People in both countries remain committed to transatlantic security
In 2017, the Pew Research Center and the Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint opinion polls to assess the state of US-German relations. The questions were developed jointly and each organization sent out a survey within their country starting that year. Read also : Supply Chain Current Time: Food Shortages and Harvest Problems Ukraine. Some of the questions were repeated annually to allow both organizations to track attitudes over time. Topics include relations with other countries, the state of the transatlantic partnership on a variety of foreign policy issues, views of China and Russia, and the state of international relations.
Results have been released in both countries, and previous Pew Research Center reports can be found here for November 2021, September 2020, May 2020, and March 2020, 2019, and 2018.
The Körber-Stiftung’s findings are contained within its larger report “Berlin Pulse” and can be found here for 2022 and earlier years.
US results come from a Pew Research Center survey conducted July 18-August 21, 2022 among 12,147 online respondents and August 1-14, 2022 among 7,647 online respondents. The German results come from a Körber-Stiftung poll conducted by Kantar from August 2 to 11, 2022, among 1,088 respondents by telephone.
Here are the questions used for this report, along with the answers and their survey methodology in the United States.
As daunting challenges from Russia, China and a global economy loom large around the world, Americans and Germans continue to say relations between their countries are good. In fact, more Germans now say the relationship with the United States is good (82%) than since 2017, when the Pew Research Center and the Körber-Stiftung began asking about the issue. For their part, 81% of Americans also characterize the transatlantic relationship as good, but there are still differences between the two nations on specific aspects of the partnership and on perceptions of what threat Russia and China pose.
Most Americans and Germans continue to see each other as partners in protecting European security, and the publics in each country are willing to support the use of military action to protect themselves and to their allies. Majorities in each country also see the other as a good partner for dealing with Russia. Germans, however, are more skeptical about how a US partnership can protect the environment, while Americans are relatively less convinced that Germany is a partner when it comes to dealing with China.
Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents tend to say Germany is more of a partner on a variety of issues than Republicans and those who lean toward the Republican Party. People in both countries also think Europe is not doing enough to become independent from Russian energy, as an approaching winter threatens to stretch Europe’s energy supply.
Germans are more likely to say the U.S. is their preeminent foreign policy partner, although Americans are more likely to say the U.K. is their most important partner (the survey was conducted earlier of the recent passing of Queen Elizabeth II). Americans, meanwhile, are also much more likely than Germans to see Russia and China as a military threat to their country. Older Americans are especially likely to see Russia and China as major military threats.
Regarding one of the most direct effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both Americans and Germans strongly support Sweden and Finland joining NATO (60% and 75%, respectively). Germans are also much more likely to say they want a close relationship with the United States than with Russia or China. But both publics express skepticism about using their militaries to promote democracy, and neither fully supports only buying energy supplies from nations that are democracies.
Those are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey of 12,147 people in the United States from July 18-Aug. 21 and 7,647 people in the United States from August 1-14, 2022, as well as a Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,088 adults conducted in Germany from August 2-11, 2022. This is the first year that the American survey is conducted online by the Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. In previous years, from 2017 to 2021, US polls were conducted by telephone. Additional results of the Körber-Stiftung survey can be found in the recently published publication “Berlin Pulse”. German polls were conducted entirely by telephone in all years, including 2022.
The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Germany
Both Americans and Germans are overwhelmingly positive about bilateral relations today, with large majorities in both countries rating relations as somewhat or very good in 2022.
Germans became substantially more optimistic about bilateral relations in 2021, following leadership changes in both countries. Positive sentiment has continued to rise in Germany, where a record 82 percent now say relations with the United States are good. See the article : United States: National Day of South Sudan. This represents an increase of 11 percentage points over last year and more than a quadruple in positive evaluations over the past two years.
Americans’ ratings of the relationship also improved significantly in 2021 and remain overwhelmingly positive this year. Democrats and Republicans generally have similar feelings about whether relations are good with Germany (84% and 80%, respectively), but Democrats are more intensely positive about the relationship. In particular, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more than twice as likely to say that relations with Germany are very good (22% vs. 10%).
The American-German partnership on key issues
About half or more of Americans say Germany is a partner on all five key issues tested, with 68% calling Germany a partner in protecting European security. About six in ten Americans also say Germany is a partner in protecting the environment and ensuring access to energy sources. To see also : China’s latest spike in Covid cases is curtailing tourists and restricting travel. However, only 56% and 52% of Americans name Germany as a partner in dealing with Russia and China, respectively.
While most Republicans and Republican-leaning independents consider Germany a partner on almost all issues, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely to say they consider Germany a partner on all issues tested. This division is greater to ensure access to energy sources and protect the environment.
Large numbers of Germans see the US as a partner on two key issues: about eight in ten Germans say the US is a partner in protecting European security, and about six in ten describe the US as a partner in deal with Russia
Germans are divided over whether the United States is a partner in securing access to energy sources. Almost half of Germans surveyed consider the United States to be an energy partner, while 45% say they do not consider the United States a partner. Although a slight increase from 2021, only 48% of Germans say the US is a partner in dealing with China and only 40% say the US is a partner in protecting the environment.
In addition, younger Germans are more critical of the partnership with the US on the environment (59% say the US is not a partner). And on all issues, those in the former East Germany tend to be more critical of association with the United States than those in the former West Germany. Politically, Green Party supporters are more likely to see the United States as a partner in dealing with China than those who support the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the CDU/CSU.
Most important foreign policy partner for U.S. and Germany
Although relations between the United States and Germany are on a relatively solid footing, each audience paints a different picture when naming their country’s most important foreign policy partner. Americans are much more likely to say that the UK is their country’s most important foreign policy partner, highlighting the historic ties between the two English-speaking nations.
About a quarter of Americans say the UK is America’s most important foreign policy partner. Next on the list, 11% say China is America’s most important foreign policy partner, followed by 6% who cite Israel and 5% who choose Canada. Just 3% say Germany is the United States’ most important international partner, placing it fifth on the open-ended question in this year’s survey. More than a third of the American panelists did not answer this question.
Among Germans, the most critical foreign policy partner named is the United States at 36%, followed closely by France at 32%. Far behind these two traditional allies are Russia (3%), the European Union (2%) and China, Turkey and Poland (each 1%).
Comparisons with previous surveys in the US are not possible due to a switch from phone to web panel mode in 2022, but similar patterns were seen among Americans on this question from 2017 to 2021, with the UK always at the top and China usually taking second place. .
In 2022, Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to cite Israel as a foreign policy partner. And Americans aged 18-29 view China as the country’s most important foreign policy partner, while older Americans say the UK is overwhelming.
Demographic differences in Germany are not deep in its most important international partner, but those in the former West Germany are more likely to name the United States as the most critical partner compared to those in the former East Germany.
In 2020 and earlier, during Donald Trump’s presidency, most Germans chose France as their most important partner, with the United States usually coming in second. But since President Joe Biden took the helm, Germans are much more likely to say the United States is their most important partner. This mirrors general attitudes toward the United States and its president in Germany and Western Europe in other Pew Research Center surveys and analyzes over the past five years.
China and Russia as a military threat
Although about one in ten Americans name China as their most important foreign policy partner, about two-thirds see China as a military threat to American security (64%). And similar shares say the same about Russia as a military threat (66%), as Americans continue to share concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On the other hand, a much smaller proportion of Germans say that Russia or China are a major military threat to their security. Only about two in ten Germans say Russia is a major military threat (22%), and even fewer say the same about China (7%). That equates to Americans being three times more likely than Germans to express top concerns about Russia’s military and about nine times more likely to be worried about China. However, 44% of Germans see China as at least a minor military threat, and 72% say the same about Russia.
Older Americans are far more concerned about the potential military threat from China and Russia than younger Americans. Age differences in Germany are not as dramatic, but older Germans tend to see Russia as a military threat more than younger Germans.
Republicans are more concerned about the military threat posed by China (75 percent say a major military threat) than Democrats (58 percent), while Democrats are slightly more likely to see Russia as a threat (69 percent ) than Republicans (64%). This tracks overall attitudes about China and Russia among supporters of the two major US political parties.
Involvement of American and German military forces in foreign conflicts
An overwhelming portion of Americans and Germans believe that their military should be used in foreign conflicts to protect the security of their own country and its allies. Nearly nine in ten Americans say the military should be involved to protect US security, and about three-quarters say the same about protecting America’s allies. About three-quarters of Germans say the same about protecting themselves and Germany’s allies.
However, when it comes to using the military to promote democracy abroad, a majority of Americans (58%) say the U.S. military should not be used to this purpose. Only 38% of Americans see a place for the military in promoting democracy abroad. This follows recent US public opinion, which ranks the promotion of democracy in other nations as the least important foreign policy priority.
Germans, meanwhile, are almost equally divided on using the German military for democratic expansion, with 49% saying it should and 46% saying it shouldn’t.
Older Americans are more inclined to support promoting democracy through the military than younger Americans, although less than half of those over 65 say so. Democrats are also slightly more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. military should strengthen democracy abroad (42% vs. 35%, respectively).
NATO’s expansion
In reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland have applied to become members of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the request is still in the process of ratification by NATO’s 30 member states, both the United States and Germany have approved the promotion. And publics in both countries wholeheartedly support the acceptance of Sweden and Finland into NATO, with little opposition.
Three-quarters of Germans say they approve of Sweden and Finland becoming NATO members, and six in ten Americans also approve. Less than one in ten in each country opposes the rise. In the United States, one-third neither approve nor disapprove of the change in NATO membership, while 16% in Germany are neutral on the issue.
In Germany, support for NATO membership of Sweden and Finland is high among key demographic groups. But slightly less support for the rise is found among those in the former East Germany (65%) compared to the West (78%). And older Germans approve of potential expansion more than younger Germans, although much of the difference is due to younger Germans being more likely to say they neither approve nor disapprove of the rise rather than to oppose it.
Likewise, the demographic differences for Americans on this issue tend to be mostly between those who approve and those who remain neutral, with only small minorities disapproving. For example, seven out of ten men say they approve of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, compared to 53% of women. But that’s because 41% of women say they neither approve nor disapprove of Scandinavian nations joining NATO, while only 23% of men say the same. (Women were also more likely to say they were unsure about questions about the details of international affairs in a recent Pew Research Center survey of foreign policy knowledge.)
The more educated and older Americans are also more likely to support NATO membership of Sweden and Finland. But again, much of the difference is because younger and less educated Americans are more likely to say they neither approve nor disapprove of NATO expansion.
There are also slight partisan differences on this issue, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to support Sweden and Finland joining NATO. This tracks other polls on US partisan attitudes toward NATO, showing that Democrats are more favorable to the organization than Republicans and more likely to see a benefit in membership.
Energy security
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting disruption of global energy markets has raised concerns about the coming winter and Europe’s ability to cope without Russia’s massive energy exports. To that end, two new questions were asked in this year’s survey about whether the American and German publics would be willing to import energy from any country or only those that are democracies, and whether Europe is doing enough to become independent of Russian energy supply.
In the latter, it is clear that people in the United States and Germany believe that European countries are not doing enough to disengage from Russian energy. Six in ten Germans and two-thirds of Americans say Europe is not doing enough to become independent of Russian gas and oil. Only around three in ten in each country say Europe is doing enough. In the US, younger people and Democrats are slightly more likely to say Europe is doing enough than older people and Republicans, but most demographics think Europe is not doing enough to disengage of Russian energy.
And on the broader question of whether to import energy from all countries or just those that are democracies, Americans are almost evenly split, while most Germans say they should seek energy markets from all countries, regardless of their political system. Interestingly, younger Germans are more willing to say they should only buy energy supplies from democratic countries, while younger Americans are more willing to get energy from all countries.
