In February, the U.S. Department of Justice scrapped its China Initiative, an effort to seek espionage in research and industry. The arrest of researchers born in China because of the initiative had made headlines, and countless scientists have experienced unnecessary stress and investigations. The effects of the program continue.
A researcher in a U.S. lab told me how, because of their collaborations in China, they lost access to their lab, grant funds and research staff while government agents and university administrators were investigating trips the researcher had made to China with personal funds. It took months of legal appeals to prove they had done nothing wrong. Meanwhile, his work, collaborators and trainees were left adrift. Another scientist told me that they thought they and others of Asian descent were being treated as potential spies to be hunted. That individual severed all ties of collaboration with Chinese researchers. The number of U.S.-China collaborations has dropped over the past five years (C. S. Wagner and X. Cai Preprint at https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00453; 2022).
However, many researchers are finding ways to ensure that such collaborations continue. The US federal government should learn from this, and learn how to favor these partners.
I study how geopolitics forms international collaboration. Supported by the Committee of 100, a nonprofit organization dedicated to constructive China-US relations, and working with Xiaojie Li, a researcher in educational policy at the University of Arizona in Tucson, I conducted a survey of about 2,000 scientists. in the United States. Stayed between May and July 2021 (see go.nature.com/3z2za). Some 95% of respondents thought that Chinese scientists make important contributions to research; 93% think that the limitation of cooperation with China will have a negative impact on academia; and 87% said the United States will build stronger partnerships with China.
In a separate paper, John Haupt, a researcher in educational policy at the University of Arizona, and I observed that a large part of the upward trend in U.S. scientific output is supported by China: e U.S. research publications would have decreased without Chinese co-authors, while China’s publication rate would have increased without the United States (J. J. Lee and J. P. Haupt High. Educ. 80, 57-74; 2020).
Collaborations between the two countries have been reformulated and redirected – and changes may be more difficult to see in standard metrics.
Although most of the U.S. political attention has been focused on the fight against intelligence theft, the researchers themselves are focused on the lost opportunity to produce knowledge and insight. Scientists form international links on the basis of their own interest. Sick politicians are obstacles, but not roadblocks, to collaboration with leading scientists, wherever they are (C. S. Wagner and L. Leydesdorff Res. Policy 34, 1608-1618; 2005).
Many scientists have said they have abandoned collaborative ties with China, as well as all ties outside the United States, for fear of being unfairly persecuted – but many others have found alternative ways to maintain their collaborations, such as and the search for non-federal concessions, for which the backgrounds of collaborators are not examined so closely. A researcher maintains his collaborations but avoids financial transactions between countries. Others extend their project from bi-national to multinational teams, or limit their projects to open-source data or data entirely provided by overseas collaborators. In particular given a lack of clarity regarding identifying and reporting conflicts of interest, scientists in the United States have erred in their prudence, but have found ways to work with China.
Should the government repress more? Such a bureaucratic witch hunt is harming domestic science. Espionage happens – but scientists whose research does not have a clear military or economic value should not be held to federal requirements similar to those at work.
Before enacting radical measures, federal agencies should consider how policies aimed at stopping intellectual property (IP) theft can limit progress. An investigation by the MIT Technology Review found that the China Initiative began with a focus on economic espionage and piracy, but its mandate was poorly defined and spread to “research integrity cases” lacking clear connection to national security or IP theft (see go. nature.com/3ansl).
To prevent counterproductive effects, scientists, particularly those on international teams, must be involved in well-defined policy measures, and there must be mechanisms in place to prevent government overreach.
The trust of many scientists in their institutions has been undermined as a result of the China Initiative, because they feel they were destined rather than consulted. Thus, guidance groups of experienced researchers in various fields should inform institutional practices. Impacts need to be better assessed and balanced if policies are to support open research and home security. Federal concessions should be something that researchers pursue, not shy. Collaboration with Chinese colleagues should not be treated as a sign of potential crime. Innocent administrative errors don’t mean that researchers have been obstructed by their labs and students – or that they’ve gotten worse.
Unless researchers are led to further their interests in the search for collaborations, extended measures to crack down on possible IP thefts could strain, rather than sustain, the competitiveness of the United States.
Competing Interests
J.J.L. has an outside interest in the Committee of 100 at the University of Arizona. The resulting conflicts of interest are managed by the University of Arizona in accordance with its policies.
