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2022 was undoubtedly the most turbulent and transformative year in international politics since the revolution of 1989. It was turbulent because of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the crisis over Taiwan, but it was transformative in the way that the United States recognized China as a superpower rival. In the National Security Strategy of the United States issued in October, the Biden administration not only identified China as its most important security challenge, but also stated unequivocally that the post-Cold War era is over. If the United States’ unipolar power position was the defining feature of the post-Cold War era, the shift to a US-Chinese bipolar power structure will shape a new world order.

Ultimately, decisions about war and peace will be made by individual leaders. But to better understand how the new bipolar era can be developed, we must look at its structure: the balance of power, the origin of the new system and the geographical environment. The US-Chinese rivalry is unique in many ways, and its nature provides us with salient information about the new world order, its stability and the role that could be played by the statesman.

In terms of the balance of power, the US-China rivalry resembles the Cold War, another antagonism between two superpowers. That’s why former Obama administration Asia-Pacific adviser Evan Medeiros called the November meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, “the first superpower summit of the Cold War version 2.0”. This has raised concerns, especially in Europe, for the re-emergence of competing blocs, and among developing countries to be stuck in the proverbial middle.

2022 was the most turbulent and transformative year in international politics since the revolution of 1989. It was turbulent because of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the crisis in Taiwan, but it was transformative in the way that the The United States recognized China as a superpower rival. In the National Security Strategy of the United States issued in October, the Biden administration not only identified China as its most important security challenge, but also stated unequivocally that the post-Cold War era is over. If the United States’ unipolar power position was the defining feature of the post-Cold War era, the shift to a US-Chinese bipolar power structure will shape a new world order.

Ultimately, decisions about war and peace will be made by individual leaders. But to better understand how the new bipolar era can be developed, we must look at its structure: the balance of power, the origin of the new system, and the geographical environment. The US-Chinese rivalry is unique in many ways, and its nature provides us with salient information about the new world order, its stability and the role that could be played by the state.

In terms of the balance of power, the US-China rivalry resembles the Cold War, another antagonism between two superpowers. That’s why former Obama administration Asia-Pacific adviser Evan Medeiros called the November meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, “the first superpower summit of the Cold War version 2.0”. This has raised concerns, especially in Europe, for the re-emergence of competing blocs, and among developing countries to be stuck in the proverbial middle.

But the new US-China bipolarity is a structural fact and cannot simply be desired. It is the result of several decades of Chinese economic and military growth that has closed the gap to the United States. In addition, a bipolar power structure is generally considered more stable than a multipolar one, so leaders like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who has spoken out in favor of a multipolar order, should be careful what they wish for. The US-Soviet rivalry, despite its arms race and tense episodes, was characterized by a high degree of stability and the absence of direct armed conflict between the two superpowers. This is why historian John Lewis Gaddis called the Cold War era the “long peace.”

That said, all bipolar systems may not be equally stable. There are good reasons to believe that the structure of US-China bipolar rivalry will make the new era less stable than the Cold War. And when structural stability is weaker, the need for statesmanship and guardrails to manage the system is stronger.

Specifically, there are five structural factors that make the new bipolar era less stable than the Cold War.

First, the US-China rivalry is marked by an unstable power transition dynamic. Historical evidence shows that there is a real danger of major war when a rising power threatens to topple a declining hegemon – think of the growing German Empire as it sought its ‘place in the sun’ over the years preceding the First World War. War does not have this dynamic: the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers from the ashes of World War II, and were equal competitors in military terms from the beginning. The current situation is different, with China gradually catching up to the United States. Also, because of its economic power, China’s potential as a superpower is greater than that of the Soviet Union. Also, because the Chinese military is still inferior at this point, there is less room for the estate to negotiate arms control agreements; China is not willing to put a cap on military development that locks its inferior status in place.

Recent statements have suggested that China may have already surpassed the United States in the number of nuclear tests on its intercontinental ballistic missiles. But in terms of the total nuclear inventory – including warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, as well as inactive nuclear warheads – China’s nuclear stockpile is still relatively small compared to that of the United States.

Second, in contrast to the Cold War, the main theater of US-Chinese military rivalry is naval, which is inherently less stable and at greater risk than a limited war. The main focus of the Cold War on the European land theater allowed the strategy of massive retaliation to emerge, firmly deterring any attempt to cross the fixed line dividing Europe. The use of military force by the two superpowers in Asian waters is less likely to represent an existential threat to the state or risk a nuclear war. China could use nuclear weapons if invaded, but it is much less likely that Chinese leaders would risk all-out war with the United States if some of their ships were destroyed. This increases the risk of a limited war in Asian waters, since the chances of massive escalation are lower than they were in Europe. But even a limited war at sea between two superpowers could have devastating consequences for regional stability and the global economy.

Third, Taiwan is another source of instability in the new bipolar order. The closest equivalent during the Cold War was the divided city of Berlin, where many tense clashes between the superpowers took place. Taiwan represents the greatest risk of a great power war in the era of US-Chinese rivalry, with uncertain escalation dynamics in terms of geographical spread and the use of weapons.

Fourth, new domains of warfare in space and the cyber realm provide Washington and Beijing with additional avenues for coercion and disruption. Cyberattacks can vary from sabotage, theft and espionage to a so-called digital Pearl Harbor: a large and sophisticated surprise cyberattack to shape the environment in advance of a military conflict or to delay or deter the rival’s response. There is a real risk of inadvertent escalation through cyber capabilities in a future Sino-American crisis. A similar dynamic is also possible in the space domain, with preemptive attacks on or from satellites leading to an uncertain scale.

Fifth, contrary to the theory that interdependence reduces the risk of war, the high level of economic and technological interdependence between the United States and China is potentially more prone to conflict than the relative autarky of the two blocs during the Cold War Indeed, the historian Gaddis pointed to the lack of interdependence between the two superpowers as an important factor in enhancing the stability of the Cold War rivalry, especially because not depending on a potentially hostile rival increases the sense of security of a superpower.

China’s high level of interdependence with the world economy is the very reason why some observers prefer to use labels other than “cold war” when describing the US-China bipolar system, suggesting terms such as competitive coexistence, the cold coexistence or conflictual coexistence. But the level of interdependence in the US-China rivalry leaves more room for economic warfare than was the case during the Cold War; in a bipolar power structure, the two superpowers see mutual interdependence as a vulnerability and thus seek to reduce it.

This decoupling process, which is currently underway, will create friction: between the two superpowers, between the United States and its allies, and in the international economic order. For example, the US-Chinese technological war is already leading to a new type of conflict, with China retaliating against US chip sanctions by launching a World Trade Organization dispute. The economic war and US-Chinese decoupling will challenge the international economic order in new ways. In addition, the concerns expressed by Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron about a new cold war illustrate the reservations of US allies about decoupling.

The steady march of globalization over more than three decades and the current high level of interdependence between China and the United States are deceiving us. We are led to believe that great power rivalry in the 21st century is relatively stable and easily managed. However, the five structural dimensions outlined above—a dynamic power transition, an inherently less stable naval rivalry, Taiwan as a hotspot, new cyberspaces and technologies, and the risks associated with economic interdependence—suggest that the structure of the US-China rivalry may actually be more fragile than that of the US-Soviet rivalry. If we remain aware of these five sources of systemic weakness, the two superpowers can to some extent compensate by establishing guardrails.

Developing guardrails will not be an easy task. Arms control will be difficult to achieve in the near future as China is still in military retaliation. As for Taiwan, Beijing and Washington have practiced strategic ambiguity for decades. It will require a wise and healthy state on both sides to develop and continuously adjust the rules of the new bipolar game. Like the Cold War, the US-China rivalry and the respective strategies of the two superpowers will only evolve over time.

Did China or US win the trade war?

There is also a lot of data to show that China was the loser in the trade war because it took a bigger economic hit than American Chinese companies that made American tariffs exported less to the United States, reduced hiring, spent less in research and development and were less. likely to start new businesses, according to economists…

Is China losing the trade war with the US? After the trade war escalated until 2019, in January 2020 the two sides reached an agreement of a tense phase; it expired in December 2021 with China failing by a wide margin to reach its targets for US imports into China. Read also : How the US-China Science Freeze Threatens Climate Disaster. At the end of the Trump presidency, the trade war was widely characterized as a failure.

How much did China lose in the trade war?

Of the $35 billion in Chinese export losses in the US market, about $21 billion (or 63%) was diverted to other countries, while the remaining $14 billion was lost or captured by the American manufacturers.

Who is winning the trade war China or the US?

HS code2018-2019 Abs Value Loss (US$ Millions)Amount Deviated (Using 63%; Millions of US$)
Sum of positive change (millions of US$)% Deviated
50-63175251.37%
84, 901349651.22%
851144742.03%

How did the US China trade war end?

The country imposed “highly selective” tariffs. China has never slapped tariffs on products it needs for economic development, such as aircraft and semiconductors. Read also : Xinhua Commentary: The politically motivated report betrays scientific principles. The tit for tat finally stopped in January 2020, when the two sides signed what is known as the First Phase trade agreement.

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Who is in control of China now?

Power is concentrated in the supreme leader, currently Xi Jinping, who heads the four most important political and state offices: he is the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, the chairman of the Central Military Commission and the president of the PRC. To see also : Ambassador Salazar Statement on the Signing of Historic Energy and Climate Acts in the United States.

How is the head of government chosen in China? The president and the Council of State are elected by the National People’s Congress, which consists of 2980 people. Elections in China are in a unique political system. Elections are only at the local level, not at the national level.

What is China’s head of government title?

The President of the People’s Republic of China, commonly called the President of China, is the head of state and the second highest political office of the People’s Republic of China.

Who is the highest government official in China?

Currently, the General Secretary holds the authority of the Paramount chief in China. Because China is a one-party state, the General Secretary holds the highest political position in the PRC and thus constitutes the most powerful position in the Chinese government.

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Did China and US ever fight?

There was nothing good about the last Sino-American War, or what we now call the Korean War. The experience of this war, now almost forgotten, should serve as a grim lesson for policy makers in both Washington and Beijing. In November 1950, China and the United States went to war.

Did China fight a war? The Chinese Civil War 1945-49.

Did China defeat US in Korean War?

On October 25, the PRC launched an attack on the ROK soldiers and landed them in Pukchin. On November 1, the Chinese defeated American troops at Unsan, in the first Sino-American battle of the war.

Did the US fight China in the Vietnam war?

China, in particular, also played an important role in the Vietnam war during 1950 ~ 1975. China militarily supported North Vietnam by fighting South Vietnam and the United States in the Vietnam War.

Did the US defend China in ww2?

Joining the widespread international condemnation of Japan’s aggression, the United States circumspectly supported China. President Roosevelt approved $25 million in military aid to China on December 19, 1940, allowing the Chinese to purchase one hundred P 40 search planes.

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