President Biden made his first trip to the Middle East last week, visiting Israel and Saudi Arabia. While the trip produced few glowing announcements — such as new normalization agreements or Saudi Arabia increasing oil production — it showed that the United States remains focused on strengthening the region’s security architecture, particularly to counter Iran. Nevertheless, there were some important developments, such as the US-Saudi agreement to build 5G and 6G telecommunications networks and Riyadh opening airspace to Israeli flights. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, the president reaffirmed Washington’s long-standing commitment to Israel and said now is not the time to restart peace talks with the Palestinians.
USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Robert Barron, Sarhang Hamasaeed, Hesham Youssef and Mike Yaffe discuss five key takeaways from the visit.
1. Re-starting an Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not a U.S. priority.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: Biden left with public claims that “the terrain is not yet ripe for a resumption of negotiations” and that his support for the vision of a two-state solution is not achievable “in the short term.” there is little doubt that his administration will not pursue, let alone actively pursue or encourage, Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic progress. That conclusion was consistent with the overall message of Biden’s trip. In response to regional perceptions of US abandonment, the administration appeared to respond that the United States had not abandoned but simply shifted its lens and terms of engagement. Implicit in this new posture is the message that engaging in 20th-century conflicts in 20th-century ways has given way to prioritizing 21st-century challenges and opportunities for cooperation as a path to regional security. Energy, water, food and climate were focused on or alongside public debates on more traditional notions of security, and the emphasis on multilateralism and new alliances dominated. This was perhaps nowhere more evident than in the Jerusalem Declaration on the US-Israel Strategic Partnership. The document, signed by Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, effectively summarizes Israeli and American positions, positions and policies in relation to each other and on issues of mutual concern. Among a list that included few shared commitments — and a list of issues ranging from preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to new interregional partnerships and Russia’s attack on Ukraine — the Palestinian issue was given a low price tag and reflected minimal ambition. The reference was notable both for being defined only as a United States interest – not a bilateral one – and for its very limited language about what both sides could commit to. Specifically, the text refers to Biden’s “longstanding and consistent support for a two-state solution and a real one in which we can Israelis and Palestinians alike enjoy security, freedom, and prosperity,” affirming that “the United States and Israel are committed to continuing to discuss the challenges and opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian relations” (emphasis added). To this end, during a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem and during a visit to the August Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem, Biden announced several positive initiatives and reinvestments in Palestinian society and in US-Palestine relations. Throughout the journey, he also found ways to communicate and exploit the potential of the Abraham Accords process as a boon – rather than a blow – to the conditions for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ending the occupation. But from Jerusalem to Bethlehem to Jeddah, the president has been as directly clear about his commitment to the goal of a Palestinian state as that U.S. diplomatic engagement or the use of American influence toward that goal is off the table in favor of practical steps aimed at improving the situation on on the ground for Palestinians and promoting more constructive Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.
At the end of the day, the message of re-establishing the US “peace process” in the 21st century was that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and occupation, this administration will embrace the art of the possible and the practical rather than the ambitious and the wishful. See the article : ‘News out of the United States is horrible’: G-7 ally Biden feels intimidated at reversing US abortion rights.
2. Expanded regional security and economic cooperation — which includes Israel — is a major U.S. priority in the region.
Barron’s: The president’s July trip highlighted the changing regional geometry of the Middle East. Since the August 2020 Abraham Accords, US policy has been to deepen cooperation between US allies and partners in the region, including Israel. So far, the Biden administration has supported multi-stakeholder and multi-issue efforts to that end. Read also : $ 450 Million New US Aid to Ukraine – US State Department. Most notably, a number of Middle Eastern foreign ministers met in the Negev in March, laying the groundwork for what was dubbed the “Negev Forum” in June – a group that includes Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, the UAE, Israel and the United States. — which was designed as a step towards a “new regional architecture” to increase security, integration, cooperation and prosperity. Biden also held a virtual meeting with the leaders of the newly formed “I2U2” group – Israel’s Yair Lapid, India’s Narendra Modi and the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed – to discuss the economic and political goals of this emerging “quartet”.
The president’s visit began in Israel, where he signed the “Jerusalem Declaration,” which states that the United States is committed to “building a robust regional architecture; deepen ties between Israel and all its regional partners; eventually accelerate Israel’s regional integration; and expand the circle of peace to include more and more Arab and Muslim countries.” From Israel, the president flew directly to Saudi Arabia, the first official flight of its kind in history, where the Saudi government announced that it would allow overflight rights to all carriers, including Israeli airlines. Lapid hailed the decision as “the first official step towards the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia.” In the president’s meetings with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, the issue of greater regional integration and cooperation (especially in the fight against Iran) was a constant theme.
While the Biden administration has been clear in its interest in expanding normalized relations in the Middle East, major announcements such as those from the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan are not expected. Saudi Arabia has been quick to point out that normalization with Israel is off the table until a two-state solution is reached under the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. By the same token, few other Arab countries appear to want to join the Abraham Accords or fully normalize relations with Israel until a solution to the Palestinian issue is reached. So, as happened in Jeddah, the administration is likely to remain content with smaller steps and under-the-radar cooperation: an area where much progress can undoubtedly still be made.
3. Despite differences, U.S.-Saudi cooperation will continue.
Hamasaed: Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with its leadership, particularly Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman — often referred to as MBS — was a difficult, pragmatic, and perhaps necessary step for both the United States and Saudi Arabia, as well as the wider region. Relations between the two countries, especially at the leadership level, reached a low point under the Bidno administration in the midst of the Ukraine war. See the article : NJ is launching a national population health data project. The murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi and a public report from the US government stating that the crown prince had approved the operation were the main reasons for the break in the relationship.
However, there is a broader trend of Saudi Arabia and other regional states unhappy with the United States changing its position in the region—described as downsizing, divesting, or recalibrating, among other things—without considering the needs of its partners, especially security. needs. The Saudis and UAE have expected more support from the UAE in the war in Yemen and in dealing with related risks, such as Houthi drone and missile attacks. Saudi Arabia and other regional countries are critical of US efforts to return to the Iran nuclear deal without addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional influence through proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
If we look closely at the record, we could find several issues that Saudi Arabia found uncomfortable, particularly in how Washington responded. Perhaps none of them have become as personal and distant for leaders as that of MBS-Khashoggi. Direct personal engagement with the US president is important to Saudi Arabia’s leadership, as well as to other Middle East leaders. Biden’s visit re-established that direct personal engagement and diplomacy and reaffirmed that the United States, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region need each other, even if they don’t always share the same values. There are many opportunities for continued cooperation: security, energy, trade, climate change, economic development and more.
President Biden assured that the Saudis and regional leaders need to hear. He said the United States “will not allow foreign or regional powers to threaten freedom of navigation in the Middle East’s waterways,” nor will it allow any country to dominate the region, including Russia, China and Iran. In the past, high-profile Saudi Arabian and UAE facilities have been attacked despite the security capabilities provided by their partnership with the United States. Biden’s visit provided much-needed energy for further engagement, but it will take time to see how events might test US assurances and mutual expectations.
4. The United States and its regional partners agree on the ultimate objective of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb, but are less unified on how to achieve this with escalation on the horizon.
Youssef: Dealing with Iran – including the nuclear deal – has always been a contentious issue between the United States on the one hand and Israel and several Gulf states on the other. Biden and Lapid signed the Jerusalem Declaration, in which Washington pledged to “never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons” and “use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.” The joint US-Saudi statement “underscored the importance of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.” On the other hand, the joint statement of the summit of the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council emphasized “the central role of diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.” The difference between the United States using “all elements of its national power” and “the central role of diplomatic efforts” is obvious.
5. Forget retrenchment: Strategic competition with China and Russia has Washington still focused on the Middle East.
While Biden’s patience is running out, he still said he “continues to believe that diplomacy is the best way to get this result.” Lapid claimed that “words will not stop them… Diplomacy will not stop them. The only thing that will stop Iran…is putting a credible military threat on the table.
Iran’s response was swift. Kamal Kharrazi, a senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said Iran is a nuclear-threshold country capable of developing atomic weapons but has not chosen to do so. Israel also reacted immediately. The Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has said that diplomacy can fail and that an attack on Iran is at the heart of the IDF’s preparations.
The Gulf states were more focused on Iranian politics and the threat posed by its proxies, particularly the Houthis and Hezbollah. It’s doubtful the meetings addressed the issue in any detail, other than Biden’s reference to “integrating air defense and early warning systems to ensure we can defeat threats in the air,” which no other leader mentioned.
