On August 15, 2021, the Taliban captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, as President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Now, almost a year later, the world seems to have largely forgotten about Afghanistan, leaving some 30 million Afghans with their basic human rights and freedoms curtailed as the country faces economic collapse.
Ukraine is, of course, a priority, but Afghanistan urgently needs international support to find a way back to a path of political and economic stability, rather than the dual threat of illegal migration and transnational terrorism. Historically, the US has approached Afghanistan too little (as in the 1990s) or too much (after 2001). Today, there are dangers associated with both. The best solution lies in between and involves active US engagement with Afghanistan to ensure the best results with the least risk.
After the US-backed Mujahideen forced Soviet troops out in 1989, the US dramatically reduced its involvement in Afghanistan. Although the US maintained limited counterterrorism surveillance and strike capabilities in the region, it closed the US embassy in Kabul and turned its embassy in Islamabad into a de facto Afghan mission. The United States and the United Nations also imposed sanctions on the Taliban for harboring terrorist groups.
On August 15, 2021, the Taliban captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, as President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Now, almost a year later, the world seems to have largely forgotten about Afghanistan, leaving some 30 million Afghans with their basic human rights and freedoms curtailed as the country faces economic collapse.
Ukraine is, of course, a priority, but Afghanistan urgently needs international support to find a way back to a path of political and economic stability, rather than the dual threat of illegal migration and transnational terrorism. Historically, the US has approached Afghanistan too little (as in the 1990s) or too much (after 2001). Today, there are dangers associated with both. The best solution lies in between and involves active US engagement with Afghanistan to ensure the best results with the least risk.
After the US-backed Mujahideen forced Soviet troops out in 1989, the US dramatically reduced its involvement in Afghanistan. Although the US maintained limited counterterrorism surveillance and strike capabilities in the region, it closed the US embassy in Kabul and turned its embassy in Islamabad into a de facto Afghan mission. The United States and the United Nations also imposed sanctions on the Taliban for harboring terrorist groups.
This “minimalist engagement strategy” proved completely inadequate, did not help the Afghan people, and did not prevent the 9/11 attacks. While the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the lack of adequate US and Western attention to Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal and especially after the Taliban took over in 1996 contributed to the tragedy. 9/11 and the bloodshed that followed.
The next phase of the US approach could be described as a “maximalist engagement strategy”, where the US launched a massive military effort to destroy all remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban while trying to build a modern Afghan state. Among the many mistakes made, two stand out: the exclusion of the Taliban from the 2001 Bonn conference, which led the group to a new insurgency, and the focus of counterinsurgency operations primarily on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, rather than their sanctuaries, funding, and support in Pakistan.
In 2017, when then-U.S. President Donald Trump decided to leave Afghanistan at any cost by the end of 2020, another wrong step was made. A 2014 bilateral security agreement with the Afghan government was ignored and a US withdrawal agreement was negotiated and signed only with the Taliban, fatally undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan government and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Taliban leaders effectively used direct negotiations with the US to boost the morale of their fighters, comparing the US withdrawal plan to that of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the Ghani government to the communist government of Mohammad Najibullah, which was doomed to defeat. their foreign patrons withdrew. The final withdrawal of US and NATO forces, and especially the contractors who enabled ANDSF operations, was the final blow that led to the collapse and mass surrender in July and August 2021.
On the surface, it may seem like a sensible disconnect. Since the maximalist engagement strategy of building a viable Afghan state did not work, the natural alternative is to return to a minimalist engagement strategy. But such a minimalist strategy will inevitably fail again, leading to regional instability and possible new international terrorism. However, there is a middle ground – an Afghanistan strategy that is less than a military invasion but more than the current inattention. This is an “active engagement” strategy.
The first step in such a strategy would be for Washington and its partners to engage Afghans, particularly the thousands of recently departed Afghans in the United States, Europe, and the region, to develop a comprehensive political and economic agenda. The future of Afghanistan. This is an important first step, as major Afghan factions, including women and youth leaders, are now based outside Afghanistan. Although some of them support the resistance, most are trying to find a peaceful way out of the current crisis. Thus, getting these Afghans to coalesce around a new political agenda creates significant political leverage both inside and outside Afghanistan to ensure the success of the strategy.
The second step would be to engage the Taliban much more actively, including in implementing a key element of the US withdrawal agreement: the formation of an inclusive, post-settlement Islamic government in Afghanistan. This should include the announcement of a large and generous multi-year international aid program to help the Afghan people overcome their current economic difficulties and prevent the loss of the gains of the past 20 years.
Following the announcement, senior international officials are expected to begin traveling to Kabul and even Kandahar to meet with Taliban leaders, including Haibatullah Akhundzada. The Taliban must realize that their current Islamic Emirate is internationally unacceptable as it will never be recognized as a legitimate government, their terrorist designation will never be lifted, their travel ban will remain in place, and governments exploring the possibility of supporting the resistance. The West – unless they enter into meaningful negotiations with other Afghans and create an inclusive Islamic government.
If the Taliban are willing to sincerely negotiate with other Afghans, a Bonn-2 conference should be held under the auspices of the United Nations where prominent Afghans, especially women, and the next generation of educated Afghans can sit with the Taliban, negotiate and agree on a new political order for Afghanistan moving forward. At the same time, a US-led initiative could bring together all regional countries, especially India, Pakistan and China, to secure the necessary regional and international consensus on the new political order to be achieved in the intra-Afghan negotiations at Bonn-2.
An active engagement strategy would allow Afghanistan to be recognized by the international community. Such recognition would facilitate a greater diplomatic presence in Kabul and much greater international aid to the Afghan people. It would also allow the US and its allies to detect and prevent potential future threats from Afghanistan at minimal cost. Moreover, a new and inclusive Afghan Islamic government is more likely to be interested in cooperation and joint action to eliminate security threats from within Afghanistan. Ultimately, this would ensure that Afghanistan is a stable and responsible member of the international community, contributing to regional and international stability and economic prosperity.
