MR PRICE: Well, good afternoon everyone. Sorry to surprise you as we are arriving on time today. I wouldn’t – I wouldn’t get used to it. You’ve already heard from her once today, but I’m very pleased to have Dr. Kari Johnstone in the meeting room once again. Dr. Kari Johnstone, as you know, is Acting Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. You had a chance to hear from her, from Secretary Blinken, from one of our heroes this year, but we wanted to bring Dr. Johnstone here to answer some of your questions about this year’s TIP 2022 Report. After that, we will continue with our regularly scheduled programming, so Dr. Johnstone, it’s your turn.
MS JOHNSTONE: Thank you very much, Ned. Buenas tardes. I am pleased to be with you today. Secretary Blinken today released the 22-2022 Trafficking in Persons Report, or TIP Report, which examines the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking using a 3P framework to prosecute traffickers. , protect victims and prevent crime. This is the 22nd TIP report the department has published and, like every year, reflects the US government’s commitment to global leadership on this key human rights, law enforcement, and national security issue. It remains our primary diagnostic and diplomatic tool to guide our engagement with foreign governments on human trafficking.
We are grateful to our colleagues at our embassies around the world and across the department who worked diligently to collect data and analyze trafficking trends and efforts. I also sincerely thank our team at the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons for their dedication to our mission and objectively evaluating governments’ efforts to meet the minimum standards required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. As we did last year, we were careful to consistently and fairly assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on governments’ anti-trafficking efforts.
The introduction to this year’s TIP Report highlights and emphasizes the importance of meaningful engagement with survivors of human trafficking and shares lessons learned and guidance for governments, international organizations, civil society, private sector entities and other stakeholders who wish to further their survivor engagement efforts. . This year’s introduction also lays a strong foundation for meaningfully engaging survivors of human trafficking, specifically experts with lived experience of human trafficking for whom sufficient time has passed since their exploitation, through trauma-informed approaches. that promote transparency, trust. , equity, inclusion and commitment to collaboration.
Survivors of human trafficking play a vital role in the fight against this crime. Their perspectives and experiences must be taken into account in order to effectively address human trafficking and develop a better response. Survivor participation is a central tenet of the US government and department’s approach to combating human trafficking.
I also sincerely thank the Network of Expert Consultants in Human Trafficking, or the Network, through which the department engages experts, particularly survivors of human trafficking, who provide expertise and input in the development of policies, strategies, and Department of State anti-trafficking products. both in the United States and abroad. Network consultants provided content and feedback throughout the writing process from this year’s introduction to this year’s report. These consultants have a variety of knowledge related to human trafficking, marginalized communities, trauma recovery and resilience, mental health care, and survivor leadership. I thank you for your valuable and significant contributions to this year’s TIP Report.
The TIP Report also sought to raise other important cross-cutting issues, such as the impact of the climate crisis, which exacerbates insecurities that directly increase trafficking risks for vulnerable populations. Vulnerable communities, such as displaced populations, migrants, indigenous communities, women, children, and minority populations, are more likely to experience the impacts of climate change and consequently are even more vulnerable to exploitation, including human trafficking, largely due to loss of livelihood. , displacement and interrupted family arrangements.
As environmental conditions worsen, the number of people vulnerable to exploitation will increase. The United Nations Environment Program, for example, indicates that human trafficking has the potential to increase by up to 30 percent during humanitarian disasters.
This year’s TIP Report also highlights corruption. Corruption related to human trafficking is committed by a variety of government officials. They also assist unscrupulous or unlicensed recruitment agencies in recruiting workers for employment, including providing false documentation and allowing illegal movements across borders. They do not report suspected trafficking victims or perpetrators, and they facilitate or turn a blind eye to ongoing illicit activities, such as commercial sexual exploitation. They also accept bribes to hinder criminal justice proceedings related to trafficking by obstructing reporting and evidence gathering, influencing witnesses, alerting traffickers to raids and pending investigations, or interfering with the prosecution of traffickers.
Addressing corruption helps combat human trafficking because corruption facilitates trafficking and perpetuates impunity for traffickers. Our reporting and diplomatic engagement is aimed at shedding light on these activities, encouraging governments to address official complicity, and advancing efforts to combat human trafficking, while combating the corruption that enables it. This year’s TIP Report continues to focus on corruption through a feature box in the introduction, which complements this administration’s increased focus on fighting corruption.
We also include a special segment on forced labor occurring under the auspices of the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a flexible brand that encompasses a wide variety of infrastructure and development projects. In at least a dozen participating countries, both PRC and host citizens are subjected to forced labor, a trend that COVID-19 travel restrictions have exacerbated. Separately, the TIP Report’s continued focus on forced labor in Xinjiang and Tibet is part of this administration’s whole-of-government approach to tackling forced labor in the PRC and around the world.
The US government has taken concrete steps to promote accountability in Xinjiang, including visa restrictions, Global Magnitsky and other financial sanctions, export controls, withholding of release orders and import restrictions, the publication of a trade notice on Xinjiang and the adoption of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, or UFLPA, in December 2021. The United States encourages allies and partners to take joint action to prevent and address forced labor and global supply chains, including those related to the atrocities in Xinjiang.
This year’s report evaluates 188 countries and territories, including the United States, which has been included in the ranking since 2010. Overall this year, there are 21 upgrades and 18 downgrades, compared to 17 upgrades and 20 downgrades last year. On a positive note, there are several updates due to the tangible progress that governments have made to combat human trafficking around the world during the reporting period. Three countries were promoted to Tier 1, which is the highest ranking. Sixteen governments were upgraded to Tier 2 for increasing efforts to address trafficking with tangible achievements, and two countries were upgraded from Tier 3, which is the lowest ranking.
We saw remarkable progress on forced labor, which is a long-standing concern in many countries, including the United States. Around the world, governments identified more victims of labor trafficking and prosecuted more labor traffickers this year. For example, in Bahrain, which remained in Tier 1, the government convicted labor traffickers for the first time since 2018 and identified victims of forced labor for the first time in two years. In Thailand, the government reported identifying 233 victims of labor trafficking and finalizing standard operating procedures for government officials to pursue forced labor cases. Thailand was upgraded this year to level 2.
Several countries initiated their first human trafficking prosecutions or obtained their first convictions for trafficking. In the Comoros, officials launched the country’s first trafficking prosecution and identified trafficking victims for the first time since 2013. Comoros moved from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watch List this year. Barbados significantly increased investigations, opening two prosecutions for the first time since 2013 and identifying a victim for the first time since 2016. Barbados also moved from a Tier 2 Watch List to a Tier 2 Watch List this year. It is noteworthy that Iceland, for the first time in 12 years, prosecuted and convicted a trafficker. Iceland went from Tier 2 to Tier 1 this year.
Unfortunately, not all countries have made such progress. One country was downgraded from Tier 2 to Tier; sorry, from Tier 1 to Tier 2. Ten countries were downgraded from Tier 2 to the Tier 2 Watch List, and seven countries and territories were downgraded to Tier 3. The department also determined that 11 countries continued to have a government policy or a pattern of human trafficking and inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Some government officials in these countries were themselves part of the problem, directly forcing citizens or foreign nationals into sex trafficking, forced labor, or use as child soldiers.
We find that some officials use their power to exploit their citizens or foreigners, ranging from forced labor on local or national public works projects, military operations, economically important sectors, or as part of government-funded projects or missions in the foreigner, or sexual slavery. on government premises. This year, 12 countries were listed under the Prevention of Child Soldiers Act 2022 for having government armed groups or supporting non-government armed groups that recruit or use children in armed conflict.
Finally, I’d like to include, on an inspiring note, as Ned said this year, the department is recognizing six TIP Report Heroes who have dedicated their lives to fighting human trafficking. The 2022 TIP Report Heroes hail from Bangladesh, Jordan, Liberia, Poland, Thailand, and Ukraine. We hope you watched this morning’s live stream of Mohammed Tariqul Islam’s award presentation and speech on behalf of this year’s TIP Report Heroes. These individuals inspire each of us to do more to advance the global fight against human trafficking and protect victims and survivors of this crime.
Honorees will engage with American communities and organizations committed to ending human trafficking through the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program. I hope you’ll join us in heeding their call to do more. to advance our shared fight against human trafficking and uplift survivors.
MR PRICE: Great, thank you very much. Mate.
QUESTION: Hello. I have a pair but they are very short. Only in one, is: the definition that you used that all forced labor is a form of trafficking, I’m just curious because when you talk about Xinjiang, when I think, or what I think, when a lot of people think of trafficking, they think of moving people to far away places across borders and the like. But when you talk about Xinjiang, then, is that, you mean forced labor is trafficking, right?
MS JOHNSTONE: The short answer is yes, and that’s a very good question, if I can just go on a little bit longer.
MS JOHNSTONE: There is a common misperception that movement is required for the crime of human trafficking. What makes it human trafficking is exploitation through force, fraud, or coercion for labor or commercial sex. So there can be movement, but unfortunately we are seeing that more and more movement is not necessary. Some people may become victims of trafficking even in their own home, as we are seeing more and more sex trafficking online. So it is the exploitation of forced labor as a form of human trafficking. Sex trafficking and forced labor are the two most common.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, I mean, that’s not it, traffic can be another word that…
MS JOHNSTONE: It’s a bit of a misnomer, but under US law and international law, no movement is required.
QUESTION: Okay. Secondly, secondly, you made a great point at the beginning of your presentation about how important it is to listen to survivors – their voices, their experiences – and the need to do so, but hasn’t that always been the case with these reports that go back to when they started? Why is it – how is it different this year?
MS JOHNSTONE: I think this year we’ve really highlighted the importance of not only highlighting the experience of survivors, but also listening to them as experts. And we see more and more in the community, the broader anti-trafficking community and governments, including our own, through increasingly formal mechanisms asking for your advice on how to improve our anti-trafficking policies and treat them not just as someone that you can tell your story to raise awareness, but actually integrating your experience on how we can improve to combat this crime.
QUESTION: And the last one. On the issue of child soldiers, how many countries that have been identified as using child soldiers are actually subject to US sanctions and how many have received presidential waivers?
MS JOHNSTONE: So this year, the way the process works for the list of child soldier protection laws, I’m sorry, list of prevention laws, that list is published in the TIP Report as we are doing today. And then at the beginning of the next fiscal year, in October, the president determines whether to resign from…
QUESTION: Correct. So approximately how many?
MS JOHNSTONE: So last year there were 15 countries…
QUESTION: And how many countries actually…
MS JOHNSTONE: Of those 15 last year that were on the 2021 TIP Report list, and I know I have it somewhere, the number, let me get back to you on that. The number: I know I have it, but it’s not close at hand right now. The number that he received – it was approximately – can someone correct me – I think it was four that were totally given up, seven – thank you. Four were granted a full exemption, seven received partial exemptions, and five received no exemption and full restrictions were imposed. Thanks.
QUESTION: Okay. So, and those five were the usual suspects who are already subject to strict US sanctions for many other things, correct? Like Eritrea, Iran, Sudan, North Korea?
MS JOHNSTONE: So the five that were fully restricted last year, that were on the 2021 CSP list, were Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Eritrea was not on the list last year.
QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. Thank you Dr Johnstone. First, he mentioned 11 countries.
QUESTION: Are they posted anywhere?
MS JOHNSTONE: I mentioned 11 countries where the department determined that there is a government policy or pattern.
QUESTION: Right, that involved, yes.
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, it’s published and I can also find…
QUESTION: Okay. And then I have a question about how you classify: in certain Arab countries like Iraq or Syria, areas under rebel control have something called pleasure marriage, pleasure marriage, where poor families or families in general marry off their young daughter: 12 , 13 , 14. Is that classified as traffic? Because normally they’ll move the – for three, four days, five days, whatever. Sometimes it can be longer. How is that classified?
MS JOHNSTONE: So the issue of early or child marriage is related to human trafficking and pleasure marriage.
QUESTION: If I may, yes, they actually call it pleasure marriage. That’s exactly what it is, which is very (inaudible).
MS JOHNSTONE: Indeed. We are quite concerned that this is in fact a practice that facilitates and exacerbates human trafficking. Once again, it all comes down to exploitation. If that marriage occurs essentially for the purpose of commercial sex, and there is an exchange for it, then it may very well be a form of human trafficking. Not all early marriages under US law, but the cases you mentioned generally are, yes.
QUESTION: Multiple countries that are at Tier 3, quite a few of them are in Asia, Southeast Asia in particular. And then Macau, of course, was added there. It’s not a country, I think, but it was added there.
QUESTION: A territory. Do you see any structural or regional peculiarities why there is that problem there? Are there particular factors in the last 12 years that have caused these problems? I know that other countries in that area have had concerns in the past. But why in particular and what problems? Are there any issues at the regional level that you can tackle together to combat this?
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you for that question. So this year, as I mentioned, several countries within, and as you asked, within East Asia that were downgraded to Tier 3, as well as other tier classifications within the region.
Each year, the TIP Report assesses government efforts based on the efforts that individual government made during the reporting period of April 1 through the end of March of this year for this year’s report. We saw that, unfortunately, there were a number of countries this year within that region that did not make the increased efforts and did not receive tangible results to stay at the level that they were at last year and actually faced downgrades.
One problem I would point out, particularly among the countries that you asked about within the East Asia and Pacific region that were downgraded to Tier 3 this year, a number of them had been on the Tier 2 Watch List for several years, and according to There is a time limitation under US law on how long a country can remain on the Watch List. And sadly, we saw that a number of those countries did not make enough progress to support an upgrade and therefore were required to be moved to Tier 3 by the department this year.
QUESTION: I wonder why China was removed from the list of state sponsors of trafficking?
MS JOHNSTONE: So I’m not quite sure which, so Level 3 is the level within the Trafficking in Persons Report, that is, we don’t use the word “state-sponsored trafficking” exactly the way that expressed it. Level 3 means that a government is not making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards.
China remains at Tier 3 not only because it is not making such efforts, but also because the Chinese government does have a policy or pattern. Therefore, it is on the list of countries where the government is involved in perpetuating trafficking, largely due to the problems we have just discussed within Xinjiang and the government’s policy of perpetuating forced labor in Xinjiang and beyond.
QUESTION: Sorry, I’m just looking at the report here, and there’s a page where it says when the government is the trafficker, the state-sponsored human trafficking, and then it lists them.
MS JOHNSTONE: China is definitely among those countries, out of the 11.
QUESTION: China is not listed here, but maybe…
MS JOHNSTONE: That could be a bug on the website. We’ll check it out.
QUESTION: But Yemen is here, which was not on the list last year, but China is not on this. He says –
MS JOHNSTONE: We’ll check on the website, but China…
QUESTION: So China should be…
MS JOHNSTONE: Absolutely, yes. China remains at Tier 3 and…
MS JOHNSTONE: — the department determined that it continues to have a government policy or pattern of human trafficking.
QUESTION: Hmm, okay. And then one more question?
So, in the remarks that Secretary Blinken wrote to open this report, he talks about the Ukraine war and the impact it could have, and is expected to have, on human trafficking in the coming year. And so I wonder, with that horrible expectation, what is the Biden administration doing to proactively prevent that from becoming a reality?
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you very much for that question. That is one that we are dealing with here in the department, as well as our colleagues in our embassies throughout the region.
Even before the full-scale invasion of Russia in February, we began meeting with both the Ukrainian government and the governments of neighboring countries and our international partners, including international organizations, urging them before the war to implement anti-trafficking measures. of people in your planning. Unfortunately, that became necessary, and we have continued through our embassies and our office and our senior officials in the department to engage both the Ukrainian governments and others in the region. We are also realigning our foreign assistance efforts and working with international experts, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU and the Council of Europe and others who are very focused on this.
We believe we have a historic opportunity to prevent a trafficking crisis in the midst of this broader refugee and humanitarian crisis, and we are obligated to do everything we can to prevent it.
MR PRICE: Humeyra, and then Alex.
QUESTION: Hello. Thank you for doing this. Just a quick one. I’m reading the story from last year that the US put Turkey on a list of countries that are implicated in the use of child soldiers, and that was the first time a NATO country was actually on that list. I don’t see Turkey’s name on this year’s list, so can you explain why you removed them from that list and if there are still ongoing concerns about whatever the reasons that put Turkey in the first place last year?
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you for that question. Last year, Turkey was on the list of governments that, in the case of Turkey last year, supported a non-state actor. This year, there were no reports of the Government of Turkey providing support to non-state armed groups inside Turkey, including Syrian armed opposition groups operating under the umbrella of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which recruited or used Child soldiers.
As a respected regional leader and NATO member, as you point out, Turkey has an opportunity to address the recruitment and use of child soldiers in Syria given its influence there, and the US looks forward to continuing to work with Turkey to encourage all groups . involved in the Syrian conflict not to use child soldiers.
QUESTION: Correct. Can I be very specific? Was it because of the lack of reports that they were off the list or were there specific conversations between the Turkish government and the US government where you told them, here is a roadmap of how they can get off this list , and they basically worked towards it and they’re not on the list anymore?
MS JOHNSTONE: We certainly have discussions with the government of Turkey, again, as a leader in the region and a member of NATO, urging them to stop supporting non-state actors in Syria that use or recruit children. And there were no cases reported during this reporting period, from April 1 to the end of March of this year.
MR PRICE: We’ll answer some final questions. Alex.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Dr. Johnstone, thank you for being here.
QUESTION: Good to see you. One line appears repeatedly in the report, referring to COVID; you also mentioned it in your introduction this morning and also now. Azerbaijan was on the Tier 2-plus list and could be upgraded to Tier 2, but does not fully meet the minimum standards. But then he mentioned that, well, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his anti-trafficking ability, what exactly is he referring to? I just want to make sure he didn’t lower the bars just to let those countries slide off the sanctions list. Thank you very much.
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you very much for that question. For the past two years, we have worked with our colleagues across the State Department and our embassies around the world to understand the impact of the pandemic specifically on governments’ efforts to combat trafficking. Now, the report assesses governments’ anti-trafficking efforts. We know that in many places the pandemic has affected many lives and many issues in each country. But what we’ve really tried to do is be very careful to understand and just consistently and fairly take into account the ways in which the pandemic may have specifically affected governments’ anti-trafficking efforts.
So, for example, if the courts were closed for a considerable amount of time, that might explain why convictions that year went down, for example. So we really focused on the specific impact of the pandemic on traffic.
QUESTION: Yes. So on child protection, Ghana had this initiative with the US that, I’m not quite sure, expired in 2020? And if not, have you selected other countries on the African continent?
And secondly, because you’re pointing out that this report is part of your diplomatic toolbox, how does this report work to advance your interests, for example, with these countries that may be using child soldiers? I’m trying to understand from the report post, how do you operationalize it? Through your foreign missions? Through high-ranking State Department officials? How can you, how do you do that?
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you very much for those questions, Pearl. In the Children’s Compact, I’m sorry, the Child Protection Compact Partnership with Ghana, we had a multi-year partnership which is a fixed-term partnership, so it has ended. Our continued support and commitment and outside assistance to protect children from trafficking and to build capacity within Ghana to also hold traffickers accountable – that work continues. The official association has concluded. We continue to expand our Child Protection Compact Partnerships with new countries around the world, and you will soon see another on the continent.
To your broader question about how we use the tool, I’m sorry, we use the report as a tool to drive progress, we, with our colleagues across the State Department, both senior officials here and in our embassies, have discussions with government officials and civil society, international organizations on the priority recommendations in each individual country’s narrative as a starting point so that we can understand how we can partner together, how we can support those governments’ efforts, those civil society efforts to increase both capacity and achieve greater results within their country each year.
QUESTION: Thank you. About North Korean defectors trapped in China, and North Korean defectors being sold to China and forced to marry and work. Has the US discussed this with China recently?
MS JOHNSTONE: Yes, thank you for that question. We have raised for many years, both in our diplomacy and in the Human Trafficking Report, our concern about the trafficking, specifically forced labor, of North Koreans within China. We have documented this for many years, and will continue to do so, as long as the practice continues.
MR PRICE: We’ll answer one final question.
QUESTION: Yes. You mentioned a conversation with Turkey about non-state actors in Syria, and in the report we also see that YPG in Syria, which is supported by the US, is using child soldiers extensively, both in Iraq and in Syria. . Do you have a specific recommendation or also for the State Department what to do with the group? Because the United States is a support group on the ground.
MS JOHNSTONE: So we certainly work with our partners, including within the US government, to raise awareness of the challenges of child soldier issues, and we will continue to work with our colleagues across the US government. to make sure we’re not supporting them either.
MR PRICE: I appreciate that, as always.
MS JOHNSTONE: Thank you all for the good questions.
MR PRICE: Okay. Before I get to your questions, I just have one item at the top, and it’s something you all saw today, when the president signed a new executive order that gives the US government expanded tools to deter and disrupt the taking of hostages and unjust detentions. .
This executive order, among other actions, creates a comprehensive sanctions program as a tool to bring home US citizens held hostage and wrongfully detained. The new sanctions authority allows the US to impose financial sanctions and entry restrictions on those who are responsible for taking hostages or wrongfully detaining US citizens and can apply regardless of whether their captor is a terrorist network or a state actor.
It also strengthens the US government’s efforts to support families by directing US officials to quickly share, as appropriate, information and strategies to secure the release of their loved ones.
Today, in a parallel effort, the State Department is introducing a new indicator of risk in our Travel Warnings, what we call the “D” indicator. This new indicator warns US citizens of the risk of wrongful detention by a foreign government. We are adding this indicator to highlight the heightened risk of unjust detention in particular countries that have regularly engaged in this practice. Obviously, we publish more information about this today.
And with that, I hope to answer your questions. Humeyra.
QUESTION: So, on this, I have a couple of questions.
QUESTION: I’m sure you’re aware of the criticism from families that this is just a bureaucratic step, which ultimately doesn’t accomplish much. Some of these mechanisms that are being put there have already been there, such as sanctions. And they also complain that there is not enough to do about existing detainees and that it is too focused on deterring this type of action. So, in general, what do you say to that?
MR PRICE: A couple of points. Number one, this is an important, yet incremental, step in our effort to achieve our highest priority, and that is to reunite Americans who are being held hostage or wrongfully detained with their loved ones. There is no single step we can take that is a panacea. If that step existed, we would have taken it long ago and all detained Americans would have been released long ago. But we see them as important tools, important tools that we will be able to handle quite effectively.
On sanctions issues, we have previously used a patchwork of sanctions authorities to go after those responsible for holding Americans, wrongfully detaining them, or taking them hostage. We now, and sometimes have been the human rights authorities; sometimes it has been the anti-terrorist authorities. We now have direct authority that allows us to pursue, with sanctions, with visa bans, those who are directly or, in some cases, indirectly responsible for ordering the detention, orchestrating the detention, maintaining custody of an American, or for carrying out a role in the support network that does. So this is an important authority.
On the question of whether this is all retrospective, it is vitally important for us, I must say, that we have the ability to communicate fully and effectively with families. There is no one out there who has a better idea of the unique circumstances, the unique factors attributed to each case of an American hostage or wrongfully detained. Several years ago, in 2015 I think it was, you may remember Presidential Policy Directive 30, and that gave us the ability to share information with families, but all of that was done primarily under the rubric of Americans being held hostage. With this executive order, essentially a codification of some aspects of the Robert Levinson Act, we now have a greater ability to communicate effectively, including sensitive information, not only with the families of American hostages but also with those wrongfully detained.
So these are important tools. These are important tools for, when it comes to the cases of Americans being held hostage, being wrongfully detained, but they’re also important tools for going after those countries that, or entities that, engage in this heinous practice, and when it comes to a separate tool, the “D” indicator, which we are also announcing today in parallel, to inform Americans about the risks of traveling to certain countries, where they could find themselves at the mercy of a government that engages in this horrible practice. .
QUESTION: So, I mean, when we look at some of those countries, some of them are the main adversaries of the US, and this was a point that was raised before, I think by Matt. For example, some of those countries that you’ve already sanctioned across the board on a number of different things: Venezuela, Iran, North Korea. What makes you think that these specific sanctions are going to make a difference? You have not been able to change their behavior with previous sanctions.
MR PRICE: Again, this is another important tool, and for what we had to get out of human rights authorities before, we had to get out of counterterrorism authorities, now we have a tool that our colleagues here at the State Department, in close coordination with our colleagues at Treasury, at OFAC, and elsewhere, they can directly and effectively bring down the people who directly or indirectly play a role in this egregious practice.
QUESTION: Okay. Let me ask you this, then, because yesterday on the call they said that the State Department is going to take the lead on that. Have you already identified the potential people (state and non-state actors) around this problem to sanction?
MR PRICE: This is a priority issue for us, and by “this” I mean this abhorrent practice, but also our goal of seeing the safe and speedy return of Americans who are held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad. So, we are always looking for actors, countries, entities that are responsible for this.
We did not announce sanctions today using this authority in part because we wanted to have conversations not only with partners across the US government but with families as well. We wanted to determine if sanctions would be the appropriate next step. In some of these cases, the sanctions can be; in other cases, the sanctions will not be, at least at this stage.
This goes back to the point I was making earlier: no one knows these cases better than the families. So by taking these steps, by considering various steps, we want to make sure that we have the capacity, we have the authority that we need to engage in the kind of constructive and comprehensive conversations with families that we think this EO will enable. us to do.
QUESTION: Correct. And my last comment on this is, like, a minute ago you said there’s not a single move or action and we would have done it. In fact, in certain cases there is, and that is a prisoner exchange. And several families say that, in some of the cases, that’s basically the answer, and some of them don’t understand why returning a criminal to their country to secure the freedom of an American has to be a difficult decision. see some family members on file about this.
So, I mean, is the administration in any way more open to trades, given that this topic has gained prominence and there are, like, quite a few people now without a clear strategy on how to bring them in? home? Is this something that you guys are thinking about more prominently?
MR PRICE: Well, Humeyra, this goes back to my first point. We are committed to doing everything reasonably possible to secure the release of Americans who are held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad. That includes making tough decisions. You heard from the president directly earlier this year when he was faced with one of those difficult decisions and decided to engage in a trade when it comes to securing Trevor Reed’s release.
Now, the distinction that we always make is that we have due process in this country. Those who are serving prison terms in this country are doing so for good reason after they have been given and granted due process and convicted and sentenced by a jury of their peers. Of course, that’s not always the case abroad, so these options can be very difficult. That was the case when it comes to what ultimately led to Mr. Reed’s freedom.
But as we have said before, we are prepared to make these difficult decisions. The President, I must say, is prepared to make these difficult decisions because he is committed to the safe release of Americans who are held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.
QUESTION: New topic, if you don’t mind. This is a somewhat general topic, but we see record heat in Europe today and in other parts of the world. We have seen severe heat. I know you don’t comment on what’s going on in Congress, but in light of what’s going on right now with the administration’s efforts, can you say that the United States is still committed to taking action on climate change? Or do you think the United States is still on the right track with reducing its emissions in the way it was presented last year?
MR PRICE: We remain absolutely committed, and it so happens that as record heat waves hit the world, including in Europe, Secretary Kerry is in Berlin today, where Germany, along with many of its neighbors, are experiencing this record heat wave. . .
The point is this, and it is the point that Secretary Blinken, Secretary Kerry and others have consistently made: This has to be the watershed decade. We have to change our course if we are going to meet the goals that have been set for us, the goals by which we can prevent irreversible damage to our climate and to the planetary ecosystem in general.
This is something to which we remain absolutely committed. You saw this from us in terms of our commitments at COP26, but you saw it much earlier in the administration when we made an ambitious promise to reduce our own greenhouse gases by, I think, 52 percent in the next few years.
We do this for a couple of reasons: Number one, of course, we are one of the biggest emitters in the world and what we do has a material impact, but number two, we do it so that we can be a driving force for the rest. of the world. Because if only the United States and a smaller group of countries act, we will not be able to meet the climate goals that have been set for us. If the United States continues to show leadership, which we will, and we see commitments and cooperation, and cooperation from countries around the world, including other major emitters, we will be fully capable of meeting the goals that have been set for us.
We have no choice in this matter. This is an existential question for the United States. It is an existential question also for the international community. I believe that the dire warnings are being seconded by the weather systems that we are experiencing now, and we are committed to seizing this moment and doing everything we can, including on the world stage, to make sure that we use this moment. change that trajectory and do what is necessary to ensure that this defining decade does not pass without us taking the right steps.
QUESTION: I’m sorry, just to get back to the executive order again.
QUESTION: El, by myself, how much notice did families receive about the announcement of the executive order in terms of days, weeks? And also, CBS understands that there was a call with families yesterday giving an advisory and that there was no chance for families to ask questions on the call. CBS also understands that State was involved in arranging that call and that it sounds uncharacteristic for State to not give families an opportunity to ask questions. Is that correct? And was it a mistake that you couldn’t ask questions about this particular call yesterday?
MR PRICE: Well, I wouldn’t like to talk about the logistics of our commitments to families, specific logistics. But I will say a thing or two: Secretary Blinken, Roger Carstens, our Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, and others throughout this administration talk constantly to hostage families. Secretary Blinken has no higher priority. Not a day goes by that it doesn’t focus, in one way or another, on a particular case of an American being separated from loved ones or the broader systemic challenge. The same is true for other high-ranking officials in our government administration.
As part of that, Secretary Blinken often talks to families one-on-one. He has, has had the opportunity on multiple occasions to speak to the families, all the so-called SPEHA families, that is, the families of Americans who are being held hostage or wrongfully detained around the world. It’s often in those larger group calls where, of course, we’re not discussing specific cases or strategies or hearing updates from families or relaying updates from our side, but imparting our prioritization, imparting elements of our broader policy.
And I can tell you that the families of the hostages, and the families of those wrongfully detained, were informed of these pending policy changes before they were announced. I don’t want to go into details, but those group calls are just one element of our commitment to the family.
And again, going back to what the EO does, it will position us to communicate with families on an individualized and individualized basis much more effectively in the future. This is an authority that we have used to good effect on Americans held hostage, and now we are able to use it to good effect on Americans wrongfully detained around the world as well.
QUESTION: And just one more. The Bring Our Families Home campaign, which is a lot of these families that came together after the launch of Trevor Reed, who, one of their main priorities, is that they want to meet with the White House, with President Biden. The announcement of this executive order is, does that mean that any such meeting with groups of these families or individual families is not likely to take place any time soon, or is it separate from that, or is it something that you will do? defer me to the White House on or…
MR PRICE: Of course, I’m not in a position to talk about the president’s agenda. I am in a position to speak to your commitment to do everything reasonably possible to bring home Americans who are being held hostage or wrongfully detained.
What I can tell you is that from this building, a building I can speak for, Secretary Blinken, Special Envoy Carstens, and others in this building regularly engage with families of hostages both as a whole and individually, and I know that the same it’s true. from the White House.
Q: On Iran, Ned, the head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, said that in a few days Iran can enrich uranium up to 60 percent, and again, we can easily produce 90 percent enriched uranium. Is there still no deadline or specific date for the nuclear talks to reach a conclusion?
MR PRICE: There is a deadline. There is a deadline, and that is the point at which the agreement that has been on the table for some months, the agreement that was negotiated in good faith in exact detail by the United States together with our European allies, together with Russia and China, in this case, the point at which that agreement is no longer in our national security interest.
Right now, the fact is that a deal is on the table that would once again subject Iran to the strictest verification and monitoring program ever negotiated. Once again, it would put limits on what Iran is in a position to do when it comes to its heavy water and enriched uranium stockpiles, and that explains exactly what steps the US would take when it comes to sanctions relief. , if Iran recommitted and resumed its compliance with the agreement.
In our assessment, and that is an assessment that is informed not only by this building but also by the intelligence community, what we are hearing from the IAEA, international weapons inspectors, information that we have received from our allies and partners around the world, the deal on the table would put us in a better position to face the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program than our current circumstance. Because the fact is, since May 2018, when the last administration left the deal, Iran has been in a position to do the things that are expressly prohibited by the JCPOA. And Iran’s breakout time has been reduced from months, to a year at a time, to weeks or less. That is unacceptable to us. The status quo is unacceptable.
That is why we continue to determine whether Iran will resume compliance with the JCPOA. If Iran makes it clear that it has no intention of doing so and the deal on the table is sidelined by Iran’s continued advances in its nuclear program, we will follow another path.
We have long been engaging our allies and partners on alternatives to the JCPOA. We will continue to have those discussions, because with each passing day, we are not only floating on water, but we are losing ground. And Iran is sending a signal to us and to the rest of the world that it has no interest in returning to mutual compliance with the JCPOA.
QUESTION: Yes. So Iran is very confident that it will get a nuclear weapon, and the United States is also expressing confidence that Iran will not get that; we hear the president say in the Middle East. On the Iranian side, we see that they are, they continue with their nuclear program. But on the US side, we are in the dark. As if we don’t know what the United States will do if Iran continues to do so. What are we missing? For example, why are you so sure that Iran will not get any nuclear weapons while the talks are deadlocked and the Iranians continue to do what they are doing?
MR PRICE: Once again, the president, as you mentioned, has made a commitment that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to believe that diplomacy is the most effective, lasting and sustainable means of achieving this. We continue to see the prospects of Iran deciding to resume compliance with the JCPOA.
But, of course, that is not a foregone conclusion and, in fact, it is far from it. So we are having discussions, and have been having discussions, with our allies and partners about what steps we might take if Iran makes it clear that it will not go back into compliance with the JCPOA.
Obviously, we’re not going to detail exactly what that’s going to look like, but you heard this from the President when he was in Israel late last week that we’re prepared to use every instrument of national power to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
QUESTION: May I ask about your definition of a deadline that doesn’t seem to fit with my editor’s idea of a deadline? Your definition of a deadline is completely subjective and can change depending on:
QUESTION: — depending on what you feel like at the moment. Like, oh, all of a sudden it’s now: Iran has crossed the line and it’s no longer in our national security interest.
MR PRICE: I guess it’s a good thing I don’t work for AP. But we can –
QUESTION: (Laughs.) I guess. But I mean, he asked you about a deadline and you said of course there is a deadline.
QUESTION: But it’s not. It is completely fluid.
MR PRICE: It is a point where we will no longer seek mutual return to JCPOA compliance.
QUESTION: Yes, but that point could be tomorrow or five years from now.
MR PRICE: I don’t think either one is correct.
MR PRICE: Excuse me, I shouldn’t, I shouldn’t be so flipped out. No, it is, time is running out and…
QUESTION: Time has been running out for him – I don’t want to go back to that.
MR PRICE: Matt, we continue to believe that diplomacy presents the best opportunity to put Iran’s nuclear program back in the box where not only the United States, but also our allies and partners believe it belongs. There is a deal on the table. It is a deal that is and remains preferable to the status quo. We will continue to see if Iran is willing to go back to that deal. But as soon as that agreement is not preferable to the status quo, we will look for these other means, and that will be sooner rather than later.
QUESTION: Yes. I mean, our colleague said, if I understood correctly, that Iran is determined to have a nuclear weapon. I do not think. I think Iran said that it is not interested in a nuclear weapon. They say they have the ability to make a nuclear program, but they are not interested in weaponizing the program. Is that your understanding of what they… what they say?
MR PRICE: I’ll let it, I’ll let Iran characterize the state.
QUESTION: Yes, but do you agree that that’s what they said?
MR PRICE: — the status of your program.
QUESTION: Okay. And my other question is is there any kind of conversation going on right now, whether it’s in Doha or Vienna, whether it’s…
MR PRICE: We have, as we said,
QUESTION: Are you engaged with the Iranians in any way?
MR PRICE: We have not engaged directly with the Iranians. That has not been our choice. We would have preferred to engage in direct diplomacy many, many months ago. Indeed, when this process began, we were prepared to engage directly with the Iranians in coordination with our European allies and our other P5+1 partners. The European Union has been playing the role of an effective broker in these discussions. We are grateful for the role that Enrique Mora and other European officials have played.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) Turkey, given the fact that…
MR PRICE: Anything else on Iran? Yes.
MR PRICE: Oh, okay, let me go, Shaun.
QUESTION: About Iran but a little bit different from this.
QUESTION: Do you have any reaction on Jafar Panahi, the famous filmmaker, who has been – the Iranian judiciary said that he has to serve his sentence since 2010 (inaudible)?
MR PRICE: I understand that you are a German citizen, so I would need to refer you to the German authorities to discuss that. [1]
QUESTION: Just a follow up. NATO member Turkey is currently present at the summit in Iran. Did you talk about Iran with Turkey? We recently had a presidential meeting between Erdogan and President Biden.
MR PRICE: So I would need to refer you to the White House to talk about the engagement between President Erdoğan and President Biden. What I will say in general terms is that countries around the world have an interest in making sure that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. That includes countries in the region, but it includes countries well beyond the region.
QUESTION: I have some questions about…
QUESTION: We’ll stay with Alex for a second. Of course.
QUESTION: Only in Ukraine, and the Kremlin says that when peace comes, it will come on Moscow’s terms because it is gaining ground, territories in Ukraine. Can you please answer that? The quote came from Medvedev this morning.
MR PRICE: I didn’t understand the last part of your question.
QUESTION: Medvedev said that when peace comes it will be on our terms because we are gaining territories. Can I get your reaction to that?
MR PRICE: What we have seen is that Moscow is already frustrated in its strategic ambitions. He entered Ukraine now months ago with the intention of subverting the Ukrainian government, subjugating the Ukrainian people and, more broadly, dividing NATO, dividing the West, dividing the international community in general. In each of its strategic objectives, Moscow has failed. Moscow has failed to meet each of them.
When it comes to what we’re seeing now, we’re seeing heavy fighting in parts of Ukraine, heavy fighting, especially in Donbas, in eastern Ukraine. Territory is coming and going, it’s exchanging hands pretty consistently. The incremental gains that Russia has been able to make have come at a tremendous cost to the Russian Federation, both in terms of manpower and in terms of treasure and supplies.
So our charge and what we are doing is to support our Ukrainian partners in the meantime, giving them precisely what they need to continue defending their territory, but also their democracy and their freedoms. This not only enables and enables our Ukrainian partners to be effective on the battlefield, but also strengthens their hands at any negotiating table that arises. And I say “any negotiating table” because we have heard from President Zelenskyy that this conflict can only end diplomatically. But at least up to this point, we have seen no indication that Russia is ready to engage in genuine diplomacy.
So until Moscow changes its approach, along with dozens of countries around the world, we will continue to provide our Ukrainian partners with what they need on the battlefield, but ultimately to help strengthen their hands at that negotiating table. definitive.
QUESTION: The image of the burning Ukrainian wheat fields remains a reality, despite the extra military aid that the United States sends, and also despite the strong statements of the State Department about the Russian invasion. So what could he address about this new reality, the burning of wheat fields in Ukraine?
MR PRICE: Well, unfortunately, this is not exactly a new reality. It has been one of the heinous tactics that Russia has used not only against the Ukrainian people, but also against the international community since the very first days of this conflict. We have seen that the increase in food prices affects countries not only in the region, but in many cases in distant countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, in South Asia, in Latin America, in practically every region of the world, this is being felt. It is the practice of burning, of destroying wheat and other fields. It is the practice of attacking grain silos. It is the practice of persecuting Ukrainian farmers and their harvesters. And perhaps most acutely, is the horrible practice of blockading Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The port of Odessa, if it were to open, there are tens of thousands of tons, excuse me, there are millions of tons of grain that could be supplied to the world market in a relatively short time.
This has been the Secretary General of the UN, and we have supported his efforts to work with our partners, Ukraine and Turkey, but also with the Russians to find a solution to this blockade of the Black Sea. Ultimately, the solution can and should be simple. It is up to Russia to end its blockade. We support UN efforts to advance that ultimate goal, and in the meantime, we are working with partners around the world to try to address the short-term and long-term challenges to food security posed by the Russian invasion, but also have precipitated longer-term factors, such as climate change.
QUESTION: Questions about Taiwan. Is the State Department facilitating Speaker Pelosi’s upcoming trip to Taiwan?
MR PRICE: I’m not aware that the speaker’s office has announced any upcoming trips, so I would need you to refer it to the speaker’s office for any possible trips that she might undertake.
QUESTION: So you should be aware that the Chinese Foreign Ministry is actually asking the US government not to arrange such a trip. Would you consider this request?
MR PRICE: Once again, there has been no such trip, no upcoming trip announced by the speaker’s office. I’d have to refer you to his office. Of course, in our country, Congress is a separate and co-equal branch, and would need to refer you to the speaker’s office to address any potential travel.
QUESTION: So you haven’t contacted the State Department for help?
MR PRICE: We are in regular contact with a variety of offices. We have a close relationship with a number of different offices, and that includes the House and Senate leadership. I’m not going to detail those conversations, but it’s not my place to talk about any trips or potential trips that haven’t been announced.
QUESTION: But would this complicate your relationship with China? Because yesterday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a very stern warning, saying that this trip will have a negative impact on the political foundation of the US-China relationship, and this will send the wrong signal.
MR PRICE: Again, I think the Foreign Office was weighing a hypothesis. That is something I will hesitate to do here.
QUESTION: Thank you. So, at the Atlantic Council, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that he is confident that Ukraine will get weapons with a longer range. And he also seemed to suggest that the Kerch Strait Bridge could be a target for them. So first, are the weapons available, like the longer range ones? And second, would the bridge be a legitimate target, in your opinion?
MR PRICE: Well, there’s nothing that is legitimate in terms of being targeted inside Ukraine. Russia’s war against Ukraine was unprovoked, unjustified, illegal.
QUESTION: No, but I mean the Russian bridge that – the bridge that Russia built between Russia and Crimea.
MR PRICE: Once again, there is nothing that we would consider a legitimate target. This is illegal. Excuse me, could you explain your question one more time? Am I missing your question?
QUESTION: So Russia built the bridge between Russia proper and Crimea.
QUESTION: And you indicated that you support hitting him.
MR PRICE: I see. I see. I am not going to weigh in on any tactical or battlefield decisions that our Ukrainian partners need to make. We are providing them with the supplies they need to engage in self-defense.
QUESTION: Yes. You also said that Ukraine will soon come up with some kind of follow-up process or mechanism to reassure those who worry about accountability in terms of weapons coming to Ukraine. Is this something that is being done in conjunction with the US or, do you have something?
MR PRICE: This is it, sure. This is something we always do as a matter of course. We take our responsibility to ensure proper oversight of the support we provide very seriously. We are actively working with the Government of Ukraine to ensure accountability for aid, even in the midst of very difficult circumstances in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And we will continue to work with our Ukrainian partners to ensure that that assistance continues to be used properly, that it continues to be safeguarded, as once again our Ukrainian partners use that assistance to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity against continued Russian aggression. .
QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. On the Palestinian question, in the last 24 hours, the Israelis arrested 15 Palestinians, including at least one well-known journalist, Amer Abu Arafeh, who worked for the Al-Quds press, etc. I wonder if he is aware of that, and if so, would he call on the Israelis to release the journalist or any other journalists they may have arrested there? And also, and the group also includes a 15-year-old and so on, and the Israelis have a habit of holding people indefinitely under the guise of administrative detention. So I wonder if you have any comments on that?
MR PRICE: I am not immediately aware of the details you refer to. If we have a specific comment, we will be happy to let you know. What I will say in general is that our commitment to freedom of the press, to freedom of the press, is universal, independent of each country, it is a principle that we defend throughout the world.
QUESTION: And on the issue of settlements, the Israelis issued, I guess they legitimized a new outpost outside of Ramallah, a new settlement outpost. And the Nahala, or Nachala, settlement movement has also announced that tomorrow they will launch dozens, that’s what they said, dozens of settlement outposts across the West Bank. I wonder if you have any comments. I know you say both sides and so on. In this last year, he issued a very strong statement against the arrangement. Would you do the same today?
MR PRICE: We have always spoken out, we have come out against any step that undermines or undermines the prospects of a two-state solution or exacerbates tensions. We’ve talked about settlement activity in that context, but again, if we have a specific comment on this development, we’ll let you know.
QUESTION: And lastly, I want to follow up on Matt’s question yesterday about the Palestinian human rights organization. Now the Europeans thought that there was nothing there, that the Israeli accusations were not based on reality, that there was no evidence, etc. You are saying that you are still investigating this matter. When will you reach a final conclusion of your investigation?
MR PRICE: I’m not in a position to put a firm time frame. What I can say, and I think you know, for our part we have not designated any of these six NGOs. We have not funded any of these groups. We have long designated the PFLP as a foreign terrorist organization since 1997, I think it was. But when it comes to these groups, we haven’t funded or appointed any of them.
QUESTION: Sure. I could go on? We talked recently about Afghanistan, about the talks with the Taliban that Tom West had in Doha. I just wanted to see if there is any follow up. I know we talked about the fact that no agreement was reached immediately on the reserves that were placed in the hands of the Afghan Central Bank. Just wondering if there’s been any further progress on that. Are there still discussions about that or just not, it’s just dying at the moment?
MR PRICE: So there are still ongoing discussions. We are working urgently to address concerns about the use of the $3.5 billion Afghan central bank authorized reserves to ensure they benefit the people of Afghanistan and not the Taliban. We’re working with Afghans, we’re working with local partners at the technical level to address the underlying macroeconomic issues, which will provide, we believe, the necessary stability for the current humanitarian response to be more effective and will alleviate many of the issues that fueled the crisis. humanitarian we see today. So these talks are ongoing. As soon as we have an update, we’ll be happy to let you know.
Yes, a couple of final questions. Pearl.
QUESTION: Yes, about Russia’s influence in Africa. Ned, I guess I just want to get a little insight because: what are you hoping to accomplish to counter your big competitors in Africa with this Russia, including China as well, as purveyors of disinformation? I don’t remember seeing any line item in the FY2023 budget in terms of what resources you’ll have available or that you’re asking Congress to deal with the Russia component. I saw the Chinese. Maybe help me understand.
Do you have resources now or are you going to go back to Congress and ask for them? I can tell you right now that there are reports, even this week, of Chinese embassy officials going after local media in South Africa when they write and publish stories critical of China, for example. But I want to understand. I see what you, what the State Department wants to try to do. What resources do you have or plan to have in order to counteract this disinformation that continues on the continent?
MR PRICE: So this has absolutely been a priority for us. We know that, far from being misinformation, it does become intentional misinformation. It is important that the United States work directly with our partners on the ground in Africa, in this case, to highlight misinformation and disinformation, including information emanating from state entities.
This is something we have done in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. We have made it abundantly clear that disinformation, suggesting that, for example, US or international sanctions are responsible for rising food and commodity prices, is nothing more than disinformation. And so us, this is an ongoing challenge. We have the budgetary authority to continue to do this, and it is something that we know will continue to determine our effectiveness with communicating to audiences around the world.
QUESTION: Can I push you a little bit more on that? Because, Ned, what we’re seeing are groups that seem to have significant funding that may not come back and counter the Ukraine issue, but yeah, they may come after American sentiment that may be kind of anti-sanctions narratives and things for the style. nature. Do you think you will have the resources in time to counter them before they take root, as we are already seeing them start to take root? Like, how far ahead of this problem are you really going to be?
MR PRICE: Well, we have to be aware of this problem. It’s something that we know is much more difficult to combat, much more difficult to address once a narrative has already taken hold. So part of our task is to be there from the beginning, not with misinformation or disinformation of our own, but with information. And we have found that the best antidote to the pernicious forces of disinformation and misinformation is information. We will continue to work with our partners on the ground to make sure that audiences in Africa or around the world can access that to diagnose what is nothing more than, in some cases, state-sponsored efforts to mislead and mislead.
QUESTION: Ned, there are reports that the EU is considering unlocking Russian bank funds to boost food trade. Have you seen those reports and what? Where do you stand on this? I ask this because Ukraine has long been asking the West to refrain from any temptation to relax its sanctions or give in to these demands no matter what.
MR PRICE: Well, what I will say in general, it is very clear that the sanctions imposed by the United States and our partners around the world are taking a severe toll on Russia. We are targeting our sanctions very closely to mitigate the impact on vulnerable populations and to ensure that trade, food and medicine are not impeded, as well as to minimize the effects on global markets. These are conversations that we have regularly with our European allies and other partners as well, and we will continue to refine our approach, including our approach on financial sanctions and other economic measures, over the coming days and weeks. .
(The briefing ended at 3:14 p.m.)
[1] Correction: Jafar Panahi is an Iranian citizen. We have seen the reports from Iran. The United States condemns Iran’s continued efforts to impede the exercise of freedom of expression. Societies are strengthened, not threatened, by expressions of opinion and dissent, including those directed at governments. We urge the Iranian government to release all media workers, activists and peaceful protesters that it has arbitrarily detained. ↑
