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US Vice President Kamala Harris’ recent comments to Pacific Island leaders that they have not previously “received the diplomatic attention and support you deserve”[1] have recognized a key gap in policy US overseas – a consistent, comprehensive presence in the South Pacific.

His comments, presented to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and which come to light just weeks after Secretary of State Blinken’s regional visit, are certainly welcome. It was almost four decades since the US Secretary of State visited Suva, the capital of Fiji, and over a decade since Secretary of State Clinton visited the Cook Islands and the largest nation in the South Pacific – Papua New Guinea (PNG).

Ostensibly to counter China’s resurgent economic and security support for South Pacific states, Harris’ comments and Blinken’s presence have served as a reminder of US intentions for “genuine engagement that speaks to real needs the islanders,” according to Blinken, and for the “US to include items on the agenda that the Pacific countries have identified as priorities for them.”[2]

Against the background of a renewed commitment to a rules-based international order[3], the United States is sending the right signals to counter and put pressure on Beijing. The announcement of a “national strategy on the Pacific Islands”, which is expected in the wake of Harris’ address, is also welcomed.[4] Missing, however, has been the combination of US regional presence and action.

Observations, much like regional diplomatic visits, are but one such toolkit of statecraft. If not framed by an action plan, momentum will disappear. This has clearly happened since Hilary Clinton declared the South Pacific to be “strategically and economically vital”[5] over ten years ago and since the Obama administration came into office declaring “The United States as a Pacific Power.”[6]

Since this time, China has upped its game in the South Pacific – establishing comprehensive strategic partnerships, providing more in-kind military assistance, joining a number of nations in its landmark Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and elevated itself to the region’s second largest aid donor behind. Australia.

The United States can be more ‘consistent’ in terms of reopening its Solomon Islands Embassy, ​​which was closed in 1993, and by expanding its consular presence in Kiribati and Tonga – commitments confirmed by Harris.[7] But it can also perform more intensively in regional South Pacific organizations such as the PIF and by enhancing American cultural, economic and security involvement across the governmental and non-governmental sectors. This is particularly important in the region, where American prestige and soft power persist.

The US can also be more ‘comprehensive’ in the South Pacific in terms of providing creative forms of US assistance across these sectors, working more closely with key partners Australia and New Zealand, setting a higher premium on delivering projects – as is the case with Chinese Aid – and creating stronger interdependence between the US mainland and the 14 countries of the South Pacific.

From nineteenth-century Yankee Whalers to World War II, the United States has ongoing relationships and interests in the South Pacific that date back at least two centuries. Even in 1825, as part of President John Adams’ State of the Nation, Adams spoke of the Pacific Islands in the same way that some US leaders do today – its potential for “trade and fisheries prosperous” but also his “rare examination. . on public shipping.”[8]

In more contemporary times, US policy makers, elected officials and military personnel generally understand the South Pacific by two elements. Firstly, by the Second World War and the enormous sacrifices of the USA in the Pacific theatre. The Battle of the Coral Sea, Guadalcanal, Midway – these places continue to fuel crucial battles from 1942 to 1945 that helped turn the tide against the Japanese forces and secure victory for the allies. When the United States remembers World War II it remembers the South Pacific in part.

Second, US policy makers usually see the Pacific Islands as its three US Pacific Territories – the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa – and the states of the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) of the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau. However, the wider Pacific islands include 15 other Pacific Island states.[9] Although not completely absent from Washington’s focus, the other nations in the Pacific do not share the same politico-legal ties with the US mainland. Thus, while the US undertakes significant forms of assistance to its Territories and COFA states[10], the wider South Pacific tends to escape US political, diplomatic, civil, military and fiscal attention .

The immediate result is US regional awareness of the South Pacific but – frankly – not an awareness of high strategic importance. This has been particularly evident since the Second World War. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower found the South Pacific to be part of an “American lake.”[11] However, throughout the Cold War, the region tended to disappear from strategic radars, with the efforts of the Soviet Union focused elsewhere.[1] 12] At the end of the Cold War, in 1993, as the United States closed its Solomon Islands Embassy, ​​it gave recognition to its ambassadors to cover multiple nations throughout the region.

Since this time the United States has also relied on allies Australia and New Zealand for regional engagement. President George W. Bush’s comments in 2003 that Australia was a regional “deputy sheriff”[13] – while being laughed at – at least captured the consistent and decades-long sentiment of US strategic policy makers – if Australia was active regionally, then the US need not be. therefore.

Rhetorically, US leaders, from President Obama to President Biden, talk about the importance of the region and the need for a strategic focus. In contrast, however, many regional commentators have spoken of US “strategic neglect”.[14] As well captured by a Congressional subcommittee report in 2016, the Pacific Island Region is “perhaps the most overlooked Asia-Pacific region.”[15] Although the United States has provided over $200 million a year to the Pacific Islands, across a range of sectors, is a comment that remains current and is clearly reflected in the Harris statement.[16]

Indeed, Harris’s concession stands out especially when contrasted with China’s more recent up-tempo efforts in the South Pacific. While Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent regional tour failed to secure a region-wide security commitment, it relied on over a decade of Chinese assertiveness.

Beijing’s expanded acceptance can be attributed to two separate but related elements – the immediate availability of funding and rapid delivery. Immediate funding clearly appeals to many Pacific leaders, especially when weighed against the long-term nature of good governance, transparency and accountability – pillars of US and Australian forms of aid, which can be seen as boring. “Perhaps our politicians think that it is easier to deal with China in terms of implementing things on the ground quickly,” noted one Solomon Islands analyst, “compared to other donors who have been in the Solomons for a long time yet . has been very slow.”[21]

Beijing, by being ‘easier to deal with’, also implies a level of oversight and accountability that can pave an easy path to corruption, bribery and other forms of inducement. It has been widely reported, for example, that Beijing has offered $USD31,000 in cash in 2021 – through a local development fund – to every Member of Parliament from the Solomon Islands to change their stance on Taiwan.[22] In the words of former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, liberal democracies such as Australia, despite spending over $AUD 2.6 billion for the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)[23], “cannot offer the kind of ‘help’ that China gives to politicians.”[24]

China’s aid is also not only a question of money but of speed. Perhaps the most emblematic example of where Beijing’s approach clearly outweighs US and Australian efforts, at least in the short term, is PNG’s Lombrum Naval Base in Manus Province. The US-Australia-PNG trilateral commitment to upgrade the base – signed at APEC 2018 by US Vice President Pence – was considered a major security deal.[25] Done right, the center has the ability to serve as ‘Guam-lite’. As Andrew Erickson of the US Naval War College points out, the need for American Pacific bases is increasing as the “militarization of China’s outposts” also grows.[26] However, four years later, little progress has been made. Meanwhile, a Beijing subsidiary assisted in the full upgrade of the province’s airport – just a twenty-minute drive away.[27]

While Beijing’s techniques appear influential, it is worth acknowledging that its efforts in the South Pacific have also had their drawbacks.

An important analysis by former Australian High Commissioner to PNG, Ian Kemish, noted that Beijing’s advances towards PNG over the past four years had actually been “surprisingly slow”, citing the PNG government’s refusal to extend mining leases and strong anti-Chinese sentiment. within PNG’s. social media circles.[28]

Another analysis by Richard Herr from the University of Tasmania has also highlighted that China’s influence in the region is primarily driven by its economic influence over its acceptance of soft power.[29] “China’s fundamental influence remains largely transactional,” Herr noted, while “the Chinese political system, economy and culture are not (yet) seen as compelling models to be emulated by the Pacific Islands. ”[30]

It is also unclear whether Beijing links its South Pacific activities to any framework of cohesion. Or that his activities may actually be driven by a sense of anxiety. Using recent events in the Solomon Islands as an example, Council on Foreign Relations analyst Zongyuan Zoe Liu notes that “The China-Solomon Islands security agreement is likely to be driven by the Chinese government’s sense of vulnerability in the region rather than by Chinese grand strategy. ” [31]

Although these observations can offer a sense of respite, they should not promote complacency. If properly assessed, and weighed against current US capabilities, Beijing’s obstacles can be used to create a more comprehensive US regional action plan.

US aid to the Pacific Islands amounts to over $200 million[32], which is an increase of $140 million in 2019.[33] The latest aid package announced by Harris includes another $US60 million a year, over the next decade, for “ocean resilience.”[34] The range of measures already in place is comprehensive, covering sectors economic, agricultural, fisheries and disaster recovery. . It will be important to continue these measures. However, the US will also need to consider consistently applying its core tools of statecraft – or ‘building blocks’ – to the region’s emerging challenges.

The first is legislative. The US Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), established under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021, increases military investment across a range of areas and has a clear regional focus for the Pacific. “The PDI is intended to reassure allies and partners across the region of the depth of US commitment,” wrote former US Ambassador to the Pacific C. Steven McGann.[35] “Most importantly, the congressional legislation that underpins resource change forces future US administrations to act.”[36]

Importantly, underpinning the PDI is the BLUE Act, a bipartisan commitment to “appropriate supplemental funding for diplomatic and civilian agencies that would augment the PDI,” according to McGann.[37] With a focus on capacity building, economic development, climate change and addressing other vulnerabilities, the Act has the potential to initiate a strong US ‘ground game’ in the region.

The civil-military element to this support, through the Hawaiian presence of the US Indo-Pacific Command, offers a particularly unique platform. The Pacific Partnerships mission, which has treated 270,000 plus Pacific Islanders across the region over the past decade, and delivered over 200 infrastructure development projects, offers a ready model to ‘give resources’. It could also help serve up Covid-19 vaccinations in the much harder to reach places in the South Pacific.

The second US building block is a strategic advantage where it ultimately counts most – among people. Indeed, although it seems productive, there is a wariness of Beijing’s intentions in the region – facilities built in Beijing not built to last, for example, or recognition among local people that actions are short-term in intention Beijing. “Papua New Guinea officials certainly like to have a number of countries bidding for their attention,” said regional cyber expert Robert Potter, “but Melanesian culture does not take kindly to the violation of respectful protocol by apoplectic wolf warriors.” [38]

It’s an instructive regional example, and one that highlights the relative amount of goodwill for US personnel in the Pacific and the values ​​America can still stand for. Indeed, it is a strategic ‘soft power’ reservoir that has never been fully tapped, at least not on any significant scale or since the Second World War.

The third building block relates to a specific US political presence that is underutilized in the region, and the need to play a more active role in the region’s political and architectural forums. Harris noted a ‘diplomatic’ lack of US engagement. However, it must also be recognized that there is a ‘political’ deficit at work. China’s regional activities, for example, are notable not only for their monetary value but their political emphasis. The United States can think in the same terms. The PIF, which offers one mechanism, is under pressure due to fragmentation, driven by a political rift from the Micronesian states. It also offers an opening for strong US political involvement, with PIF Harris tackling a confident first step that could help put political elements in place. This is provided that this type of engagement is kept up.

All three building blocks in the United States point not only to political will but a need to think creatively about the application of American prestige and power – for the United States to punch under its weight – in a theater where it has never been fully implemented. Here the United States may surprise, while also grappling with small victories in its race against Beijing.

The great strategist of the Cold War, George Kennan, wrote in Realities of American Foreign Policy, “the task of international politics is not to prevent change but to find a way to allow change to proceed without repeatedly shaking the peace of the world.” [39]

It can be a useful way to frame and guide contemporary US activities in the South Pacific, especially while the US is in direct competition with China. It is clear that the United States does not want to ‘shake the peace’ of the South Pacific. Indeed, the rhetoric used recently by Blinken sets a positive tone to build on – seeking genuine engagement, speaking to the real needs of Islanders and encouraging agenda items that are critical to Pacific people.

It is clear that the United States has the legal, political and soft power tools to expand its influence in the South Pacific. The reopening of the US Embassy in the Solomon Islands, the creation of stronger relations with Tonga and Kiribati, and even the publication of the Pacific Islands strategy, are important steps to focus these tools and realize further goals. However, it will be the job of current and future administrations – beyond Harris and Biden – to join these capabilities into a consistent and comprehensive presence in the South Pacific.

[4] Kelly and Creighton, “The US has not given the support it deserved to the Pacific, Kamala Harris told the forum.”

[7] Kelly and Creighton, “The US has not given the support it deserved to the Pacific, Kamala Harris told the forum.”

[9] Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

[12] According to one comment from 1988, the Soviet Union showed “new political as well as economic interest in penetrating the South Pacific region” however it is not clear to what depth this occurred. See Langdon, Frank C. “Challenges for the United States in the South Pacific.” Pacific Affairs (1988): 7.

[26] Edel, “Small spots, large strategic areas: US interests in the South Pacific.”

[31] Liu, “What the China-Solomon Islands Agreement Means for the United States and the South Pacific.”

[32] “U.S. Engagement with the Pacific Islands: The Pacific 2020 Promise. “

[34] Kelly and Creighton, “The US has not given the support it deserved to the Pacific, Kamala Harris told the forum.”

[39] George Kennan, The Reality of American Foreign Policy, Norton & Company, New York, 1966, 35-36.

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