Sébastien Thibault for foreign policy
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in February, Foreign Policy asked a group of prominent thinkers how the first major war in Europe since 1945 would shape US grand strategy going forward. Although their perspectives differed, most agreed on one thing: the war marked the end of the post-Cold War era and the return of heightened superpower competition in Europe and the Pacific.
Now that the war is half a year on, we asked the question again – and found a few surprises, along with themes that were already evident the first time around. The liberal West has held together remarkably well, with NATO reinvigorated by the addition of two new members and the European Union discovering a new role in waging economic warfare. Lessons from the conflict reach far beyond Europe, also influencing the strategic competition with China.
The war also points to some problems for Washington strategists. First and foremost: most countries outside the West refused to pick sides. The conflict also hastened a painful process of separation between the superpowers – especially in technology – that is likely to put the final nails in the coffins of unfettered globalization and open markets, key planks of the post-Cold War order. And that will require new thinking on many political fronts.
Below, seven experts discuss these and other lessons for future American strategy. —Stefan Theil, Deputy Editor
It’s Back to the Future for U.S. Grand Strategy
By Angela Stent, author of Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and Others and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution On the same subject : Seven ways the war in Ukraine is changing global science.
Javelin anti-tank missiles serve as the backdrop for a speech by US President Joe Biden at a Lockheed Martin manufacturing facility in Troy, Alabama, on May 3. Julie Bennett/Getty Images
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine ended the first phase of the post-Cold War era. Now the grand strategy of the United States seems to be directed back into the future. The war underscored Washington’s indispensable leadership role as Europe’s security guarantor and brought home the reality for its NATO allies that they can only protect themselves under the US umbrella. The European Union, despite all its plans and ambitions, failed to achieve its own strategic autonomy. Other institutions – the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – have also failed to adequately respond to the Russian invasion and the security threat that Moscow poses to Europe. While the United States has provided the lion’s share of weapons to Ukraine and enabled it to repel Russian advances, other NATO members are also supporting Ukraine with weapons, training and intelligence.
After NATO’s difficult exit from Afghanistan, the bloc rediscovered its original mission: containing expansionist Russia. One key difference this time around is that NATO will coordinate more closely with its Asian partners after the bloc flagged China as an adversary. The United States, through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the AUKUS partnership, and bilateral alliances in Asia, will lead the collective West—North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore—in an effort to contain Russia as well. and China simultaneously.
It will become increasingly difficult, however, to maintain Western unity in the face of growing difficulties caused by the war’s economic consequences, including Western sanctions and Russian weapons for energy and food supplies. Washington will have to take the lead in helping its allies find alternatives to Russian oil and gas while pursuing a domestic fossil fuel phase-out agenda.
But the United States will also face a new reality. While the collective West condemned and sanctioned Russia and supported Ukraine, almost the entire global South refused to choose a side. India is America’s partner in the Quad, but has neither criticized nor sanctioned Russia – and has increased its imports of Russian oil since the war began. China neither supported nor condemned the Russian invasion, but supported Russia’s claims that its attack was prompted by NATO threats to its security. Many other countries in the Global South view Russia as a big authoritarian country to do business with and accuse the United States of hypocrisy, given Washington’s past wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States will have to manage this large non-aligned group of countries just as it did during the Cold War: trying to convince them that a Russian invasion, in violation of the UN Charter and international law, poses a threat to other nations’ sovereignty and territorial integrity as well.
Russia and China have called for a new post-Western order in which the United States can no longer set the agenda. Beijing is seeking a global order where China can set the rules with the United States, but where the rules will still exist. Russia, judging by its actions in Ukraine and its nightly television propaganda barrages, is promoting something else entirely: world disorder without rules. The great strategic challenge for the United States is to ensure that the post-Cold War world actually maintains the rules—including, most importantly, those designed to avoid large-scale armed conflict.
Finally Wean Europe Off Washington
Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy columnist and professor of international relations at Harvard University Read also : The expansion of the U.S. Contribution to the World Food Program – United States Department of State.
Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin and President Sauli Niinistö hold a press conference announcing their country’s application for NATO membership at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, Finland, on May 15. ALESSANDRO RAMPAZZO/AFP via Getty Images
When Foreign Policy first asked five months ago about the impact of the Ukraine war on American strategy, I argued that Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine was an ideal opportunity to begin the process of weaning the United States’ European allies from their excessive dependence on US protection. If anything, the case for a new division of labor has since grown stronger.
The war showed that hard power is still important in the 21st century, exposed Europe’s military shortcomings, subtly drew the limits of US commitment, and exposed Russia’s enduring military limitations. Rebuilding Europe’s defenses will take time and money, but assuming greater responsibility for its own defense will allow the United States to shift more effort and attention to Asia to meet the many challenges posed by a more powerful and assertive China.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration ignores these implications and reinforces Europe’s dependence on Uncle Sam. If this course continues, the United States will remain overstretched and its capacity to effectively balance China will suffer.
What has happened in the past five months to strengthen the case for Europe’s weaning from Washington?
First, Russia’s military performance has not significantly improved, and its armed forces continue to suffer significant losses. Even if Moscow’s greater latent power allows it to achieve some sort of Pyrrhic victory in Ukraine, its ability to threaten the rest of Europe in the future will be minimal. Russia has lost a significant part of its most sophisticated weapons and best trained military personnel. Western sanctions have significantly damaged its economy. Export restrictions will make it much more difficult for Russia’s defense industry to acquire advanced semiconductors and other technologies required for cutting-edge weapons. Over time, European efforts to reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas will deny Moscow revenue and further hamper its ability to rebuild its military forces after the fighting in Ukraine ends.
Second, Sweden and Finland were admitted to NATO. Unlike some of the other new members of the bloc, both countries have powerful militaries, and their entry greatly complicates Russian defense planning by turning the Baltic Sea into a virtual NATO lake. This tilts the balance of power in Europe even more decisively in favor of NATO.
Third, events in Asia—such as the large-scale Chinese military exercises that followed US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan—have underscored the centrality of American power in maintaining a favorable balance of power in Asia. If preventing the emergence of a rival hegemon in a vital strategic region remains a cardinal principle of US grand strategy, then a pivot to Asia is essential, regardless of what happens in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration may now be repeating the same mistakes that encouraged Washington’s European partners to neglect their own defense capabilities in the past. The United States has assumed primary responsibility for arming, training, subsidizing, and advising Ukraine. In February, the administration announced the indefinite deployment of an additional 20,000 US troops to Europe, and other new forces were added in June. Not surprisingly, Europe’s determination to do more is waning, and long-entrenched free-riding habits are re-emerging. The coming European recession will only exacerbate these tendencies, casting doubt on the bold promises made by Germany and other European countries a few months ago.
If this trend is not reversed, Washington will do more than is necessary in Europe, but not enough in Asia. For US grand strategy, that would be a fundamental mistake.
Biden’s Pivot to Asia Was Right
C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Policy columnist and senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute See the article : Migrants, newly arrived in the United States, struggle with immigration barriers.
Taiwan Navy warships docked in Keelung, Taiwan on August 7. nnabelle Chih/Getty Images
Six months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden’s pre-war focus on China’s challenge proved to be correct. Despite an unprecedented military crisis in Europe, the Biden administration has refused to take its eyes off Asia. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscored the dangers of Russian ambitions in Europe, Biden has never wavered from his belief that Chinese expansionism in Asia poses a greater threat to the United States.
The poor performance of Moscow’s armed forces in Ukraine showed the limitations of Russian military power. Moscow’s inability to break Ukraine’s internal coherence, European unity or transatlantic solidarity highlights the Kremlin’s main strategic weaknesses in its confrontation with the West.
If the Ukrainian conflict becomes protracted, it is certainly possible that some or all of these factors could change and yield some gains for Russia. But a prolonged standoff in Ukraine would also create new domestic challenges for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Whatever the outcome, Russia can only emerge with reduced power. If the task of confronting both Russia and China simultaneously is considered impossible, Russia’s vulnerabilities should make it less daunting.
This brings us to the connection between the European and Asian theaters and the “partnership without limits” between Moscow and Beijing, which the two revisionist powers announced in early February. China has not been of much help to Russia in countering the West. But Russia, which inevitably emerges weaker from the Ukraine war, could be even more dependent on China. Russia will also be under greater pressure to support Chinese adventurism in Asia. This, in turn, will make it harder to counter Chinese power in Asia.
Escalating tensions over Taiwan following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in early August is just a reminder that the prospect of a US-China confrontation is growing in Asia. Unlike Ukraine, where the West has refrained from any direct intervention, the United States is likely to be drawn into a direct conflict with China over Taiwan. Any Asian sense of US reluctance to resist Chinese hegemony will prompt more countries in the region to move with Beijing. Fortunately, the Biden administration continues to raise its game in Asia.
Empowering friends and allies in Europe and Asia to take greater responsibility for securing their regions has been a central theme of Biden’s policy. In Europe, it remains to be seen whether all of the United States’ allies – especially Germany and France – are truly committed to translating their commitments into action. In Asia, US allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and India appear far more willing to take a greater role in their own security and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration has devoted considerable diplomatic energy to preventing the growth of neutralism in the rest of Asia. But it’s a work in progress.
It is no surprise that there are deep divisions in Europe and Asia over how to deal with Russia and China. Preventing Moscow and Beijing from exploiting these divisions will remain a major political challenge for the United States as it tries to stabilize the two regions. The United States remains essential in balancing Russia in Europe and China in Asia. But long-term stability in Europe and Asia will depend on Washington’s ability to build local balances of power and promote regional orders.
A New Grand Bargain With Europe
Liana Fix, Program Director for International Relations at the Körber Foundation
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky make statements after talks in Kyiv on June 11. SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images
Six months after Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, two preliminary lessons can be drawn about how the war will affect America’s strategic view of Europe.
The first and obvious one is NATO’s return from what French President Emmanuel Macron called “brain death” to the most important organization on the European continent. The war reaffirmed the central role of the bloc – as well as the primacy of the United States – for European security.
This is not surprising: a war launched by an adversary in its neighborhood gives a defense alliance every reason to assert its raison d’être. What is surprising is the scale of NATO’s revival, including two new members invited within months of the start of the Russian war. Support for NATO has increased among the European public, as have positive attitudes towards the role of the US in Europe.
However, more significant than the revival of NATO is that the European Union rose to the occasion. Instead of becoming marginalized in times of war, the EU has become NATO’s powerful cousin on the economic front. Within days of the invasion, the EU was transformed from an organization dedicated to peacetime economic cooperation to one willing and able to wage economic war.
In part, this reflects the nature of this particular war: since NATO and its partners are not fighting directly, their instruments are limited to military support for Ukraine and economic measures. The West’s economic warfare is therefore almost as important as its arms delivery and intelligence support. And economic measures are firmly EU territory.
However, economic warfare is a new business for the EU, which has more experience negotiating free trade agreements than organizing the entire bloc’s separation from a major trading partner. Instead of bringing economies closer together – which is its usual role – Brussels had to reverse the process and cut ties between Russia and the EU in many areas.
Europe should, of course, do more. His embargo on Russian oil – much easier to implement than replacing gas from the Kremlin – will not take effect until December. Meanwhile, EU countries continue to funnel huge amounts of money to Russian energy. But in the medium term, the Western sanctions regime will make it impossible for Russia to maintain a modern economy and will likely limit its ability to wage war.
What does this mean for US grand strategy? The United States should look beyond NATO when assessing Europe’s strategic importance.
Until Europeans can take greater responsibility for their own security – which is some time away, if ever – the economic area is where they can be very powerful. Washington will need partners in the coming conflicts of the future, where China will be as much an economic as a security challenge. Since February, the EU has proven that it can be a reliable partner even at a great cost to its own economy. This points to a grand strategic bargain that marries the EU’s economic power with the United States’ military might – and will require Washington to remain more engaged in Europe than it has planned.
Of course, China is in a completely different economic league than Russia, and the Europeans will need compelling reasons to put their economic ties with China at risk. However, no one would have expected such a strong European response to Russia, and this response was very likely noticed by the Chinese leadership as well. The Moscow war taught us that the same rules apply in economic warfare as in military warfare: no plan of operations can provide any security except the first encounter.
An Emerging Atlantic-Pacific Partnership
By Robin Niblett, Distinguished Fellow at Chatham House
Filipino fighters take up position next to US Marines during a joint military exercise with Japanese troops in San Antonio, Philippines on October 6, 2018. TED ALJIBE/AFP via Getty Images
Faced with heroic Ukrainian resistance and substantial international support for Kiev, Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine is running out of steam. In contrast, the Biden administration used this opportunity to restore the strategic position of the United States as a pillar of the world’s liberal democracies.
Aided by Beijing’s decision to join Moscow, Washington forged a new Atlantic-Pacific partnership. This partnership links the United States’ commitment to European security against persistent Russian aggression with its Asian allies against China’s growing military assertiveness.
The presence of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea at the NATO summit in Madrid in June showed that these countries understand that the US commitment to their security also requires their support for US interests in Europe. And the first mention of China as an explicit security challenge in the alliance’s summit statement—despite the ongoing war in Europe—was a signal that Europeans know they must take future threats from China seriously if they want the United States to remain a reliable ally in Europe.
Biden’s team now needs to make this new trans-hemispheric partnership a reality, not a fleeting mirage. European allies, some of whom have betrayed ambitious Indo-Pacific strategies, should be challenged to join regular freedom of navigation operations and military exercises in and around the South China Sea. Allies must also now work together to preserve freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, after Beijing opportunistically used House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August to change the military status quo over the island.
In addition, the G-7 should invite its close Pacific partners beyond Japan to be regular participants in the group’s strategic dialogues, whether on sanctions policy, technology investment or critical supply chains. Together, they would have the economic critical mass to agree on trade and investment standards that align with their values. If successful, other democracies may be invited to join this community.
However, the United States must ensure that this moment does not herald a return to the divided world of the 20th century. While cultivating a new Atlantic-Pacific partnership is a priority, another element of America’s grand strategy should be to draw countries in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and elsewhere into next-level economic and strategic relationships that counterbalance Chinese and Russian efforts to do the same.
In the competition between Russia and China on the one hand and the Atlantic-Pacific Partnership on the other, the 140 or so countries that now constitute a replay of the non-aligned communities of the Cold War era have an agency they never possessed during the Cold War. This time, a “with us or against us” approach by the United States and its allies would be counterproductive. Rather, the material benefits that other countries derive from interacting with members of the new Atlantic-Pacific Partnership should be matched by their commitment to pursuing common interests and the efforts they undertake to improve domestic governance and protect the rights of their citizens.
This strategy will require the Biden administration to develop a more inclusive approach to global leadership as its predecessors did. For their part, the United States’ allies must cross their fingers and hope that the next US presidential election does not undo the achievements of the past six months.
Future U.S. Success Requires a Ukrainian Victory
Written by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, President of Rasmussen Global, former Secretary General of NATO and former Prime Minister of Denmark
Ukrainian military vehicles drive past Independence Square in Kyiv on February 24. DANIEL LEAL/AFP via Getty Images
Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought territorial defense back to the top of the agenda in Europe. Watching a nuclear-armed state launch an all-out invasion of a neighboring country seems to have finally focused minds in European capitals. Military budgets are increasing, Finland and Sweden are about to join NATO, and nations across the free world are coming to Ukraine’s aid. This has important consequences for the strategic ambitions of the United States. As the divide between the world’s democracies and autocracies widens, the world is entering a renewed period of competition and confrontation. The war showed that Washington remains the ultimate guarantor of security in Europe. It also demonstrated the need for the democratic world to unite in the face of increasingly aggressive autocracies.
The main strategic focus of the United States remains the pivot to Asia and increased competition with China. However, it will be much more difficult if Washington is tied to a protracted conflict in Europe. The best way to avoid this trap is to give the Ukrainians everything they need to win this war. The West must then ensure that Russia never attacks it again. That is the goal of the working group that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked to co-chair with his chief of staff Andriy Yermak on security guarantees for Ukraine. The group’s work is still ongoing, but one thing is already clear: the best deterrent against further Russian aggression is a militarily strong Ukraine. The United States and its allies should therefore provide Ukraine with everything it needs to defend its independence in the long term. If the West does not, Russian leader Vladimir Putin will not stop in Ukraine.
Dictators everywhere are watching the conflict closely. So far, the United States has responded strongly and led a strong and unified response from the Western world. With the approaching painful winter, this unity will be tested. The West must redouble its efforts to ensure that Ukraine wins both the war and the ensuing peace. If he fails to do so, autocrats everywhere will be cheering.
Economic Warfare Must Be Tempered to Win Allies
Edward Alden, Foreign Policy columnist, visiting professor at Western Washington University, and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Protesters demonstrate against rising energy prices in London on August 26. Rob Pinney/Getty Images
For many decades, economic influence has been central to the grand strategy of the United States—but only as a soft edge to American power. Successive administrations have largely followed the economic orthodoxy of free trade, foreign investment, and open markets, believing that a global system governed by such rules would serve US national interests while enriching much of the world.
But with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States threw this rulebook out the window. Led by the Biden administration, the West has imposed harsh economic sanctions on Russia that are likely to remain in place for years. With national security in mind, Congress adopted a comprehensive industrial policy, passing the CHIPS and Science Act to strengthen the nation’s manufacturing capacity in semiconductors and other critical sectors. The explicit goal of this policy is to reduce dependence on imports from China and other potentially hostile powers. Beijing, in turn, has redoubled its own efforts to achieve greater self-sufficiency, not least to reject any future sanctions in the event of, say, a war over Taiwan. Russia has also joined the economic fray: it hopes to weaken European support for Ukraine by cutting off gas supplies, even at the huge cost of Russian economic growth.
These actions would suggest a future of economic conflict among the great powers, with the United States and its allies hoping that its technological leadership will provide a decisive advantage. But there is one problem with this strategy: the rest of the world wants no part of the economic war. Most countries outside the Western bloc have already refused to pick a side on Ukraine or join the sanctions regime. India may be moving towards alignment with the West in the Indo-Pacific, but it has gobbled up Russian oil at a discount. Saudi Arabia has continued to accept Russia as part of the OPEC+ oil cartel, rejecting US calls to expel Moscow from the club. Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America are largely focused on their own economic aspirations – and on managing food shortages and war-exacerbated inflation. Indonesia has rejected Western calls to expel Russia from the G-20 summit it is hosting in November, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping saying they will attend. “The rivalry between the big countries is really worrying,” Indonesian President Joko Widodo told Bloomberg News. “What we want… for this region is to be stable, peaceful, so that we can build economic growth.”
For America’s strategy to succeed, Washington will have to moderate its economic actions against major power rivals in order to curry favor with the less committed. US President Joe Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July to push for more oil production and his administration’s reluctance to criticize India for buying Russian oil are just two examples of this delicate balance. Biden also showed no sign of boycotting the G-20 summit in protest of Putin’s presence, although US Treasury officials walked out of a preparatory meeting earlier this year.
Unlike the Cold War, when only the West had the wealth and institutions to offer significant economic carrots, the United States now faces stiff competition. China and even Russia have a lot to offer. China has a whole host of large markets for hungry goods and other inputs, plenty of money for foreign investment and loans, and cheap manufactured exports. Russia mostly has cheap resources, but some, like oil and fertilizers, are vital for many developing countries. The United States and its allies will have to show that they can apply their new focus on economic governance to the current challenges these countries face—for example, by offering food aid and debt relief when needed and keeping Western markets open for trade. The economic pillar of America’s new grand strategy will succeed only if it offers tangible gains for the not-so-great powers.
What is a presidential drawdown?
Facilitates rapid delivery of defense items and services from DoD stockpiles to foreign countries and international organizations to respond to unforeseen emergencies.
How much money did the US give to Ukraine? The money will also be used for training, maintenance and upkeep. As of January 2021, the United States has committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.
How much aid does Ukraine give?
On May 5, President Macron announced that 1.7 billion dollars have been donated to Ukraine so far in 2022. An additional $300 million in funding was announced on May 5, bringing the total to $2 billion.
What weapons has the US sent to Ukraine?
Among the weapons that the Pentagon has delivered to Ukraine so far are more than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 8,500 Javelin anti-tank missiles (critical for destroying Russian tanks), 700 Switchblade drones and 142 howitzers with more than 900,000 rounds.
What do we get from Ukraine?
Total imports of agricultural products into the US from Ukraine amounted to $143 million in 2019. The leading categories are: fruit and vegetable juices ($48 million), other vegetable oils ($31 million), snacks ($12 million), other dairy products ($2 million), and processed fruits and vegetables ($918 thousand).
Does the US buy anything from Ukraine? United States imports from Ukraine amounted to US$1.99 billion in 2021, according to the United Nations COMTRADE international trade database. United States imports from Ukraine – data, historical chart and statistics – last updated August 2022. Base metals nec, cermets.
What does Ukraine produce for the world?
In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine, or both, are ranked among the world’s top three exporters of wheat, barley, corn, canola and canola, sunflower seeds, and sunflower oil.
What does us receive from Ukraine?
In 2019, of the $1.3 billion in US imports from Ukraine, the leading commodity sectors were base metals (59.0%), agricultural products (12.0%), and machinery and mechanical equipment (9.5%).
What does Ukraine supply to the world?
Russian and Ukrainian shares of global grain trade (wheat, maize and coarse grains) Ukraine also exports oilseeds (sunflower, soybean, canola) with a well-established crushing industry for sunflower oil production. Fifty-two percent of the sunflower seeds and oil traded globally came from Ukraine in 2020.
What does Ukraine produce for the world? In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine, or both, are ranked among the world’s top three exporters of wheat, barley, corn, canola and canola, sunflower seeds, and sunflower oil.
Does Ukraine supply the US with anything?
Exports increased by 64.9% to 1.6 billion dollars, and imports by 8.6% to 3.3 billion dollars. The largest goods of Ukrainian exports to the USA in 2021 were: ferrous metals (56.2%) and articles (8.7%); ore, slag and ash (4.6%); fats and oils of animal origin (3.8%); electrical machines (3.7%).
What does Ukraine export to the world?
Ukraine mainly exports steel, coal, fuel and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and grains such as barley, corn and wheat. More than 60% of exports go to other countries of the former Soviet republics, of which Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus are the most important.
Is US Military Helping Ukraine?
Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $12.7 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.
Are the US military allies with Ukraine? Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, the US became one of Ukraine’s largest defense partners.
What is the US sending to Ukraine?
WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House announced Friday that the United States is sending an additional $270 million in security assistance to Ukraine, a package that will include additional medium-range missile systems and tactical drones.
Does the US support the Ukraine?
As of January 2021, the United States has committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. The equipment provided by the United States changed as the Russian invasion continued. Initially, the US supplied anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions, including the Javelin and Stinger systems.
