Editor’s Note: The following is an adapted excerpt from the USIP Senior Study Group report, “China’s Influence on the Free Associated States of the North Pacific,” published on September 20. The report examines how China’s engagement with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands threatens US interests locally and in the wider Pacific region, provides a nuanced perspective on the importance of the Loosely Associated States and makes practical recommendations for policy makers in Washington.
For much of the past 75 years, the Pacific region and in particular the Associated States of the North Pacific (FAS) – Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands were not considered. as US national security priorities.
On some level, this de-prioritisation is not surprising: the region’s total population of around 2 million is spread across a vast expanse of ocean; its economies are small and, with the exception of fisheries and (historically) the garment industry, largely peripheral to global supply chains; many smaller Pacific nations are at high risk of natural disasters and are perceived to have limited pathways to economic development. Partly because of these factors, as well as the immense distances separating the Pacific nations from the United States and the Eurasian mainland, the Pacific was not a site of significant geopolitical competition during the Cold War or the years after him. Until recently, Chinese engagement in the region was not seen as having any obvious implications for US defense operations in the Pacific theater or threatening any significant US economic interests.
Strategic Rivalry Leads to Reassessment
Intense competition with China has led US policymakers to reevaluate the strategic significance of the Pacific and the FAS. But US interests in the FAS predate the current era of great power competition and were always greater than many in Washington recognized. The unique security relationships established by the Compacts of Free Association have amplified US power projection in the Indo-Pacific region, structured US defense planning and force posture, and contributed to critical defense capabilities. In particular, the US right of strategic denial over the vast territorial seas of the FAS, which spans much of the North Pacific, intertwines the US forward presence and creates a key buffer between military bases in Guam and Hawaii and the coastal waters of Asia. In addition, the US military installation on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands serves as a key component of US space and ballistic missile defense capabilities, one that the Department of Defense characterized even two decades ago as “an important asset and would be costly and difficult to replicate.”
Equally important, the economic and political ties between the FAS and the United States, as well as the geographic proximity of the FAS territorial seas to Hawaii and Guam, directly protect the US homeland. In addition, the right of FAS citizens to travel freely to the United States and work in the United States means that migratory pressure would intensify first and foremost in the US municipalities. On the same subject : Strengthening Guyana’s Relationship with the United States. Compact migrants are disproportionately homeless, unemployed, and lacking health care, in large part due to the patchy nature of access to federal services. Accordingly, a surge in Compact migrants is likely to strain local administrative resources and potentially contribute to existing social problems such as homelessness and human trafficking.
On a less tangible level, the prosperity and stability of the FAS creates a positive legacy for the United States as a benevolent regional power and sends a strong message about the resilience and resolve of US commitments. The relationship between the United States and the FAS is unique: although the FAS is not the most powerful or wealthy of the United States’ international partners, they are its closest partners. The range of services that the United States provides within FAS territories and the privileges it grants to FAS citizens is greater than in any other country; likewise, no other sovereign countries give Washington so much control and oversight over their defense and foreign policy. FAS societies are deeply intertwined with those of the United States, including in terms of military service.
The interdependence at the heart of the relationship between the US and the FAS is a double-edged sword. Thriving FAS associations and strong ties between the US and the FAS send a message that the US and the security order it upholds can help build prosperous, democratic societies. In contrast, if FAS societies experience social ills or poverty, or if ties between the US and the FAS increase, the value and credibility of partnerships and other relationships in the US are called into question. For US treaty allies in East Asia and other Pacific Island countries, downgrading or neglecting US Compact responsibilities could be seen as a sign of a reduction in US commitment. If Washington cannot fulfill its commitments to its closest allies given their low cost and strategic relevance, how can it be trusted to guarantee the security of much larger countries at the expense of much larger ones?
China’s Expanding Influence in the Pacific
China’s economic and geopolitical rise and its growing influence in the Pacific reinforce some of these US interests and create new ones. The value of the buffer created by US strategic denial over the FAS territorial seas is set to increase as China seeks to offset its blue water naval ambitions and deepen its security relationship with Pacific nations. In addition, as Washington seeks to limit the scope of Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific in conjunction with regional partners, the relationship between the US and the FAS acts as a key vehicle for reinforcing regional norms and democratic values. Although the Free Associated States have different perspectives on Beijing, they share with Washington an interest in avoiding excessive Chinese influence in the regional architecture of the Pacific Islands. This was most recently seen in March 2022, in FSM President David Panuelo’s public opposition to a regional security agreement proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, which Panuelo argued would threaten regional stability and increase the likelihood of military conflict between the United States and China.
China’s success in attracting some of the governments of the Pacific Islands, such as Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, to recognize Beijing, has depended on its apparent commitments to help them meet the threat of climate change and promises of economic development, which Beijing claims that are better than the benefits offered. through relationships with Taiwan, as well as traditional regional powers such as Australia, Japan, France, New Zealand and the United States. See the article : Airlines are too ambitious to chase travel rebounds. Now they reduce it. If the FAS were to turn to reliance on China for their economic growth and climate resilience goals, the change would not only likely lead to greater Chinese influence in the FAS – including the potential for China to persuade Palau and Islands Marshall to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing – but also significantly undermines the ability of the US to credibly defend the wider network of democratic partnerships that have historically defined the regional architecture of the Pacific.
Fears Over Fragmentation
One particularly troubling scenario for the United States would be the fragmentation of one or more of the Associated States. The Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau encompass hundreds of islands and atolls, many of which have distinct cultures and political traditions. Some local political leaders in FSM provinces (Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei and Yap) have expressed dissatisfaction with the federal government’s funding arrangements for FSM, which has helped fuel ongoing discussion of secession. A referendum on Chuukese independence was initially scheduled for 2015 and has been postponed several times. To see also : In a time of global problems, it is becoming more difficult for researchers to collaborate across national borders – New Hampshire Bulletin. Some Yapese secessionists believe that it was a mistake for Yap to join the Federated States of Micronesia when the FSM became independent and that Yap should instead have joined Palau based on cultural similarities and geographic proximity. The FSM’s relative lack of political cohesion dates back to its establishment: in the late 1970s, when the islands were part of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory, Palau and the Marshall Islands were the first to become political entities, leaving the remaining Trust Territory. areas to form the Federated States of Micronesia.
The existence of secessionist movements in the Federated States of Micronesia going back decades – even as efforts to hold independence votes have slowed – probably increases the risk that economic destabilization could boost support for independence among the states. Many knowledgeable observers of FAS domestic politics have speculated that the Compact relationship is an essential precursor against regional balkanization and that the failure of Compact negotiations could, at the very least, strain the cohesion of the Marshall Islands and Palau and could be a catalyst for that. states that secede from the FSM. Local dissatisfaction with Chuuk’s impoverished economy has been a key driver of the Chuukese’s support for secession, suggesting that a firm repayment of the Compact could address some of Chuuk’s economic grievances and help preserve the territorial integrity of the FSM .
The potential secession of Chuuk from Micronesia, or the secession of any territory in the FAS, would pose significant security risks to the United States, the FAS and the wider Pacific. As an independent state, Chuuk would no longer be subject to the Compact of Free Association, causing the United States to lose its right of strategic denial over Chuuk’s land, airspace and territorial seas. The breakaway of Chuuk, or any part of the FAS, and the associated end to US strategic denial of the breakaway area, would also allow China to establish formal security relationships with the newly independent islands at a time when Beijing is seek a larger military footprint. in the region.
The Pacific is also very important in preserving Taiwan’s international space, which has emerged as an important US interest at a time when Washington is actively looking for ways to express solidarity with the Taiwanese government and people. Of the 14 countries that still have formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, four – the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu – are Pacific nations, and two of those are Free Associated States. Taiwan’s relationships with these countries, due in part to their geographical proximity, are arguably the most vibrant and have provided Taipei with valuable opportunities to raise its regional and international profile and enhance its soft power. The 2021 announcement of a special pandemic-related travel arrangement between the Republic of Palau and Taiwan, the launch of which included a visit by the US ambassador in Palau to Taipei, is a recent example of the unique value of Taiwan’s partnerships in the Pacific. Taipei’s strong ties in the Pacific have the added benefit of acting as a deterrent to Chinese influence efforts. For example, the four Pacific Island countries that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei are also members of the Pacific Islands Forum and have tried to limit Chinese engagement with the body from time to time; in 2018, Nauru, during its term as president of the Pacific Islands Forum, refused to allow Chinese observers to attend the forum on their official passports.
The authors are co-chairs of the Senior Study Group. Admiral (Ret.) Philip Davidson is the former commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command. Brigadier General (Ret.) David Stilwell is a former assistant secretary of state for the Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Robert Underwood is a former representative from Guam to the House of Representatives and former president of the University of Guam.
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