea? Scarborough Shoal is a disputed territory claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines. See the article : Birmingham, Alabama: Best Places for Beer, Soul Food and Seafood. Since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, access to the shoal has been restricted by China.
Who legally own West Philippine Sea?
| West Philippine Sea | |
|---|---|
| Etymology | Hereafter the Philippines (the name officially adopted by the Philippine government on September 5, 2012 pursuant to Executive Order No. 29.) |
| Part of it | South China Sea (EEZ claimed only by the Philippines) |
| Islands | Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal (disputed territory) |
Does the Philippines still have sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea?
“The position of the Philippines is to continue to assert the sovereignty of Bajo de Masinloc and its territorial sea, as well as the right to sovereignty and jurisdiction over the surrounding EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and the continental shelf,â Andanar said in the press. talk.
Does China has the right to sovereignty claim over the whole South China Sea West Philippine Sea is the nine-dash line of China valid?
China claims 90% of the South China Sea, and this claim is based on a U-shaped nine-dash line drawn on a 1940s map by a Chinese geographer. See the article : US Gets Warrant to Seize Russian Oligarch Andrei Skoch’s Plane Worth Over $90 Million.
Do US aircraft carriers still rule the seas?
Today, carriers are still at the heart of the war, and service providers still have the same objective: to extract air power from the sea. See the article : California Man Sentenced for Threatening Local United States Congressman. While they are bigger and more capable than ever, carriers are also more expensive and vulnerable than ever.
Can an American aircraft carrier enter the Black Sea? This, too, is impossible because of the Montreux Treaty of 1936. According to that treaty, the countries along the Black Sea receive special naval privileges, and other countries are strictly limited in what ships can enter the sea. (eg, no aircraft carriers or submarines. ), how often, and how much.
What is the only US carrier ever sunk in the Atlantic?
Block Island was the only American ship lost in the Atlantic Ocean during World War II.
How many US aircraft carriers are at sea?
The US Navy currently has 11 aircraft carriers. These ships allow the Navy to perform a wide variety of tasks, ranging from bringing air power to combating adversaries to humanitarian operations.
Did Japan surrender South China Sea to China?
The United States and forty-seven other nations signed the Peace Treaty [PDF] with Japan in San Francisco, officially ending World War II. Japan rejects all claims to Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
Which country rightfully owns the South China Sea? Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, known as Taiwan) both claim almost the entire body as theirs, defining their claims within what is known as the “nine-dash line”. and claims that they overlap. with almost every other country in the region.
Which countries support China South China Sea claim?
The territorial dispute in the South China Sea involves disputed islands and maritime claims in the region by several sovereign states, namely Brunei, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia , the Philippines, and Vietnam
Did the Allies promise the sea to China?
The historical evidence is clear. None of these documents pledge the South China Sea islands â other than Taiwan and the Pescadores â to China. It is a great shame that many people who claim to be knowledgeable on the subject continue to perpetuate the myths they are creating. Dr.
