The glitz of new and smart weaponry can seduce politicians and institutions, but major wars are still won by industrial mobilization.
Since the 1990s, members of the Transatlantic Alliance have relied on new technologies such as precision-guided munitions and telecommunications and their promise to provide greater military impact. The importance of innovation is emphasized in almost every document on both sides of the ocean. On the same subject : West Newton Cinema May Become Non-Profit Center to Support Community Arts. Major and medium powers use innovation as a solution to overcome defense budgets and the weakness of their defense infrastructure. The European Union (EU), a master of rhetoric and branding, is no exception.
Technology-based technology projects are of interest and widely reported by policymakers, service leaders, and members of the defense industry. As scholar Nina Kollar has noted, innovation scares policy makers and scares gun makers. However, the thirst for new defenses can overshadow the winning power of traditional and non-innovative technologies. As Jack Watling, from the Royal United Services Institute, explained: “The West needs to be disciplined not always in the pursuit of great things but rather in understanding how to the remarkable doing evil and ordinary things.”
Yes, the new protection is as hard to criticize as motherhood and apple pie. In addition, the new decision of the EU on the strengthening of the new defense (the Commission recently announced a new project called the EU Defense Innovation Scheme, EUDIS, of € 2bn euro – $ 2.06bn – investment programs to support innovation and business) is definitely a good thing. development, especially because you argue that no other part of the European defense project had a big gap between what was promised and what was delivered. But, at a time when a lot of money is spent on defense, it is tempting to prioritize expensive projects, specialized technology at the expense of savings of parts from the current systems and the production of weapons.
The war in Ukraine shows that there is a future, but it involves traditional methods for artillery and ground troops because it remains at the center of the war. Most importantly, the conflict shows the inadequacy of the West’s defense – especially conventional guns and ammunition. The rate of use of both is higher than expected by military personnel. “This is a shooting war now,” Ukraine’s deputy military chief Vadym Skibitsky recently told the Guardian. “We lost in terms of shooting. All this depends on what [the West] brings to us,” said Skibitsky.
But the West is running out of weapons and is quickly running out of weapons to send to Ukraine. The Ukrainian army says they are using 5,000-6,000 shells a day. Britain this month announced another 50,000 guns for Ukraine and the US has so far more than 300,000. It is perhaps not surprising that the sales were low, especially since the basic knowledge before the war was that the West would not fight a commercial conflict. As a result, almost no one retained the ability to increase the productivity of the country. But as shown by the war in Ukraine, and Lieutenant Colonel (rtd.) Alex Vershinin rightly pointed out, industry is back and the victory in a prolonged armed conflict between close-competitors is still based on the most powerful industrial base. A country, said Vershinin, must have the capacity to produce a large number of weapons or, on the other hand, have other industrial facilities that can be quickly converted to the production of weapons – and the West doesn’t seem to exist anymore.
But what is unusual, the priority should be to fill the shelves and increase the production of common military equipment. The EU was surprisingly quick to address this issue. On July 19, the Commission announced an EU Investment Tool aimed at replenishing Europe’s arms inventory. In particular, €500m was offered to encourage joint arms procurement among member states, in an effort to help replace the destroyed stockpiles of weapons in Ukraine. The bloc’s primary goal is to encourage at least three member countries to jointly purchase weapons, such as guns, air defense systems, and anti-aircraft guns. There have been times when some members of the EU have bought weapons together, but this is the first time that the administration of the bloc is working to do this.
The distribution of this package is very important. It introduces a role for the EU in the protection of industries that goes beyond the financing and destruction of protection activities, and shows the growing importance of the EU institutions in the regulation of industrial protection products of the continent. However, it is important that this package is not just an emergency tool.
In fact, so far, the Commission’s request emphasizes the short-term nature of the package: the financial commitment will last from 2022-2024 and it is initially planned to assistance to members of the state urgently seeking protective goods. It is important for the EU to make the expansion of industrial production a long-term goal of its defense policy. It is not possible to turn on and off the defense with the snap of a finger and attention to the large part of the European security must be maintained over time. It still maintains the advanced, advanced technology to deal with enemies like Russia, but also very heavy.
The EU is a strong performer when it comes to setting priorities and providing incentives for state compliance. As one senior NATO official explained: “We can demand higher and higher defense spending all we like, but if that group cannot [ the EU leader] then force them to spend properly, it will not make a big difference”.
Therefore, the EU can and should use its financial muscle to bring cooperation to the “intermediate country” that has been evident for many years of European business efforts. In particular, incentives should be offered to ensure that the national defense industry develops a capacity for redistribution. If it is true that modern problems require modern solutions, then the return of power politics may require old policies. In times of full-scale domestic attacks, it pays to invest in a manufacturing facility that can be used technologically as well as strategically.
The EU is well placed and on the right track to improve both. But the tension between the old and the new will continue to underpin the European debate. The EU should not allow its technological needs as well as the desire for technological weapons and production to undermine the importance of maintaining stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Isabella Antinozzi is a Research Associate at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). His main research interests include EU defense and security initiatives, UK foreign policy, defense acquisition and industrial strategy, and maritime security relations.
