As Russia escalates its offensive against Ukraine, two powers in the Middle East that are often on opposite sides in many conflicts are helping Moscow. Iran has reportedly been supplying weapons, including drones and possibly missiles, to Russia for use in Ukraine. Saudi Arabia is arming its oil production in ways that will help keep Moscow close and create more pain in Western capitals ahead of a cold winter. Riyadh (a long-standing Western ally) and Tehran (a long-standing Western adversary) are largely motivated by one side: the United States.
The crisis caused by Russia’s attack on Ukraine has given a major boost to Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical position. And Riyadh is playing a bad game. This month, Riyadh doubled down on this strategy by urging OPEC+ (which includes OPEC members as well as other non-member producers, such as Russia) to cut combined production at 2 million barrels per day.
This comes at a time when the United States and Europe have called for increased production to reduce costs in ways that will eliminate all Russian money and help to offset the cost of living in the West. The sanctions have forced Russia to sell its oil, including to Saudi Arabia, at below-market prices. Thus, a high inflation rate is the main way for Moscow to continue to make a profit from its power and support its high prices and failure. The first budget of Riyadh in 2023, including a surplus of about $ 2.4 billion, was calculated by the price of $ 76 per barrel, which rejects the rush to crisis at prices of about $ 90 per barrel, as it was at the beginning of October. At least, the OPEC + could have waited for another month, as the officials of the White House asked the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to do, so that the cuts could not be enforced before held the US election.
As Russia escalates its offensive against Ukraine, two powers in the Middle East that are often on opposite sides in many conflicts are helping Moscow. Iran has reportedly been supplying weapons, including drones and possibly missiles, to Russia for use in Ukraine. Saudi Arabia is arming its oil production in ways that will help keep Moscow close and create more pain in Western capitals ahead of a cold winter. Riyadh (a long-standing Western ally) and Tehran (a long-standing Western adversary) are largely motivated by one side: the United States.
The crisis caused by Russia’s attack on Ukraine has given a major boost to Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical position. And Riyadh is playing a bad game. This month, Riyadh doubled down on this strategy by urging OPEC+ (which includes OPEC members as well as other non-member producers, such as Russia) to cut combined production at 2 million barrels per day.
This comes at a time when the United States and Europe have called for increased production to reduce costs in ways that will eliminate all Russian money and help to offset the cost of living in the West. The sanctions have forced Russia to sell its oil, including to Saudi Arabia, at below-market prices. Thus, a high inflation rate is the main way for Moscow to continue to make a profit from its power and support its high prices and failure. The first budget of Riyadh in 2023, including a surplus of about $ 2.4 billion, was calculated by the price of $ 76 per barrel, which rejects the rush to crisis at prices of about $ 90 per barrel, as it was at the beginning of October. At least, the OPEC + could have waited for another month, as the officials of the White House asked the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to do, so that the cuts could not be enforced before held the US election.
On Iran’s side, despite the continued official statement that Iran is neutral and has not supplied weapons to Ukraine, it is clear that the conflict has become a new theater in which Tehran feels can strengthen its ties with Russia to weaken the United States. Ukrainian officials have confirmed that many of the drones produced by Iran have been installed by Russia in Ukraine with dire consequences. There are also US reports of Iranian military trainers in Crimea and Tehran has agreed to supply Russia with Iranian-made surface-to-surface missiles for use in Ukraine.
It is clear that Iran and Saudi Arabia are using the conflict in Ukraine to weaken the interests of the West. What is not clear is how the West can effectively change its position.
Many things are driving Riyadh and Tehran, but the main motivation is to strengthen their own hand against the United States in an increasingly global organization. After years of being forced and dictated by Western governments, regional players like Iran and Saudi Arabia are letting the world’s major players know that their relationship is now a two-way street. and are increasingly looking to strengthen ties with non-Westerners to assert their independence. action.
In this context, the Saudi refusal to cooperate in oil policy with the United States is not aimed at Russia. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia voted against Russia in all important United Nations resolutions, provided $400 million in aid to Ukraine, and supported an agreement that released Western citizens arrested by Russia. while fighting with Ukraine. Saudi Arabia’s recent actions are more of a non-support for Washington, which it feels is no longer a reliable partner.
A key tenet of the US-Saudi partnership over the years—oil in exchange for security—has been undermined by the Obama and Trump administrations. The former President of the United States of America Barack Obama signed a nuclear agreement with Iran, and the former President of the United States Donald Trump explained that the Saudi facilities were hit by missiles and drones launched by ‘ team supported by Iran in 2019. energy market, the US President Joe Biden may have continued to expel Mohammed bin Salman for many years.
Saudi lawmakers are now sending clear messages to the US government: Riyadh is in a Saudi-first mood, renewing the foundations of their partnership will reduce expectations, the the Middle East has become multipolar, and Saudi Arabia feels the right to play. It’s an awesome wall-to-wall game.
Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its options as a safety net while straining relations with the West and hopes of revising the 2015 nuclear deal seem increasingly slim. If the nuclear talks collapse, Tehran expects increased political, economic, and military influence on the West (and Israel). Iran is doubling down on its military partnership with Russia, pushing for more economic ties with China, and deepening diplomacy with its Persian Gulf and Asian neighbors. By building these relationships, Tehran hopes to stop the West from being able to isolate itself in the same way that the Obama administration was able to do through sanctions and through global integration. widely against Iran’s nuclear program.
Tehran also sought all means to weaken the ability of the United States to isolate and confront Iran. One of the ways he sought to achieve this was to build deeper security ties with Russia—specifically, by following Moscow’s decision to join the military in Syria after Iran called for its help. in 2015 to save the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Now, at the time of Russia’s demands, it is difficult to imagine Iran’s rejection of requests from Moscow for weapons that bring financial incentives and geopolitical influence on the world. Ukraine has also given Iran a military demonstration to demonstrate its weapons capabilities despite years of sanctions, as a warning to Iran’s regional enemies that the use of its weapons can be devastating.
In order to regain influence and alignment with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United States must show these measures related to the appearance of a large world order. In fact, Washington has to rethink its thinking, based on an old place of American power in the Middle East.
As usual in Iran, there is a heavy focus on sanctions. Europe and the United States have made new sanctions against individuals and organizations over the drones that were given to Russia for its use in Ukraine. But Iran remains one of the most liberal countries in the world; his military is the hardest hit. Despite the positive sign, it is clear that more Western sanctions will not change Iran’s behavior. Europe and the United States should focus on how they can prevent and counter the Iranian weapons that are being used in Ukraine as well as increasing the real costs for Iran and its own civilians.
The public situation is particularly important as Iran’s leadership struggles with nationwide protests are now in their second month, fueled by years of protests and fueled by the death of a young woman. -Mahsa Amini-while being detained by the police. These protests have further undermined the credibility of the state authorities in Iran. And at a time when the opposition is calling for accountability and regime change, the West must continue to expose Iran’s role in supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. This is a sensitive issue in Iran’s public debate because of the role played by the West in supporting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War that resulted in the deaths of thousands of people in Iran and left many villages that faced long. -lasting effects of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons. This experience continues to damage the position of the West and large sections of the Iranian public, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij who were on the front lines. The public display of Iran’s support for Russia has made it clear to the Iranian authorities to answer to their own public why they have chosen to support a terrorist. And unlike Syria, where Iran defends its actions based on supporting the state against terrorism and US aggression, Iran is now helping Russia weaken a state in Ukraine. .
The result of talks to restore the nuclear deal can also be used to influence Iran in Ukraine. While it’s clear that many in Tehran are skeptical about a new deal, it’s also clear that economic success has kept Iran from returning to talks – and that could be more motivating than a other times it was given to increase the pressure in the country.
France and Britain, both parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, have called Iranian drone deliveries to Russia a violation of Iran’s obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. They adhere to this resolution to ban Iran ( until 2030) from the transfer of delivery systems – such as drones – that can deliver a nuclear weapon. This is important to convey to Tehran that the deeper Iran is aligned with Russia in Ukraine, the more damaging the nuclear program will be. Even if the nuclear deal is restored, Iran cannot expect the European market to welcome it with open arms when Tehran and Moscow are connected to Ukraine.
Western policymakers should also warn Iran that its position in Ukraine could open the door for an unpredictable new front with Israel. Despite Israel’s close relationship with Moscow, Israel has reportedly given Ukraine intelligence about Iranian drones. The shadow of the war between Iran and Israel could increase in Ukraine in the same way as Israel’s use of Iranian people and assets in Syria. For example, Israel can help the Ukrainian forces to control the locations and Iranian military advisers who are working with Russia.
On the Saudi side, US lawmakers and the White House have publicly accused Riyadh of colluding with Russia. Because of the US bipartisan reluctance to return to a high level of security in the Middle East, Washington must accept the idea that its relationship with Saudi Arabia needs a renewed, objective-correct focus in the interests of both parties. In a purely coercive (unlikely) scenario, the sanctions against Riyadh would not have the policy effect that Washington wants and would it deepens the relationship in a downward environment as well as the value of upward energy. The best course of action is to be specific and focused on the Saudi-Russia relationship.
First, the United States must adopt policies to improve its own resilience not only in Saudi Arabia but in all hydrocarbon producers. The G-7 tariffs on Russian oil—scheduled to be implemented in December—are now expected to accelerate in November. Europe and the United States should also strengthen cooperation on long-term natural gas (LNG) supplies and the oil-to-LNG transition, especially coordinating prices, investments, incentives, and regulations. Second, the idea that Republicans will be more respectful of a Saudi-Russian alliance when they return to power weakens the United States. It is the success of the country to activate a two-pronged effort before the US midterm elections, focusing on revisiting the NOPEC (or No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels) Act that applies only to people from abroad, save the US energy industry and introduce a blue-ribbon audit. the financial relations of Russia-Saudi, especially between the currencies of the two governments.
Finally, the most influential strategy remains to find creative ways to remind Tehran and Riyadh that Moscow is the first and most competitive, using how Russia offers more and more volumes reduction in the traditional markets of Saudi and Iran in China and Asia in general.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have decided to support Russia directly or indirectly in its war efforts in Ukraine. In considering how to control the regional forces, the United States should turn away from the common idea that a special plan can be made in Saudi Arabia or a policy that is the solution to all aspects of the conflict with Iran.
The West needs new, more innovative, and better policies to respond to regional forces in the multipolar world that has been accelerated by the conflict with Russia.
