The more the US military leans on wireless networks, the more crowded they become. Unfortunately, the modern battlefield is experiencing critical system outages – and troops are increasingly at risk – because we’re intentionally disrupting our own networks.
This digital fratricide is not a problem that can be solved by radio discipline or commanders’ access to live feed video.
Instead, the solution had to be baked in from the ground up by Defense Department acquisition staff who demanded that products be designed and built to intelligently absorb, not waste, valuable bandwidth.
On America’s front lines, the internal battle for bandwidth has reached critical mass. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, every branch of the military is pouring huge sums of money into high-tech drones and high-definition cameras. Unfortunately, every General wants to see the enemy in HD 4K video, the mesh network is so congested that the frontline fighters cannot communicate with each other on conventional radio. Fortunately, American tech companies have deployed commercial solutions to solve the problem.
Self-driving cars, for example, generate more data than even the most reliable 5G networks can handle. In the early days of autonomous vehicles, software engineers had to take a large hard drive and shut down the car on a “sneakernet” just to be able to analyze a day’s routes. At the time, engineers promoted a concept known as “data decimation” where only segments of data and corresponding alerts should be extracted from the car, thus becoming more efficient with scarce network resources.
Beyond autonomous vehicles, the video game industry has partnered with hardware manufacturers to bring the power of the Cloud to disconnected devices, which removes another tax on the network. The industry calls this method ‘edge computing’ and Pentagon leadership often talks about the need for greater intelligence at the tactical edge. But the worlds of defense and technology are talking about the same solution: the goal is to avoid bandwidth overload by building artificial intelligence and machine learning software into handheld devices, robots, and sensors.
There are operating system techniques that are just as influential, such as “compute orchestration,” which effectively turns a dozen cell phones into one supercomputer when connected on a secure platform. These practices should be enforced as technological standards for the battlefield of the internet of things; however, such techniques are currently being considered in the Ministry of Defense.
There are three main obstacles preventing this solution from being adopted in time to maintain America’s competitive advantage in the AI arms race.
The first is the notion that ancient techniques can solve new battlefield problems. Senior executives and early adopters are apparently surprised that the network is suffering from major bandwidth constraints, and mitigation measures are now focused on the promise of 5G. However, it is prohibitively difficult and expensive to deploy a new cell tower in an austere environment. Furthermore, the tower will not help much if active communication is contested by a very effective, $100 radio jammer.
The second barrier is awareness. The Pentagon must have an understanding of the problems that have been solved by America’s innovative technology experts so that common solutions can be provided to the Defense Department’s requirements process. The National Security Commission’s AI Final Report makes it clear that the Department is not moving fast enough, and the widening gap between what is revolutionary in US Defense and what is common in the technology industry has reached a crisis point.
More specifically, it has taken 10 years for the Ministry of Defense to get savvy in the “War Cloud”. But even though those programs are just beginning to be set in their terms, the industrial world has begun to move computing back to the tactical edge, and we can’t wait another 10 years for the Pentagon’s buyers.
The final obstacle is the incongruity of the Defense Department’s software and procurement system. The US government has spent decades optimizing procurement around physical things and billable hours. As a result, the best GovTech software is now bundled in hardware or “black boxes” (like new drones).
Unfortunately, a natural side effect is an explosion of vendor lock-ins and data silos, which prevent the best software from getting into the hands of the warfighters when they need it. Instead, the executive office of the program charged by Congress to acquire this important technology should strive to deconstruct hardware and software so that interoperability can free the tacticians from data silos.
Anyone close to the Defense Department’s data challenges understands the features of digital fratricide. A solution is within reach if we can build consensus and drive action to deploy industry-leading techniques like data decimation, edge computing, and compute orchestration to protect the networks our warfighters rely on. And it is the responsibility of Pentagon acquisition officials to empower those who serve on our nation’s front lines.
Ian Kalin is the Chief Executive Officer of TurbineOne. He spent the last two decades focused on modernizing government technology and was the first Chief Data Officer for the US Department of Commerce.
