As the United States settled into the winter holiday season, China sent 71 planes for military exercises around Taiwan, its largest single raid in history. The incident adds to hundreds of flights over the past 18 months, as well as military exercises and missile launches near the main island in the wake of the then-US military operation. Visit of the speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, in August of last year. Along with warnings of more military retaliation, Beijing has also increased its stockpile of nuclear warheads, deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle, launched a third aircraft carrier and further modernized its military.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to debate how best to maintain the status quo in the region, support the self-governing island, and deter a Chinese attack. Washington’s current policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” based on the theory that it is best to keep all parties guessing if, and to what extent, the US military will intervene in a war across the Taiwan Straits. Is that still the appropriate strategy to deter Beijing? Or should Washington publicly commit to defending Taiwan, as former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged on January 5?
Strategic ambiguity is generally understood as the deliberate creation of uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about whether the United States would intervene in a war. This supposedly creates a double deterrent: the threat of US intervention prevents China from invading, and the fear of US abandonment prevents Taiwan from launching a war by declaring independence, which China views as a casus belli. This approach, supporters argue, has kept the peace for decades and prevented the United States from inadvertently being drawn into war.
As the United States settled into the winter holiday season, China sent 71 planes for military exercises around Taiwan, its largest single raid in history. The incident adds to hundreds of flights over the past 18 months, as well as military exercises and missile launches near the main island in the wake of the then-US military operation. Visit of the speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, in August of last year. Along with warnings of more military retaliation, Beijing has also increased its stockpile of nuclear warheads, deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle, launched a third aircraft carrier and further modernized its military.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to debate how best to maintain the status quo in the region, support the self-governing island, and deter a Chinese attack. Washington’s current policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” based on the theory that it is best to keep all parties guessing if, and to what extent, the US military will intervene in a war across the Taiwan Straits. Is that still the appropriate strategy to deter Beijing? Or should Washington publicly commit to defending Taiwan, as former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged on January 5?
Strategic ambiguity is generally understood as the deliberate creation of uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about whether the United States would intervene in a war. This supposedly creates a double deterrent: the threat of US intervention prevents China from invading, and the fear of US abandonment prevents Taiwan from launching a war by declaring independence, which China views as a casus belli. This approach, supporters argue, has kept the peace for decades and prevented the United States from inadvertently being drawn into war.
However, strategic ambiguity may be based on misconceptions and little systematic evidence. The United States has never officially articulated what it means or adopted it as policy. At this point, strategic ambiguity may be doing more harm than good. And there are good arguments that Washington might consider switching to a policy of strategic clarity, such as a NATO-style security guarantee for Taiwan.
Political science views strategic ambiguity as a form of fundamental deterrence, in which one state prevents two others from going to war with each other. But this only works under three conditions. First, the pivot (the United States, in this case) must possess decisive military power over the adversaries (China and Taiwan). Second, both adversaries must want the war more than the pivot. (Otherwise, the pivot should just line up with your preferred partner.) Finally, neither adversary can unreasonably commit to going to war. When all three conditions are met, the pivot can exert its decisive power against any country that upsets the status quo. Because it does not commit to any particular course of action, both adversaries are unsure of the US reaction and therefore avoid escalation.
Today, across the Taiwan Strait, the first two of these conditions are no longer met. China’s military budget has quintupled since 2001 and now boasts the world’s largest missile force, second-largest navy and third-largest air force. According to a Rand Corporation report, as of 2017, China already possessed parity or even an advantage over US forces in five of the nine operational areas involved in a Taiwan scenario. In deterrence theory, the United States is no longer a pivot.
Beijing’s rising power also deters Taiwanese adventurism. Taipei does not want a war because it knows that it will be the first to suffer retaliation from Beijing. No major Taiwanese politician has advocated declaring independence from China since 2005. In any case, Taiwan’s president has no constitutional authority to unilaterally declare independence, and strong majorities favor maintaining the status quo for fear of military retaliation.
As Beijing’s military capabilities have increased, fundamental deterrence has steadily faltered, exactly as theory predicts. In 1996, Beijing fired missiles at the island to protest the Taiwanese president’s speech at his college reunion in the United States. But he avoided further provocation after Washington sailed two aircraft carriers through the strait. After Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in 2022, China responded with military exercises and missile flyovers. Washington limited itself to verbal condemnation and avoided any military demonstration, even as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has continued its coercion and raids.
Despite this, proponents cling to strategic ambiguity in large part because they worry that an unconditional security guarantee would allow Taiwan to trap the United States into going to war against China.
But entrapment almost never occurs. One academic found only five possible cases since 1945, and only in them, Vietnam, was the United States drawn into the war. Countries wriggle out of the alliance’s promises by adding conditions, taking advantage of ambiguity, employing tricks of legal language, or simply walking away. Washington could put up barriers to any defense promises, such as mandatory crisis consultation and annulment if Taiwan declares independence. Even NATO’s supposedly ironclad mutual security guarantee is implemented “in accordance with [each country’s] respective constitutional processes,” language specifically inserted by US negotiators. If the US can avoid being trapped by NATO, then it probably can avoid it by Taiwan.
Furthermore, strategic ambiguity is largely irrelevant to China’s decision to attack Taiwan. China “has already put a price on a full defense of the United States,” US Senator Chris Murphy tweeted. His operational plans assume that Washington will intervene. America and allied power, not ambiguity, is what deters China. Ambiguity by itself offers few additional benefits.
That means that if anything can deter Chinese aggression, it’s additional improvements to Taiwan’s security. Strategic ambiguity could also do more harm than good on this front.
As I have written, US intervention is essential to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Taipei must make sure the United States shows up, and arms sales are the clearest and strongest indication of US support. Taipei buys high-end weapons systems, believing that Washington’s willingness to sell these platforms increases the likelihood that it will intervene to defend the island.
However, analysts agree that Taiwan’s best strategy is an asymmetric porcupine defense, which is embodied in a Taiwanese military plan called the General Defense Concept. The island would be littered with mines and anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-vehicle missiles, buying time for the US military to arrive. However, high-end equipment like F-16 jets, heavy tanks, and submarines are useless for this mission; they are likely to be destroyed in the opening salvo of any invasion. But Taipei cannot fully switch to the asymmetric defense because the strategic ambiguity leaves it in doubt whether Washington will intervene.
This creates an American problem in Taiwanese politics. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou declared: “The Americans… will sell us weapons and provide us with intelligence, but they will not send troops.” The Kuomintang, his political party, is skeptical of Washington’s intentions, leading some members to advocate greater autonomy in Taiwan’s defense decisions. Other experts go so far as to suggest accommodating China. This attitude should not come as a surprise. Military alliances allow small states to withstand overwhelming threats. Without them, countries tend to jump on their threat bandwagon to avoid a hopeless war.
If this were to happen in Taiwan, Washington would lose a critical partner in the strategic competition with China. Beijing could use Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to project power in the Pacific, stifle US support for Japan and South Korea, dominate the Philippines and further consolidate control over the South China Sea.
Strategic ambiguity appears to have trapped the United States and Taiwan in a prisoner’s dilemma. Washington wants Taipei to increase defense spending and implement its porcupine strategy before making any more unspecified commitments. Taiwan spends a larger proportion of its government budget on defense than even the United States, but it wants to receive the US commitment on which its defense concept depends before further implementation. The Taiwanese will to fight increases significantly if Washington intervenes. Each side’s strategy depends on the other’s actions, and each side is stuck waiting while China continues to modernize its military.
Strategic clarity may offer a way out of this dilemma. Of course, any change would have to be implemented carefully, with military preparations before any public announcement of a US commitment. But as the weakest and most threatened party, Taiwan runs much greater risks by closing the door to accommodating China; it would need private and concrete guarantees that these risks would be rewarded. These, of course, would have to be linked to clear markers that Taipei is actually implementing its existing defense strategy.
Strategic clarity could offer the best opportunity for a superior Taiwanese force posture that is aligned with US defense strategy. Furthermore, as Taipei improves its asymmetric defenses, the need for US intervention diminishes. Ukraine’s successful fight against Russia’s invasion demonstrates how the right weapons, combined with an effective strategy, can defeat a seemingly overwhelming force, all at relatively little cost to the United States and other NATO allies. Strategic clarity would resolve the political obstacles that currently prevent Taiwan from taking a similar stance. Clarity would advance US interests by enhancing Taiwan’s defense, reducing the risk of a broader war, and containing China.
To its proponents, the idea of strategic ambiguity seems to have become an end in itself that has not, and logically cannot, adapt to the disruptive growth of Beijing’s military power. The conditions under which the policy worked appear to have evaporated with the rise of China.
What are some problems with strategic ambiguity?
Is strategic ambiguity effective? Used wisely, strategic ambiguity can be a powerful tool for business and political leaders. Using it correctly can help leaders achieve their goals while avoiding blame or undue credit. However, the practice can also backfire, so it must be used wisely to be effective.
What potential problems are associated with using strategic ambiguity?
While strategic ambiguity can be an effective way to manage risk and achieve objectives, it can also lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and ultimately the failure to achieve desired results.
When should you avoid using strategic ambiguity?
Never use ambiguous language to convey a difficult message because people want to hear the bad news straight up. This may interest you : US warns of sanctions against Russia’s munitions suppliers. Strategic ambiguity is used to soften the blow of difficult messages.
Who owned Taiwan before 1895?
China gained control there in the late 17th century and ruled Taiwan for about two centuries. This may interest you : Joint US-Israel Declaration on Launching a Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology. Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War and it became a colony.
Who colonized Taiwan in the past? With the arrival of the Dutch in 1624, Taiwan experienced a succession of six foreign colonial rulers: the Dutch (1624â1662), the Spanish (in northern Taiwan, 1626â1642), the Cheng family (1662â1683), the Manchus (1683â1895), the Japanese (1895â1945) and the Chinese nationalists (1945â1988).
Who owned Taiwan before China?
Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895, and certainly in the first 20 years there were many rebellions and uprisings against Japanese rule by the local Hoklo, Hakka, and aboriginal populations. See the article : China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the North Pacific.
Who owned Taiwan before the Dutch?
From the late 13th century to the early 17th century, the Han Chinese gradually came into contact with Taiwan and began to settle there. Called Formosa by Portuguese explorers, the south of the island was colonized by the Dutch in the 17th century, while the Spanish built a settlement in the north that lasted until 1642.
Who controlled Taiwan before 1895?
In the 17th century, large-scale immigration of Han Chinese (specifically the Hakkas and Hoklos) into western Taiwan began under a Dutch colony and continued under the Kingdom of Tungning. The island was annexed in 1683 by China’s Qing dynasty and ceded to the Empire of Japan in 1895.
When did Taiwan become its own country?
| Republic of China ä¸è¯æ°å (Chinese) ZhÅnghuá Mínguó (Pinyin) | |
|---|---|
| ⢠Establishment of the current government of the ROC | May 20, 1948 |
| ⢠The ROC government moved to Taipei | December 7, 1949 |
| ⢠Loss of representation at the UN | October 25, 1971 |
| ⢠Legally defined cross-strait relations | July 31, 1992 |
What was Taiwan before it was Taiwan? It was a colony of the Netherlands for about 40 years from the early to mid-17th century and subsequently became independent again for about two decades. China gained control there in the late 17th century and ruled Taiwan for about two centuries.
When did Taiwan separate from China?
The ROC government moved to Taiwan in 1949 while it was fighting a civil war with the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, the ROC has continued to exercise effective jurisdiction over the main island of Taiwan and several outlying islands, leaving Taiwan and China under the rule of a different government.
Did Taiwan ever belong to China?
In 1662, Koxinga, a Ming dynasty loyalist who had lost control of mainland China in 1644, defeated the Dutch and established a base of operations on the island. His descendants were defeated by the Qing dynasty in 1683, and their territory in Taiwan was annexed by the Qing dynasty.
When did Taiwan separate from China?
The ROC government moved to Taiwan in 1949 while it was fighting a civil war with the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, the ROC has continued to exercise effective jurisdiction over the main island of Taiwan and several outlying islands, leaving Taiwan and China under the rule of a different government.
When did Taiwan claim its independence from China? The Kinmen and Matsu islands off the coast of Fukien, and the islands in the South China Sea currently administered by the ROC on Taiwan were not part of the cession. In 1895, following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan officials declared independence.
Did Taiwan ever belong to China?
In 1662, Koxinga, a Ming dynasty loyalist who had lost control of mainland China in 1644, defeated the Dutch and established a base of operations on the island. His descendants were defeated by the Qing dynasty in 1683, and their territory in Taiwan was annexed by the Qing dynasty.
Did Taiwan gain independence from China?
China currently claims that it is a province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), while Taiwan’s current Tsai Ing-wen administration maintains that Taiwan is already an independent country as the Republic of China (ROC) and therefore has no to push for any kind of formal independence.
